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Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring 
for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Cluster 
Munition Coalition (CMC). For more information visit www.the-monitor.org or 
email monitor2@icblcmc.org.
Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor makes every effort to limit the environmental 
footprint of reports by publishing all our research reports online. This report is available 
online www.the-monitor.org.  
Detailed country profiles are available online at www.the-monitor.org/cp 
INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) is committed to the 1997 Mine Ban 
Treaty (or “Ottawa Convention”) as the best framework for ending the use, production, 
stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines and for destroying stockpiles, clearing 
mined areas, and assisting affected communities. 
The ICBL calls for universal adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty and its full implementation 
by all, including:
  No more use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel landmines by 
any actor under any circumstances;
  Rapid destruction of all remaining stockpiles of antipersonnel landmines;
  More efficient clearance and destruction of all emplaced landmines and 
explosive remnants of war (ERW);
  Fulfillment of the rights and needs of all landmine and ERW victims.







LANDMINES AND EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR
Peace agreements may be signed and hostilities may cease, but landmines and explosive 
remnants of war (ERW) are an enduring legacy of conflict.
Antipersonnel mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, 
or contact of a person. This includes improvised landmines, also known as improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs), with those same victim-activated characteristics. Antivehicle mines 
are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle as 
opposed to a person. Landmines are victim-activated and indiscriminate; whoever triggers 
the mine, whether a child or a soldier, becomes its victim. 
Mines emplaced during a conflict against enemy forces can still kill or injure civilians 
decades later.
ERW refer to ordnance left behind after a conflict. Explosive weapons that for some reason 
fail to detonate as intended become unexploded ordnance (UXO). These unstable explosive 
items are left behind during and after conflicts and pose dangers similar to landmines. 
Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) are explosive weapons that have not been used 
during armed conflict but have been left behind and are no longer effectively controlled. 
ERW can include artillery shells, grenades, mortars, rockets, air-dropped bombs, and cluster 
munition remnants. Under the international legal definition, ERW consist of UXO and AXO, 
but not mines.
Both landmines and ERW pose a serious and ongoing threat to civilians. These weapons 
can be found on roads, footpaths, farmers’ fields, forests, deserts, along borders, in and 
surrounding houses and schools, and in other places where people are carrying out their 
daily activities. They deny access to food, water, and other basic needs, and inhibit freedom 
of movement. They endanger the initial flight and prevent the repatriation of refugees and 
internally displaced persons, and hamper the delivery of humanitarian aid. 
These weapons instill fear in communities, whose citizens often know they are walking 
in mined areas, but have no possibility to farm other land, or take another route to school. 
When land cannot be cultivated, when medical systems are drained by the cost of attending 
to landmine/ERW casualties, and when countries must spend money clearing mines rather 
than paying for education, it is clear that these weapons not only cause appalling human 
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suffering, but that they are also a lethal barrier to the implementation of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) and post-conflict reconstruction.
There are solutions to the global landmine and ERW problem. The 1997 Mine Ban 
Treaty (officially the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction) provides the best framework for 
governments to alleviate the suffering of civilians living in areas affected by antipersonnel 
mines. Governments who join this treaty must stop the use, stockpiling, production, and 
transfer of antipersonnel mines immediately. They must destroy all stockpiled antipersonnel 
mines within four years and clear all antipersonnel mines in all mined areas under their 
jurisdiction or control within 10 years. In addition, States Parties in a position to do so 
must provide assistance for the care and treatment of landmine survivors, their families 
and communities, and support for mine/ERW risk education programs to help prevent mine 
incidents. 
This legal instrument provides a framework for taking action, but it is up to governments 
to implement treaty obligations and it is the task of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
to work together with governments to ensure they uphold their treaty obligations. 
The ultimate goal of the ICBL and its sister campaign, the Cluster Munition Coalition 
(CMC), is a world free of landmines, cluster munitions, and ERW, where civilians can walk 
freely without the fear of stepping on a mine, children can play without mistaking an 
unexploded submunition for a toy, communities don’t bear the social and economic impact 
of mines or ERW presence for decades to come, and the rights of survivors and persons with 
similar needs are protected.
INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES 
The ICBL is a global network in some 100 countries, working locally, nationally, and 
internationally to eradicate antipersonnel mines. It received the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize 
jointly with its founding coordinator Jody Williams in recognition of its efforts to bring about 
the Mine Ban Treaty.
The campaign is a loose, flexible network whose members share the common goal of 
working to eliminate antipersonnel landmines. 
The ICBL was launched in October 1992 by a group of six NGOs: Handicap International 
(now Humanity & Inclusion), Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines Advisory 
Group, Physicians for Human Rights, and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. These 
founding organizations witnessed the horrendous effects of mines on the communities they 
were working within Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, and saw how mines 
hampered and even prevented their development efforts in these countries. They realized 
that a comprehensive solution was needed to address the crisis caused by landmines, and 
that the solution was a complete ban on antipersonnel mines.
The founding organizations brought to the international campaign practical experience 
of the impact of landmines. They also brought the perspective of the different sectors 
they represented: human rights, children’s rights, development issues, refugee issues, and 
medical and humanitarian relief. ICBL member campaigns contacted other NGOs, who 
spread the word through their networks; news of this new coalition and the need for a treaty 
banning antipersonnel landmines soon stretched throughout the world. The ICBL organized 
conferences and campaigning events in many countries to raise awareness of the landmine 
problem and the need for a ban, and to provide training to new campaigners to enable them 
to be effective advocates in their respective countries.
Campaign members worked at the local, national, regional, and global level to encourage 
their governments to support the mine ban. The ICBL’s membership grew rapidly, and today 
there are campaigns in some 100 countries. 
The Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature on 3 December 1997 in Ottawa, Canada. It was 
due to the sustained and coordinated action by the ICBL that the Mine Ban Treaty became a reality.






Part of the ICBL’s success is its ability to evolve with changing circumstances. The early days 
of the campaign were focused on developing a comprehensive treaty banning antipersonnel 
mines. Once this goal was achieved, attention shifted to ensuring that all countries join 
the treaty and that all States Parties fully implement their treaty obligations. Today, the 
campaign also encourages States Parties to complete their major treaty obligations by 2025, 
a target agreed in the 2014 Maputo Declaration and reiterated in the 2019 Oslo Action Plan.
The ICBL works to promote the global norm against mine use and advocates for countries 
who have not joined the treaty to take steps to do so. The campaign also urges non-state 
armed groups to abide by the spirit of the treaty. 
Much of the ICBL’s work is focused on promoting implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. 
This includes working in partnership with governments and international organizations on 
all aspects of treaty implementation, from stockpile destruction to mine clearance to victim 
assistance.
The campaign has been successful in part because it has a clear campaign message 
and goal; a non-bureaucratic campaign structure and flexible strategy; and an effective 
partnership with other NGOs, international organizations, and governments.
The ICBL’s efforts to ban landmines have led to a whole new approach called 
humanitarian disarmament, which is spearheaded by civil society campaigns and has led to 
four international treaties and, to date, two Nobel Peace Prizes.
In January 2011, the ICBL merged with the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) to become 
the ICBL-CMC, but the CMC and the ICBL remain two distinct and strong campaigns.
LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR
Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for the ICBL and 
the CMC and is formally a program of the ICBL-CMC. It is the de facto monitoring regime for the 
Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It monitors and reports on States 
Parties’ implementation of, and compliance with, the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions, and more generally, it assesses the international community’s response to 
the humanitarian problems caused by landmines, cluster munitions, and other ERW. 
In June 1998, the ICBL created Landmine Monitor as an ICBL initiative, for the first 
time bringing NGOs together in a coordinated, systematic, and sustained way to monitor 
humanitarian law or disarmament treaties and to regularly document progress and challenges. 
In 2008, Landmine Monitor also functionally became the research and monitoring arm of the 
CMC. In 2010, the initiative changed its name from Landmine Monitor to Landmine and Cluster 
Munition Monitor (known as “the Monitor”) to reflect its increased reporting on the cluster 
munition issue. The Monitor successfully puts into practice the concept of civil society-based 
verification that is now employed in many similar contexts.
Responsibility for the coordination of the Monitor lies with the Monitoring and Research 
Committee, a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board. The ICBL-CMC produces 
and publishes Landmine Monitor and Cluster Munition Monitor as separate publications.
The Monitor is not a technical verification system or a formal inspection regime. It is an 
attempt by civil society to hold governments accountable to the obligations they have taken 
on with respect to antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. This is done through extensive 
collection, analysis, and distribution of publicly available information on all aspects of mine 
action. Although in some cases it does entail investigative missions, the Monitor does not send 
researchers into harm’s way and does not include hot war-zone reporting.
Monitor reporting complements transparency reporting required of states under international 
treaties. It reflects the shared view that transparency, trust, and mutual collaboration are crucial 
elements for the successful eradication of antipersonnel mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. 
The Monitor was also established in recognition of the need for independent reporting and 
evaluation.
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The Monitor aims to promote and advance discussion on mine-, cluster munition-, and ERW-
related issues, and to seek clarifications to help reach the goal of a world free of mines, cluster 
munitions, and ERW. The Monitor works in good faith to provide factual information about 
issues it is monitoring, in order to benefit the international community as a whole.
The Monitor system features a global reporting network, country profiles, and an annual 
report. A network of more than two-dozen researchers and an Editorial Team gathered 
information to prepare this report. The researchers come from the ICBL-CMC campaigning 
coalitions and from other elements of civil society, including journalists, academics, and 
research institutions.
Unless otherwise specified, all translations were done by the Monitor.
As was the case in previous years, the Monitor acknowledges that this ambitious report is 
limited by the time, resources, and information sources available. The Monitor is a system that 
is continuously updated, corrected, and improved. Comments, clarifications, and corrections 
from governments and others are sought, in the spirit of dialogue, and in the common search 
for accurate and reliable information on an important subject.
ABOUT THIS REPORT
This is the 22nd annual Landmine Monitor report. It is the sister publication to the Cluster 
Munition Monitor report, first published in November 2010. 
Landmine Monitor 2020 provides a global overview of the landmine situation. Chapters on 
developments in specific countries and other areas are available in online Country Profiles 
at www.the-monitor.org/cp. 
Landmine Monitor covers mine ban policy, use, production, trade, and stockpiling; includes 
information on developments and challenges in assessing and addressing the impact of 
mine contamination and casualties through clearance, risk education, and victim assistance; 
and documents international and national support for mine action. This report focuses on 
calendar year 2019, with information included up to October 2020 where possible.
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Díaz García, Alžbeta Djurbová, Sarah Edgcumbe, Marianne Schulze, and Clémentine 
Tavernier; and
  Support for mine action: Marion Loddo.
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Report formatting and cover design was undertaken by Lixar I.T. Inc. Pole Communication 
printed the report in Switzerland. This report was also published digitally at 
www.the-monitor.org.
The front cover photograph was provided by Sean Sutton/MAG and back cover photographs 
provided by Dieter Telemans/HI and CCCM. Additional photographs found within Landmine 
Monitor 2020 were provided by multiple photographers, cited with each photograph.
We extend our gratitude to Monitor contributors*. 
  Government of Australia
  Government of Austria
  Government of Canada
  Government of Germany
  Government of Luxembourg
  Government of Norway
  Government of Switzerland
  Government of the United States of America**
  Holy See
The Monitor is also grateful for the support received from private donors.
The Monitor’s supporters are in no way responsible for, and do not necessarily endorse, 
the material contained in this report. We also thank the donors who have contributed to the 
organizational members of the Monitoring and Research Committee and other participating 
organizations.
* List accurate as of October 2020. 
** Specifically for research on mine action, support for mine action, casualties, and victim assistance.
vi 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AXO abandoned explosive ordnance
BAC battle area clearance
CCW 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons
CHA confirmed hazardous area
CMC Cluster Munition Coalition
CRPD Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
DCA DanChurchAid
DDG Danish Demining Group
DPO disabled persons’ organization
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
EORE explosive ordnance risk education
ERW explosive remnants of war
GICHD Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
HI Humanity & Inclusion (formerly Handicap International)
HRW Human Rights Watch
ICBL International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IED improvised explosive device
IMAS International Mine Action Standards
IMSMA Information Management System for Mine Action
ISU Implementation Support Unit
MAG Mines Advisory Group
NGO non-governmental organization
NSAG non-state armed group
SHA suspected hazardous area
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF  United Nations Children’s Fund
























Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) – Explosive ordnance that has not been used 
during an armed conflict, that has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed 
conflict, and which is no longer under its control. Abandoned explosive ordnance is 
included under the broader category of explosive remnants of war.
Accession – Accession is the way for a state to become a party to an international treaty 
through a single instrument that constitutes both signature and ratification. 
Adherence – The act of becoming a party to a treaty. This can be through signature and 
ratification, or through accession.
“All reasonable effort” – Describes what is considered a minimum acceptable level 
of effort to identify and document contaminated areas or to remove the presence or 
suspicion of mines/ERW. “All reasonable effort” has been applied when the commitment 
of additional resources is considered to be unreasonable in relation to the results 
expected.
Antihandling device – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antihandling device “means 
a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or 
placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or 
otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.”
Antipersonnel mine – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antipersonnel mine “means 
a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and 
that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.”
Antivehicle mine – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antivehicle mine is a mine 
designed “to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed 
to a person.”
Area cancellation – Area cancellation describes the process by which a suspected 
hazardous area is released based solely on the gathering of information that indicates 
that the area is not, in fact, contaminated. It does not involve the application of any mine 
clearance tools.
Area reduction – Area reduction describes the process by which one or more mine 
clearance tools (e.g. mine detection dogs, manual deminers, or mechanical demining 
equipment) are used to gather information that locates the perimeter of a suspected 
hazardous area. Those areas falling outside this perimeter, or the entire area if deemed 
not to be mined, can be released.
Battle area clearance (BAC) – The systematic and controlled clearance of dangerous 
areas where the explosive hazards are known not to include landmines.
Casualty – The person injured or killed in a landmine, ERW, or IED incident, either through 
direct contact with the device or by being in its proximity.
Clearance – Tasks or actions to ensure the removal and/or the destruction of all mine 
and ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth.
Cleared land – A defined area cleared through the removal and/or destruction of all 
specified mine and ERW hazards to a specified depth.
Cluster munition – According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions a cluster munition is 
a “conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions 
each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive submunitions.” 
Cluster munitions consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from the ground 
or air, the containers open and disperse submunitions (or bomblets) over a wide area. 
Submunitions are typically designed to pierce armor, kill personnel, or both.
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Confirmed hazardous area – An area where the presence of mine/ERW contamination 
has been confirmed on the basis of direct evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.
Demining – The set of activities that lead to the removal of mine and ERW hazards, 
including survey, mapping, clearance, marking, and the handover of cleared land. 
Explosive remnants of war (ERW) – Under Protocol V to the Convention on Conventional 
Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned 
explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly excluded from the definition.
Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) – The detection, identification, evaluation, rendering 
safe, recovery, and disposal of explosive ordnance.
Explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) – Activities which seek to reduce the risk of 
death and injury from explosive ordnance by raising awareness of women, girls, boys, 
and men in accordance with their different vulnerabilities, roles, and needs and by 
promoting behavioral change. This includes public information dissemination, education 
and training, and community liaison.
Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) – All activities aimed at significantly reducing or 
completely eliminating the threat and impact of landmines and ERW upon civilians 
and their livelihoods. This includes: survey and assessment, mapping and marking, and 
clearance of contaminated areas; capacity-building and coordination; risk education; 
victim assistance; stockpile destruction; and ban advocacy.
Improvised explosive device (IED) – A device placed or produced in an improvised 
manner incorporating explosives or noxious chemicals. An improvised explosive device 
(IED) may be victim-activated or command-detonated. IEDs that can be activated by the 
presence, proximity or contact of a person (victim-activated) are banned under the Mine 
Ban Treaty, but command-detonated IEDs are not. 
Improvised mine, also improvised landmine and improvised antipersonnel landmine – 
An IED acting as a mine, landmine or antipersonnel landmine.
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) – Standards issued by the UN to improve 
safety and efficiency in mine action by providing guidance, establishing principles and, 
in some cases, defining international requirements and specifications.
Land release – The process of applying all reasonable effort to identify, define, and 
remove all presence and suspicion of mines/ERW with the minimum possible risk 
involving the identification of hazardous areas, the cancellation of land through non-
technical survey, the reduction of land through technical survey, and the clearance of 
land with actual mine/ERW contamination.
Mine action center – A body charged with coordinating day-to-day mine action operations, 
normally under the supervision of a national mine action authority. Some mine action 
centers also implement mine action activities.
Non-state armed groups (NSAG) – For Landmine Monitor purposes, non-state armed 
groups include organizations carrying out armed rebellion or insurrection, as well as a 
broader range of non-state entities, such as criminal gangs and state-supported proxy 
forces.
Non-technical survey (NTS) – The collection and analysis of data, without the use 
of technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding 
environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW 
contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization 
and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Non-technical survey 
activities typically include, but are not limited to, desk studies seeking information from 
central institutions and other relevant sources, as well as field studies of the suspected area. 
Person with disabilities – Those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual, or 
sensory impairments, which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and 






















Reduced land – A defined area concluded not to contain evidence of mine/ERW 
contamination following the technical survey of a suspected or confirmed hazardous 
area.
Residual risk – In the context of humanitarian demining, the term refers to the risk 
remaining following the application of all reasonable efforts to remove and/or destroy 
all mine or ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth.
Submunition – Any munition that, to perform its task, separates from a parent munition 
(cluster munition). All air-dropped submunitions are commonly referred to as “bomblets,” 
although the term bomblet has a specific meaning in the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions. When ground-launched, they are sometimes called “grenades.”
Survivors – People who have been directly injured by an explosion of a landmine, 
submunition, or other ERW and have survived the incident.
Suspected hazardous area (SHA) – An area where there is reasonable suspicion of mine/
ERW contamination on the basis of indirect evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.
Technical survey (TS) – The collection and analysis of data, using appropriate technical 
interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of 
mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW contamination is 
present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-
making processes through the provision of evidence. Technical survey activities may 
include visual search, instrument-aided surface search, and shallow- or full sub-surface 
search.
Unexploded cluster submunitions – Submunitions that have failed to explode as 
intended, becoming unexploded ordnance.
Unexploded ordnance (UXO) – Unexploded ordnance (UXO) refers to munitions that 
were designed to explode but for some reason failed to detonate. 
Victims – Individuals killed or injured by a mine/ERW explosion (casualty), their family, 
and community.
Victim assistance – Victim assistance includes, but is not limited to, data collection and 
needs assessment, emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, 
psychological support and social inclusion, economic inclusion, and laws and public 
policies to ensure the full and equal integration and participation of survivors, their 
families, and communities in society.
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1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production  
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction
Table Key
States Parties: Ratified or acceded as of  
31 October 2020
Signatory: Signed, but not yet ratified as of  
31 October 2020
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Landmine Monitor 2020, continues to document progress toward a mine-free world, but 
also highlights challenges such as non-state armed groups (NSAGs) using antipersonnel 
mines, particularly of an improvised nature. The use of improvised mines has again resulted 
in a high number of casualties in 2019, with the majority of victims being civilians. The 
outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020 also generated a new set of unanticipated 
challenges to which the mine action community had to adapt in order to stay focused on the 
treaty’s ultimate objective of putting an end to the suffering caused by landmines. 
Currently, 164 countries are bound by the Mine Ban Treaty.  Despite no states joining 
the treaty in the reporting period, most of the 33 countries that remain outside continue 
to act in compliance with the international normative framework. However, the United 
States (US) new landmine policy announced in January 2020 reversed a previous directive 
banning production and limiting the use of antipersonnel mines. The decision was met with 
condemnation in the US and internationally as an unjustified step backwards, at odds with 
both the global recognition of the ban norm and the impact of this indiscriminate weapon 
on civilians.
As countries continue to work to clear mine-contaminated land and provide risk education 
to affected communities, the Monitor identifies much that remains to be done, including to 
support the needs of landmine survivors and their communities as well as to ensure the 
sustainability of resources as global funding to mine action fell for the second consecutive year.
USE
From mid-2019 through October 2020, Landmine Monitor has confirmed new use of 
antipersonnel mines by the government forces of one country—Myanmar, which is not party 
to the Mine Ban Treaty. 
NSAGs used antipersonnel mines in at least six countries during the reporting period: 
Afghanistan, Colombia, India, Libya, Myanmar, and Pakistan. 
  There were as yet unconfirmed allegations of new antipersonnel mine use by 
NSAGs in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Egypt, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, the Philippines, 
Somalia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yemen.
2 
CASUALTIES
2019 was the fifth year in a row with high numbers of recorded casualties due to the 
indiscriminate use of antipersonnel mines and antivehicle mines, including improvised 
types, as well as cluster munition remnants and other explosive remnants of war (ERW). 
The continuing high total recorded since 2014 is mostly the result of a large number of 
casualties recorded in countries facing intensive armed conflict and involving the large-
scale use of improvised mines. 
  In 2019, at least 5,554 casualties of mines/ERW were recorded: 2,170 people were 
killed, 3,357 people were injured, and for 27 casualties the survival status was 
unknown. 
  Although the 2019 total indicated a decline from the 6,897 casualties of mines/ERW 
recorded in 2018, it was still 60% higher than the lowest determined annual number 
of 3,457 casualties in 2013. 
  The States Parties with over 100 casualties were: Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Mali, 
Nigeria, Ukraine, and Yemen.
Casualties in 2019 were identified in 55 states and other areas, of which 36 are States 
Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.
  The vast majority of recorded landmine/ERW casualties were civilians (80%) where 
their status was known.
  In 2019, children accounted for 43% of all civilian casualties where the age was 
known.
  Men and boys represented 85% of all casualties for which the sex was known. 
CONTAMINATION
Sixty states and other areas are contaminated by antipersonnel mines as of October 2020. 
This includes 33 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, 22 states not party, and five other 
areas. 
  Three States Parties need to clarify the extent of residual contamination (Algeria, 
Kuwait, and Nicaragua) and five States Parties need to provide information regarding 
suspected or known contamination by improvised mines (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Mali, Nigeria, and Tunisia).
  Mauritania which declared itself free of mines in 2018, reported finding new 
contamination dating from the 1970s Western Sahara conflict in 2019 and needed 
to confirm whether this contamination was actually on its territory. 
Massive antipersonnel mine contamination (defined by the Monitor as more than 
100km2) is believed to exist in 10 States Parties: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), 
Cambodia, Croatia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and Yemen. 
SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION
In 2019, donors and affected states contributed approximately US$650.7 million in combined 
international and national support for mine action, a decrease of $48.8 million compared to 
2018, and the second year in a row of declining support.
In 2019, 35 donors contributed a total of $561.3 million in international support for 
mine action in 41 affected states and other areas. This represents a decline of $81.3 million 
compared to 2018 and the first time since 2016 that international support fell below $600 
million.
  The 15 largest donors accounted for $78.2 million of the global decline. Despite this 











  In 2019, 27 states and areas experienced a change of more than 20% in funding 
compared to 2018, including 15 recipients receiving less support. In addition, seven 
countries did not receive new support.
  International funding was distributed among the following sectors: clearance and 
risk education (56% of all funding), victim assistance (8%), capacity-building (1%), 
and advocacy (1%). The remaining 34% was either not disaggregated by the donors 
or unearmarked.
The Monitor identified 10 affected states that reported providing $89.4 million in 
national support for their own mine action programs: Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, 
Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Lao PDR, Lebanon, and Zimbabwe. This represents an increase of 
$32.5 million from 2018.
RISK EDUCATION
Risk education is a core pillar of mine action, but one that has received little attention or 
acknowledgement by the broader mine action community in the last decade and, as a result, 
has frequently been under-funded. 2019 marked a significant and positive turning point for 
risk education, also known as Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE).
  An international advisory group was established in 2019 to steer efforts related to 
EORE.
  The Oslo Action Plan adopted at the Fourth Review Conference included a distinct 
set of actions specifically dedicated to mine risk education and risk reduction.
  Twenty-eight States Parties were known to have conducted risk education to 
populations affected by antipersonnel mine contamination in 2019.
In 2020, risk education has been greatly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic as face-
to-face sessions are often the most appropriate way to reach affected communities and 
to promote behavioral change. However, operators have shown innovation to address the 
challenges in terms of using digital methods and combining risk education and COVID-19 
messaging. 
CLEARANCE
At least 156km² of land was reported cleared of landmines in 2019 and more than 123,000 
antipersonnel mines were cleared and destroyed. This represents an increase from the 
estimated 146km² cleared and nearly 98,000 landmines destroyed in 2018.
  The largest total clearance of mined areas in 2019 was achieved in Afghanistan, 
Cambodia, Croatia, and Iraq, which together accounted for 86% or all recorded 
clearance.
  In 2019, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen have all continued landmine clearance despite 
ongoing conflict or insecurity. 
  In 2020, mine clearance was temporarily suspended due to COVID-19 related 
restrictions in Armenia, BiH, Chad, Colombia, Lebanon, Peru, Senegal, Vietnam, and 
Zimbabwe, in other areas Kosovo and Western Sahara, as well as in the Falkland 
Islands/Islas Malvinas. 
Thirty States Parties, one state not party, and one other area have completed clearance of 
all mined areas on their territory since the treaty’s entry into force. 
  Chile became the most recent State Party to declare completion of clearance of all 
mined areas in early 2020. No State Party declared completion of clearance in 2019.
  As of 15 October 2020, 25 States Parties have deadlines to meet their Article 5 
obligations, before and no later than 2025. Four States Parties have deadlines 
after 2025: Croatia (2026), Iraq (2028), Palestine (2028), and Sri Lanka (2028), and 
three have requested an extension of their current deadline after 2025: BiH (2027), 
Senegal (2026), and South Sudan (2026).
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  Eight countries requested extensions to their Article 5 obligations in 2020: BiH, 
Colombia, DRC, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, South Sudan, and Ukraine. These requests 
will be considered at the Eighteen Meeting of States Parties in November 2020.
  Eritrea and Nigeria were expected to submit an Article 5 extension request in 2020, 
but have yet to do so as of 15 October 2020.
VICTIM ASSISTANCE
The following findings relate to 34 States Parties with significant numbers of mine victims. 
In 2019–2020, many states indicated improvements in the accessibility, quality, or quantity 
of services for victims. However, important challenges remained in all countries. 
  Only 14 of the 34 States Parties had victim assistance or relevant disability plans in 
place to address recognized needs and gaps in assistance. Another nine still need to 
complete the revision or adoption of a draft  national disability strategy relevant to 
the implementation of victim assistance.
  Approximately two-thirds of the States Parties had active coordination mechanisms, 
and survivors’ representatives participated in the coordinating processes in 18 
of those States Parties. However, there was little evidence that their input was 
considered or acted upon.
  Significant gaps remain in access to economic opportunities for survivors and other 
persons with disabilities in many of the States Parties where opportunities for 
livelihoods were most needed.
In 2020, victim assistance activities and services were strongly impacted by COVID-19 
related restrictions and prevented survivors and other persons with disability to access 
services and to exercise their rights on an equal basis in a number of mine-affected 
countries. The impact of the pandemic was compounded by years of under-resourcing for 
victim assistance activities in many countries. Mine victims, especially in remote areas, often 
already struggled to reach or lacked access to adequate services.
STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION AND MINES RETAINED
States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have destroyed more than 55 million stockpiled 
antipersonnel mines, including more than 269,000 destroyed in 2019.
  Greece and Ukraine remain in violation of the treaty as both have missed successive 
deadlines to complete destruction of their stockpiles.
  Three States Parties possess approximately four million antipersonnel mines 
remaining to be destroyed: Ukraine (3.3 million), Greece (343,413), and Sri Lanka 
(62,510).
A total of 64 States Parties have reported that they retain a combined total of more than 
145,000 antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes, of which 32 retain more 
than 1,000 mines each.
  Botswana, Brazil, and Uruguay reported the destruction of their remaining retained 
mines in 2019. 
  Seven States Parties have never reported consuming any mines retained for the 
permitted purposes since the treaty entered into force for them: Burundi, Cape Verde, 
Djibouti, Nigeria, Oman, Senegal, and Togo.
PRODUCTION 
The Monitor lists 12 states as landmine producers because they have yet to disavow 
future production: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, 
Singapore, South Korea, the US, and Vietnam. 
  This is an increase of one country from the previous report, following the change 
in US landmine policy which rolls back the 2014 policy pledge to not produce 
antipersonnel mines.
NSAGs have produced improvised landmines in Afghanistan, Colombia, Myanmar, 
Pakistan, and Yemen in the reporting period. 
In February 2020 Humanity & Inclusion (HI) organized an event in Geneva under the 
Broken Chair, symbol of the campaign against landmines, to call on States Parties to the 
Mine Ban Treaty to urge the United States to reverse its landmine policy shift.










Since it was adopted in September 1997, the Mine Ban Treaty has stigmatized antipersonnel 
mines through its comprehensive prohibition on use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of 
the weapon. 
A total of 164 States Parties are applying this binding international humanitarian law 
treaty to ensure the clearance of mined areas within 10 years, provision of risk education 
for as long as the threat remains, destruction of stockpiled mines within four years, and 
provision of victim assistance for a lifetime. 
Most of the 33 countries that remain outside of the treaty nonetheless abide by its key 
provisions and thus act in compliance with the international normative framework. During 
this reporting period, Landmine Monitor documented new use of antipersonnel mines by 
government forces in only one country, Myanmar, which engages with, but has not joined the 
Mine Ban Treaty.
Efforts to ensure the treaty’s provisions are implemented have been hindered by use of 
antipersonnel mines by non-state armed groups (NSAGs), particularly improvised mines.1 
NSAGs used antipersonnel mines in at least six countries during this reporting period, 
including in States Parties Afghanistan and Colombia, and states not party India, Libya, 
Myanmar, and Pakistan.
The new United States (US) policy rolling back its prohibitions on landmine production 
and use is one of the most significant and regrettable developments of 2020. Issued by the 
administration of President Donald Trump on 31 January 2020, the policy has taken the US 
off the path toward joining the Mine Ban Treaty, a goal most recently set during the Obama 
administration in 2014.2 
1 The Mine Ban Treaty defines an antipersonnel landmine as “a mine designed to be exploded by the 
presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.” 
Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or booby-traps that are victim-activated fall under this definition 
regardless of how they were manufactured. The Monitor frequently uses the term “improvised landmine” 
to refer to victim-activated IEDs.
2 The White House, ‘‘Statement from the Press Secretary – National Security & Defense,’’ 31 January 2020, 
bit.ly/WhiteHouseStatement31Jan2020; and US Department of Defense, “Memorandum: DoD Policy on 
Landmines,” 31 January 2020, bit.ly/DoDLandminesPolicy31Jan2020. 
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In general, States Parties’ implementation of and compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty 
has been excellent. The core obligations have largely been respected, and compliance 
challenges continue to be addressed in a cooperative manner. However, some States Parties 
could do much more to implement key provisions of the treaty, particularly mine clearance 
and victim assistance, as detailed in this report and in online country profiles.
The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020 has seen the community of States 
Parties, United Nations (UN) agencies, international organizations such as the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining (GICHD), and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), adapt their 
work supporting the Mine Ban Treaty. They remain strong and focused on the treaty’s ultimate 
objective of putting an end to the suffering and casualties caused by antipersonnel mines.
USE OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES
There have been no allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by States Parties to the Mine 
Ban Treaty during the reporting period, from mid-2019 through October 2020. However, 
Landmine Monitor documented new use of antipersonnel mines by government forces in 
state not party Myanmar. Previously, Landmine Monitor 2018 and Landmine Monitor 2019 also 
found that government forces in Myanmar used antipersonnel mines.
Landmine Monitor identified new use of antipersonnel landmines by NSAGs in six 
countries during the reporting period, as listed in the table.
Locations of antipersonnel mine use mid-2019–October 20203







Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold.
Landmine Monitor has not documented or confirmed, during this reporting period, any use 
of antipersonnel mines by Syrian government forces or Russian forces participating in joint 
military operations in Syria. NSAGs in Syria likely continued to use improvised landmines as 
in previous years, but limited access by independent sources to territory under NSAG control 
made it difficult to confirm new use.
Landmine Monitor was also unable to document or confirm allegations of new 
antipersonnel mine use by NSAGs in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Egypt, Mali, Niger, 
Nigeria, the Philippines, Somalia, Tunisia, Turkey, or Yemen. In many cases, a lack of available 
information, or means to verify it, meant that it was not possible to determine if mine 
incidents and casualties were the result of new use of antipersonnel mines in the preceding 
12-month period, due to legacy or remaining contamination of mines, including improvised 
mines laid in previous years, or involved some other kind of explosive device. 
3 NSAGs used mines in at least six countries in 2018–2019, eight countries in 2017–2018, nine countries in 
2016–2017, 10 countries in 2015–2016 and 2014–2015, seven countries in 2013–2014, eight countries 
in 2012–2013, six countries in 2011–2012, four countries in 2010, six countries in 2009, seven countries 
in 2008, and nine countries in 2007. In the reporting period, there were also reports of NSAG use of 








LANDMINE USE BY GOVERNMENT FORCES
Myanmar
Since the publication of its first annual report in 1999, Landmine Monitor has every year 
documented the use of antipersonnel mines in Myanmar by government forces, known as 
the Tatmadaw, and by various NSAGs. 
However, the government of Myanmar continues to deny its use of antipersonnel mines. 
Since mid-2018, fighting between the Tatmadaw and the NSAG Arakan Army in Rakhine 
state has intensified. The Arakan Army has regularly published photographs online of 
antipersonnel mines produced by the Ka Pa Sa, the state-owned military industries, 
including MM2, MM5, and MM6 antipersonnel mines, among other seized weaponry.4 While 
these photographs do not specifically identify new landmine use, they do indicate that 
antipersonnel mines are part of the weaponry of frontline units. 
Claims of new mine use by government forces during the reporting period include:
  In September 2020, a villager from Hpo Kaung Chaung village in Buthidaung 
township, Rakhine state, stepped on a landmine while collecting firewood from the site 
of a temporary Tatmadaw camp which had been vacated earlier in 2020.5
  In June 2020,  a villager in western Hpapun township, Kayin state, was killed by a 
landmine laid by the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) near a Tatmadaw post. The 
mine had been laid due to an increase in tensions between the KNLA and the Tatmadaw.6 
  In May 2020, villagers in northern Hpapun township, Kayin state, alleged that 
Tatmadaw soldiers from Infantry Battalion 19 and Light Infantry Battalions 434, 341, 
and 340, operating under the Hpapun Operations Command, emplaced mines at the 
eastern part of their battalion’s base along a major road.7
  On 7 January 2020, near Teik Tu Pauk village in Kyauk Yan village tract, in Rakhine 
state’s Buthidaung township, several children and an adult were killed or injured 
by mines the villagers indicated had been laid by the Tatmadaw. Previously, the 
Tatmadaw had made a temporary camp and left chopped dried bushes from the 
area they cleared. A teacher and his students went to the area to find firewood. 
The villagers stated that soldiers did not warn them that mines had been laid by 
government forces around the temporary camp. Once they began to collect branches 
they stepped on mines, killing four and injuring three.8 
  In November 2019, the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S) published photographs of 
MM2 antipersonnel mines which they claimed had been laid by the Tatmadaw’s 
Brigade 99 near Wan Wah village of the Murng Mu region of Namtu township, in 
northern Shan state. They alleged that after clashes between the Tatmadaw and 
other ethnic armed groups, the Tatmadaw began to emplace landmines on farmland 
outside the villages and near the woods where they thought rebel groups would be 
injured by them.9
4 See, Mine Free Myanmar, “Allegedly Seized Mines Displayed by Arakan Army,” 18 April 2019, 
bit.ly/MineFreeMyanmar18April2019. See also, allegation and photographs published on a 
Facebook page associated with the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), 3 December 2019, 
bit.ly/FacebookRCSS3Dec2019. 
5 Monitor interview with villagers who requested anonymity.
6 “Karen Human Rights Group Submission to Landmine Monitor,” August 2020, unpublished. The villager 
who eventually died from his injuries stated that he knew the placement of the mines as he had been 
informed by the KNLA, however forgot about them on his return to the area.
7 “Karen Human Rights Group Submission to Landmine Monitor,” August 2020, unpublished. The villagers 
stated that the Tatmadaw had issued verbal warnings to avoid the area.
8 Monitor interview with villagers who requested anonymity. Families of each of the injured were required 
to pay MMK20,000 (US$20) per day to the hospital so that the injured would be cared for by the doctors 
and nurses.
9 Allegation and photographs published on a Facebook page associated with the RCSS, 3 December 2019, 
bit.ly/FacebookRCSS3Dec2019.
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It is often difficult to ascribe specific responsibility for incidents to a particular combatant 
group in Myanmar, however in every month during early 2020 villagers reported landmine 
casualties in areas where armed conflict had only recently occurred. Examples of such 
incidents include:
  On 29 February, 11 March, and 5 May 2020, landmine incidents caused injuries to 
villagers in areas near Ah Lae Sakhan village in Ye Phyu township, in the Tanintharyi 
region.10 
  On 19 January 2020, a villager was injured in an area where Tatmadaw and Arakan 
Army forces had clashed in Ponnagyun township, Rakhine state, but the perpetrator 
could not be determined.11 
These are among the latest in a string of casualties which began in October 2018 in 
an area under dispute between the Karen National Union and the New Mon State Party, 
both NSAG signatories to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, signed in 2015 between the 
government and eight NSAGs. Two more NSAGs signed in 2018. Both parties have denied 
using landmines but have accused each other of doing so. Local activists have informed the 
Monitor that the following incidents also involved improvised mines, but were unable to 
attribute responsibility for use:
  On 30 July 2020, one child was killed and five were injured in Kho Tin village, Kutkai 
township, Shan state, after finding a landmine and playing with it. Villagers said that 
Tatmadaw soldiers had previously stayed in the house where the incident occurred.12
  On 14 July 2020, an abbot of a Buddhist monastery in Namkham township, Shan 
state, was killed when he triggered an antipersonnel landmine while cleaning the 
grounds. Villagers said Tatmadaw soldiers had frequently stayed in the monastery 
grounds but that the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) also was based in the 
area. Villagers called on both groups to remove their mines from the area.13 
  On 24 May 2020, one villager was injured by a mine, and a second was injured while 
coming to his aid in an area where conflict between the Tatmadaw and Arakan Army 
had occurred in Ponnagyun township, Rakhine state, but villagers did not know who 
laid the mine.14 
  On 5 April 2020, a villager in Motesoe Chaung village in Rathedaung township, 
Rakhine state, was killed by a landmine in an area where clashes between the 
Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army were a frequent occurrence.15 
  In March 2020, two villagers were killed by a landmine near Kham Sar village in 
Kyaukme township, northern Shan state. Armed conflict between the Tatmadaw, the 
SSA-S and the TNLA had previously occurred in the area and it is uncertain which 
group may have been responsible.16 
10 “Two villagers from Ye Phyu Township severely wounded in landmine blasts,” Mon News Agency/
Burma News International, 14 March 2020, bit.ly/MonNewsAgency14March2020; Lawi Weng, 
“Civilian Injured by Landmine as Mon, Karen Armed Groups Trade Blame,” The Irrawaddy, 5 May 2020, 
bit.ly/Irrawaddy5May2020; and Landmine Monitor interviews with informants who wished to remain 
anonymous.
11 “9 people wounded in Arakan landmine explosions,” Narinjara News, 20 January 2020, 
bit.ly/NarinjaraNews20Jan2020. 
12 “One Child Dead and Five Injured in Northern Shan State Landmine Blast,” Network Media Group/Burma 
News International, 4 August 2020, bit.ly/NetworkMediaGroup4Aug2020. 
13 “Buddhist Abbot And Villager Killed By Landmine,” Shan Herald News Agency/Burma News International, 17 
July 2020, bit.ly/ShanHeraldAgency17July2020. 
14 “Mro ethnic villagers Injured in Ponna Kyaut landmine blasts,” Narinjara News, 25 May 2020, 
bit.ly/NarinjaraNews25May2020. 
15 ‘‘Rathedaung man killed by landmine,’’ Development Media Group/Burma News International, 9 April 2020, 
bit.ly/DevelopmentMediaGroup9April2020. 









At the Fourth Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in November 2019, which 
was attended by delegations from both Myanmar and neighbor Bangladesh, Myanmar’s 
representative neither confirmed nor denied mine use, but stated, “Building lasting peace 
is the most fundamental and important task in the process of stopping future use of anti-
personnel mines.”17
Bangladesh called on Myanmar to impose a moratorium on the use, production and 
transfer of antipersonnel mines. Bangladesh reiterated its “deep concern” over Myanmar’s 
continued mine use and said that its “border management authorities recorded anti-personnel 
mine related accidents within Myanmar territory along our borders even as recently as in 
September and November 2019, leading to several civilian fatalities and injuries.”18 
Myanmar’s observer delegation made no comment on Bangladesh’s offer of assistance 
or its suggestion of a moratorium on use, as Myanmar’s delegation had left the room by the 
time the statement was made. 
Landmine casualties continue to be reported in Rakhine state, on the Myanmar side of 
the border with Bangladesh. On 16 March 2020, a Rohingya refugee living in a refugee 
camp on the border was killed while collecting firewood in the “no man’s land” between 
Maungdaw township adjacent to Bandarban district.19
LANDMINE USE BY NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS
In the reporting period, Landmine Monitor identified new use of antipersonnel mines by 
NSAGs in Afghanistan, Colombia, India, Libya, Myanmar, and Pakistan.
Afghanistan
NSAG use of improvised mines in Afghanistan in 2019 and 2020 resulted in numerous 
casualties.20 The use of improvised mines in Afghanistan is primarily attributed to the Taliban 
and Islamic State Khorasan Province. According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan (UNAMA), “anti-government” forces used victim-activated improvised mines in 
slightly decreasing numbers throughout 2019 and in the first half of 2020.21
Colombia 
The Colombian government reported landmine use in 2019 and 2020 by residual or dissident 
forces of both the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias 
de Colombia, FARC) and the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN). 
17 Statement of Myanmar, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, segment on Universalization, Oslo, 26 
November 2019, bit.ly/MyanmarStatementRevCon2019. 
18 Statement of Bangladesh, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 27 November 2019, 
bit.ly/BangladeshStatementRevCon2019. 
19 Abdul Azeez, ‘‘Rohingya man killed in landmine explosion,’’ Dhaka Tribune, 18 March 2020, 
bit.ly/DhakaTribune18March2020. 
20 Afghanistan stated that new use of improvised mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) was responsible 
for killing approximately 1,451 civilians between June 2019 and May 2020. Presentation by Afghanistan, 
Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings (virtual), 1 July 2020, bit.ly/AfghanistanPresentation2020. 
21 UNAMA, “Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2019,” February 2020, p. 42, 
bit.ly/AfghanistanReportUNAMA2020. 
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Colombia reported 508 new mine incidents in 2019.22 Local media has reported numerous 
landmine seizure incidents in late 2019 and early 2020.23
India
Maoist insurgents in India have made sporadic use of improvised landmines. In August 
2020, two Adivasis (tribal people) were killed after they stepped on a mine laid by the 
People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M) 
in Visakhapatnam district, in Andhra Pradesh.24 The CPI-M admitted responsibility for the 
incident to the family and by audio press note to the village where it occurred, claiming that 
they had laid the booby-trap for pursuing police forces.25 Prior to that, in December 2019, a 
Central Reserve Police Force officer was injured when he stepped on a mine allegedly laid 
by the CPI-M near Lohardaga in Jharkhand state. In the same area the previous day, a girl 
was killed by a landmine and five others were injured while visiting a waterfall.26 In August 
2019, in Kanker, Chhattisgarh state, a villager herding cattle was killed after stepping on a 
landmine allegedly laid by the CPI-M. Previously, in July 2017, the Deputy Inspector General 
of Police in Chhattisgarh state told the state news agency, “Pressure IEDs planted randomly 
inside the forests in unpredictable places, where frequent de-mining operations are not 
feasible, remain a challenge.”27
Libya
In May 2020, the United Nations-recognized Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) 
discovered significant mine contamination in areas of Tripoli vacated by rebels that month. 
The departing rebels were from a Russian government-linked military company, the Wagner 
group, which was fighting on behalf of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Tobruk-
based Libyan National Army. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported, “GNA-aligned forces shared 
22 The figures were collated by Descontamina, the Colombian government agency responsible for 
humanitarian demining activities, which is part of the High Commission for Peace. Information provided 
by Maicol Velasquez, Office of the High Commissioner for Peace Information Management Team, from the 
Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, 31 August 2020.
23 See, for example, antipersonnel landmines seized from the ELN in April 2020, “En El Tambo, Cauca, un 
muerto y un capturado del Eln dejan operaciones militares,” (“In El Tambo, Cauca, one dead and one 
captured during military operations against ELN”), Extra, 28 April 2020, bit.ly/Extra28April2020. In March 
2020, the army captured 120 antipersonnel landmines from a warehouse belonging to a dissident FARC 
faction, “Hallan depósito ilegal con material explosivo en Guaviare,” (“Illegal deposit with explosive 
material found in Guaviare”), RCN Radio, 17 March 2020, bit.ly/RCNRadio17March2020. In February 2020, 
the army found a cache of 117 antipersonnel landmines belonging to the ELN, “Hallan minas antipersonal 
y bandera del ELN en Guática Risaralda, zona límite con Caldas” (‘‘Antipersonnel mines and ELN flag found 
in Guática Risaralda, border area with Caldas’’), W Radio, 7 February 2020, bit.ly/WRadio7February2020. 
In October 2019, the army reportedly discovered 100 antipersonnel landmines belonging to a dissident 
faction of the FARC, “Hallaron 100 minas antipersona y material explosivo de las disidencias de las Farc 
avaluado en $50 millones,” (“100 antipersonnel mines and explosive material from FARC dissidents and 
valued at $50 million were found”), Minuto 30, 16 October 2019, bit.ly/Minuto16October2019.
24 Srinivasa Rao Apparasu, “Maoist landmine kills two tribals in forest area of Visakhapatnam” Hindustan 
Times, 3 August 2020, bit.ly/HindustanTimes3Aug2020. See also, previous incidents: “Landmine blast 
near polling centre in Naxal-affected Maharashtra’s Gadchiroli,” India Today, 11 April 2019, bit.ly/
IndiaToday11April2019; “Army officer defuses landmine in J-K’s Rajouri, second one kills him,” Hindustan 
Times, 16 February 2019, bit.ly/Hindustan-Times16Feb2019; “Maoists trigger landmine blast in Odisha, 
2 SOG jawans injured,” The Times of India, 12 May 2019, bit.ly/TimesOfIndia12May2019; “Landmine kills 
at least 15 police in western India,” Reuters, 1 May 2019, bit.ly/Reuters1May2019; “Army man injured in 
landmine blast in J&K’s Poonch district,” India TV, 7 June 2019, bit.ly/IndiaTV7June2019; “One civilian killed 
in landmine blast,” Hans News Service, 1 April 2019, bit.ly/HansNewsService1April2019; and “Police unearth 
four landmines in Visakhapatnam,” The Times of India, 30 May 2019, bit.ly/TimesOfIndia30May2019. 
25 Siva G., “Andhra Pradesh: Maoists offer apologies for landmine blast,” The Times of India, 11 August 2020, 
bit.ly/TimesOfIndia11Aug2010.
26 “CRPF jawan injured in land mine blast in Lohardaga,” United News of India, 25 December 2019, 
bit.ly/UnitedNewsofIndia25Dec2019; and “One killed, five injured in landmine blast in Jharkhand,” 
Telangana Today, 24 December 2019, bit.ly/TelanganaToday24Dec2019. 









photographs on Twitter on May 29 showing four types of antipersonnel landmines manufactured 
in the Soviet Union or Russia and claiming they were ‘laid by the Wagner mercenaries,’ in the 
Ain Zara, Al-Khilla, Salahuddin, Sidra, and Wadi al-Rabi districts of Tripoli. Other photographs 
shared on social media show mines equipped with tripwires and mines used as triggers to 
detonate larger improvised explosive devices. Video footage shows various explosive charges 
used to booby trap homes, including antivehicle mines, paired with various types of fuzes and 
a mix of electronic timers, circuit boards, and modified cell phones.”28 
The new use was condemned by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL),29 
by the President of the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty 
Ambassador Osman Abufatima Adam Mohammed,30 and by the ICBL.31 The mines, both 
standard and improvised, caused casualties among civilians returning to the area. By early 
July 2020, UNSMIL reported 138 casualties including from clearance of the newly laid 
explosive devices.32
The antipersonnel mines discovered in Tripoli in May were of Soviet and Russian origin 
and included POM-2, PMN-2, and olive drab-colored MON-50 mines that were not previously 
recorded in Libya, suggesting these landmines may have been transferred into the country in 
recent years.33
Myanmar
Many NSAGs have used antipersonnel mines in Myanmar since 1999. In late 2019 and early 
2020, there were allegations of new use by the Arakan Army, the KNLA and other groups.34 
It is often difficult to ascribe responsibility for each mine incident to a specific armed 
group. For example, in August 2019, in northern Shan state, the Tatmadaw engaged in armed 
conflict with three members of the Northern Alliance—the TNLA, the Myanmar National 
Democratic Alliance Army, and the Arakan Army—near Maw Harn village in Kutkai township. 
Subsequently, a resident of Maw Harn was injured by a landmine. The villagers said there 
had been no landmines in the area prior to the conflict, but did not know which group was 
responsible for using them.35
Several allegations of recent use were also reported in Kayin state: 
  In March–April 2020, the KNLA’s Third Company used mines in Hpapun township during 
armed conflict with the Tatmadaw, which led to the injury of a villager in May 2020.36
  In late 2019, soldiers of KNLA Headquarters emplaced mines in Hpapun township to 
halt work on the controversial Hatgyi Dam on the Salween River, resulting in injury 
of a local villager in February 2020.37 
28 HRW, “Libya: Landmines Left After Armed Group Withdraws,” 3 June 2020, bit.ly/LibyaHRW3June2020. 
29 UNSMIL press release, “UNSMIL condemns the use of Improvised Explosive Devices against the civilians 
in Ain Zara and Salahuddin in Tripoli,” 25 May 2020, bit.ly/UNSMIL25May2020. 
30 Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Convention press release, “Convention President condemns reported use of 
mines; calls for an immediate cessation of their use,” 1 June 2020, bit.ly/MBTPressRelease1June2020. 
31 ICBL, “ICBL Joins Mine Ban Partners in Condemning Reported New Mine Use in Libya,” 4 June 2020, 
bit.ly/LibyaICBL4June2020. 
32 UNSMIL, “Statement by Acting SRSG Stephanie Williams on the Death of Two Libyan Mine Clearance 
Workers in Southern Tripoli,” 6 July 2020, bit.ly/UNSMILStatement6July2020. 
33 HRW, “Libya: Landmines Left After Armed Group Withdraws,” 3 June 2020, bit.ly/LibyaHRW30June2020. 
34 There are also allegations of use by the TNLA, the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army-North 
(SSPP/SSA-N) and the RCSS/SSA-S in their operations against the Tatmadaw during the reporting period. 
35 “Kutkai Villager ‘Seriously Injured’ by Landmine,” Shan Herald Agency for News/Burma News International, 
20 September 2019, bit.ly/ShanHeraldAgency20Sept2019. 
36 “Karen Human Rights Group Submission to Landmine Monitor,” August 2020, unpublished. The villager 
who was injured while collecting thatch near the area stated he was aware that the KNLA had laid 
landmines but thought it was safe as he had collected thatch there before.
37 “Karen Human Rights Group Submission to Landmine Monitor,” August 2020, unpublished. The villager 
who was injured while hunting near the area stated he was aware of verbal warnings issued by the KNLA 
prior to laying the landmines, but felt it was safe as he had been hunting in the area previously.
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  In July 2019, in Hpapun township, the Karen National Defence Organization (KNDO) laid 
mines in the Bu Ah Der village tract reportedly to defend against attack by the Tatmadaw.38
  In May 2019, in Hlaingbwe township, a Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) 
officer from Meh Pru village tract ordered his soldiers to plant more landmines in 
seven nearby mountainous villages to protect their area.39
Pakistan
NSAGs in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa used improvised antipersonnel landmines 
during the reporting period. Use is attributed to a variety of militant groups, frequently 
referred to as “miscreants” in local media reports, but generally accepted to be constituent 
groups of the Tehrik-i-Taliban in Pakistan (TTP) and Balochi insurgent groups.40 In April 2020, 
a spokesman for the Baloch Liberation Army claimed responsibility for mines laid near a 
Pakistani Army post in the Kalgari mountains in Kohistan Marri, causing death and injury to 
two soldiers.41 As in previous years, many military personnel and some civilians were killed 
or injured in incidents of new mine use, however, from available information it is difficult 
to attribute specific responsibility in each case.42 Landmine Monitor has recorded numerous 
antipersonnel mine incidents in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, although in some 
cases the precise date of mine use cannot be ascertained.
UNIVERSALIZING THE LANDMINE BAN
Since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, states wishing to join can no 
longer sign and ratify the treaty but must instead accede, a process that essentially combines 
signature and ratification. Of the 164 States Parties, 132 signed and ratified the treaty, while 
32 acceded.43
No states joined the Mine Ban Treaty in the reporting period. The last states to accede to 
the treaty were Sri Lanka and the State of Palestine, both in December 2017. 
The 33 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty include the Marshall Islands, which is the 
last signatory yet to ratify.
ANNUAL UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION
Since 1997, an annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution has provided 
states outside the Mine Ban Treaty with an important opportunity to demonstrate their 
support for the humanitarian rationale of the treaty and the objective of its universalization. 
More than a dozen countries have acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty after voting in favor of 
consecutive UNGA resolutions.44
38 “Karen Human Rights Group Submission to Landmine Monitor,” September 2019, unpublished.
39 Ibid.
40 Emails from Raza Shah Khan, Sustainable Peace and Development Organization (SPADO), 30 September 
2019 and 21 September 2017. See also, “Landmine blasts kill five in Pakistan’s tribal areas,” Arab News, 
21 August 2019, arabnews.pk/node/1543081/pakistan; “Soldier martyred, 5 injured in North Waziristan 
landmine blast,” Tribal News Network, 25 August 2019, bit.ly/TribalNewsNetwork25Aug2019; “At least 2 FC 
personnel killed, 5 injured in Kurram Agency blast,” The Nation, 10 July 2017, bit.ly/TheNation10July2017; 
and Ajmal Wesai, “4 children wounded in Tirinkot bomb explosion,” Pajhwok Afghan News, 5 August 2017, 
bit.ly/PajhwokAfghanNews5Aug2017.
41 “Balochistan: One Pakistani soldier killed in landmine blast another wounded,” Balochwarna News, 6 April 
2020, bit.ly/BalochwarnaNews6April2020. 
42 “Landmines recovered from Bajaur college,” Dawn, 22 January 2020, bit.ly/Dawn22January2020. 
43 The 32 accessions include two countries that joined the Mine Ban Treaty through the process of 
“succession.” These two countries are Montenegro (after the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro) and 
South Sudan (after it became independent from Sudan). Of the 132 signatories, 44 ratified on or before 
entry into force (1 March 1999) and 88 ratified afterward.
44 This includes Belarus, Bhutan, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, 








On 12 December 2019, UNGA Resolution 74/61, calling for the universalization and full 
implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, was adopted by a vote of 169 in favor, none against, 
and 18 abstentions.45 This marked the second consecutive year of 169 votes in favor, and 
represented a slight increase in the number of abstentions (up from 16 in 2018). States 
not party Egypt, Iran, Myanmar, Pakistan, Singapore, and South Korea made statements 
explaining their votes.
A core of 14 states not party have abstained from consecutive Mine Ban Treaty resolutions 
since 1997: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South 
Korea, Syria, the US, Uzbekistan,46 and Vietnam.47
CHANGE IN US LANDMINE POLICY 
The US landmine policy announced on 31 January 2020 allows the US to develop, produce, 
and use landmines48 as long as they are “non-persistent,” that is, equipped with self-destruct 
and self-deactivation features.49 The policy abandons the previous constraint on using 
antipersonnel mines only on the Korean Peninsula, and instead permits the US to use them 
anywhere in the world.50
A Department of Defense fact sheet issued with the policy, entitled “Strategic Advantages 
of Landmines,” asserts that landmines are “a vital tool in conventional warfare” that provide 
“a necessary warfighting capability…while reducing the risk of unintended harm to non-
combatants.” Frequently Asked Questions prepared by the Department of Defense for the 
policy announcement assert that the US needs landmines now, because “the strategic 
environment has changed” since 2014 with “the return of Great Power Competition and a 
focus on near-peer competitors” or adversaries. Defense officials announcing the policy told 
media they could envision the US using landmines in a variety of theaters against a range of 
adversaries, such as Russia and China.51
The Trump administration’s decision to reverse US prohibitions and limits on landmines 
has been widely condemned and criticized, including by the US Campaign to Ban Landmines 
(USCBL). Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont said it “reverses the gains we have made and 
weakens our global leadership.”52 On 6 May 2020, Senator Leahy, Representative Jim 
McGovern and more than 100 other members of Congress wrote to Secretary of Defense Mark 
Esper expressing disappointment at the policy reversal, regret at the lack of consultation, 
45 The 18 states that abstained were: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, 
Palau, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Syria, the US, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe.
46 Uzbekistan voted in favor of the UNGA resolution on the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997 and did not vote on the 
resolution in 2018.
47 Of these states: India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea and the US are party to the Convention on 
Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II on landmines; Cuba and Uzbekistan are party to CCW 
Protocol II; Egypt and Vietnam have signed the CCW but are not party to any of its protocols. Iran, Myanmar, 
North Korea, and Syria remain outside any treaty-based prohibition or regulation of antipersonnel mines.
48 The policy makes no distinction between antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, but the White House 
spokesperson stated that antipersonnel landmines are the focus of the new policy.
49 The decision was outlined in a three-page policy contained in a letter signed by Secretary of Defense 
Mark Esper on 31 January 2020. US Department of Defense, “Memorandum: DoD Policy on Landmines,” 31 
January 2020, bit.ly/DoDLandminesPolicy31Jan2020. 
50 Previous US president Barack Obama issued a new landmine policy in 2014 banning production and 
acquisition of antipersonnel mines as well as halting their use by the US anywhere except the Korean 
Peninsula. The Obama administration brought US policy further in line with the Mine Ban Treaty, but 
did not take any measures towards US accession. Under the 2014 policy, the US committed not to use 
antipersonnel landmines outside of the Korean Peninsula and not to assist, encourage, or induce other 
nations to use, stockpile, produce, or transfer antipersonnel mines outside of the peninsula. It also 
committed to no future US production or acquisition of antipersonnel mines.
51 Jeff Seldin, “US Ends Self-Imposed Ban on Use of Landmines,” Voice of America, 31 January 2020, voanews.
com/usa/us-ends-self-imposed-ban-use-landmines. 
52 Office of US Senator Patrick Leahy, “Statement on the Trump Administration’s Decision to Roll Back Limits 
on US Production and Use of Anti-Personnel Landmines,” 31 January 2020, bit.ly/LeahyStatementJan2020. 
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and providing three pages of questions regarding future plans for development and use of 
antipersonnel mines.53 The Department of Defense provided a detailed 12-page response in 
September 2020. 
Department of Defense officials have said the US does not intend to pressure partners 
and allies to change their landmine policies, nor will the new US policy prevent it from 
conducting future operations in coalition with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
and other partners.
Mine Ban Treaty President, Ambassador Osman Abufatima Adam Mohammed of Sudan, 
issued a statement asserting that the policy “goes against” the “long-standing commitment” 
made by the US to help eradicate the suffering caused by landmines. States Parties including 
Austria, Belgium,54 France, Germany,55 the Netherlands,56 Norway,57 and Switzerland58 expressed 
their concern and disappointment over the new US policy, as did the European Union.59 In 
addition to the ICBL and the ICRC, other civil society actors that decried the policy change 
included several US Senators, Lloyd Axworthy (former Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs), 
the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) USA, and the US Conference of Catholic Bishops.
NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS
Some NSAGs have committed to observe the ban on antipersonnel mines, which reflects the 
strength of the growing international norm and stigmatization of the weapon. In September 
2019, the Central Division, a faction of the Syrian National Army, and in July 2019, the Southern 
Transitional Council in Yemen, agreed to a ban on use of landmines by signing the Geneva 
Call Deed of Commitment.60 At least 70 NSAGs have committed to halt using antipersonnel 
53 Letter to Mark Esper, US Secretary of State, from Senator Patrick Leahy and more than 100 other 
Congressional representatives, 6 May 2020, bit.ly/LeahyLetterMay2020. 
54 MFA, Belgium (BelgiumMFA), “Anti-personnel mines do not make countries safe. Their use has been 
drastically reduced thanks to #MineBanTreaty, a cornerstone of humanitarian disarmament. We regret the 
new US landmine policy which is out of sync with global progress towards a mine-free world.” 4 February 
2020, 18:43 UTC. Tweet. bit.ly/BelgiumMFATweet4Feb2020. 
55 Annen, Niels (NielsAnnen), “Präsident Trumps Entscheidung, das Verbot zum Einsatz von Landminen zu 
ignorieren, ist ein schwerer Rückschlag für die langjährigen internationalen Bemühungen, diese tödliche 
Waffe zu ächten. @AuswaertigesAmt @GermanyUN.” (“President Trump’s decision to ignore the landmine 
ban is a severe blow to longstanding international efforts to outlaw this deadly weapon”). 3 February 
2020, 08:34 UTC. Tweet. bit.ly/NielsAnnenTweet3Feb2020. 
56 Disarmament, NL-Amb (RobGabrielse), “The Netherlands is disheartened by the US’ decision to lift its 
2014 policy on anti-personnel landmines. See also the statement by the Spokesperson of HR/VP Borrell 
Fontelles regarding this decision.” 4 February 2020, 19:38 UTC. Tweet. bit.ly/RobGabrielseTweet4Feb2020. 
57 MFA, Norway (NorwayMFA), “#LandMines kill and mutilate thousands of civilians every year, most of them 
children. Norway is a strong supporter of the @MineBanTreaty. We call upon the US to respect the ban on 
anti-personnel mines, and to continue to support survey and clearance of mines - FM #EriksenSoreide.” 5 
February 2020, 08:34 UTC. Tweet. bit.ly/NorwayMFATweet5Feb2020. 
58 EDA-DFEA (EDA_DFAE), “La Suisse poursuit l’objectif d’un monde exempt de mines anti-personnel. 
C’est pourquoi le DFAE regrette l’annonce du président des Etats-Unis d’y recourir à nouveau.” 
(“Switzerland pursues the goal of a world free of anti-personnel mines. This is why the FDFA regrets the 
announcement of the President of the United States to use it again”). 7 February 2020, 14:15 UTC. Tweet. 
bit.ly/EDA-DFAETweet7Feb2020. 
59 European Union, “Anti-personnel mines: Statement by the Spokesperson on the United States’ decision to 
re-introduce their use,” 4 February 2020, bit.ly/EUStatement4Feb2020. 
60 Deed of Commitment under Geneva Call for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-personnel Mines and 
for Cooperation in Mine Action. Geneva Call press release, “Syria: the armed non-State actor “Central 
Division” signs Geneva Call’s Deeds of Commitment on banning anti-personnel mines and on protecting 
health care in armed conflict,” 12 November 2019, bit.ly/GenevaCallSyriaNov2019; and Geneva Call 
press release, “Yemen: The Supreme Commander of the Southern Transitional Council signs 3 Deeds of 









mines since 1997.61 The exact number is difficult to determine, as NSAGs have no permanence, 
frequently split into factions, go out of existence, or become part of state structures. 
PRODUCTION OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES
More than 50 states produced antipersonnel mines at some point in the past.62 Forty states 
have ceased production of antipersonnel mines, including three that are not party to the 
Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Israel, and Nepal.63
The Monitor identifies 12 states as producers of antipersonnel mines, an increase of 
one from last year’s report: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, 
Singapore, South Korea, the US, and Vietnam. Most of these countries are not believed to be 
actively producing mines but have yet to disavow ever doing so.64 Those most likely to be 
actively producing are India, Iran, Myanmar, and Pakistan. 
The new US landmine policy returns the US to the list of countries worldwide that 
either actively produce antipersonnel landmines or reserve the right to do so.65 According 
to the Department of Defense, the 2020 policy “encourages the Military Departments to 
explore acquiring landmines…that could further reduce the risk of unintended harm to non-
combatants.”66 Yet, US defense officials commenting on the new policy told media that as 
the US has a sufficient inventory of so-called smart landmines, there is no need to restart 
production immediately. No antipersonnel mines or other victim-activated munitions are 
being funded in the fiscal year 2021 ammunition procurement budgets of the US Armed 
Services or Defense Department.67
As of August 2020, Iran’s Ministry of Defence Export Center advertised the availability of 
the YM-IV, a bounding, fragmentation antipersonnel mine, and the YM-I-S, a self-neutralizing 
antipersonnel blast mine.68
61 As of October 2020, 48 NSAGs have committed not to use mines through the Geneva Call Deed of 
Commitment, 20 by self-declaration, four by the Rebel Declaration (two have signed both the Rebel 
Declaration and the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment), and two through a peace accord (in Nepal and 
Colombia). See, ICBL-CMC, Landmine Monitor, “Briefing Paper: Landmine Use by Non-State Armed Groups: 
A 20-Year Review,” November 2019, bit.ly/MonitorBriefingPaperNov2019. 
62 There are 51 confirmed current and past producers. Not included in that total are five States Parties that 
some sources have cited as past producers, but who deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Thailand, 
and Venezuela. It is also unclear if Syria has produced antipersonnel mines.
63 Additionally, Taiwan passed legislation banning production in June 2006. The 36 States Parties to the Mine 
Ban Treaty that once produced antipersonnel mines are Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uganda, the United Kingdom (UK), and 
Zimbabwe.
64 For example, Singapore’s only known producer of antipersonnel landmines, Singapore Technologies 
Engineering, a government-linked corporation, said in November 2015 that it “is now no longer in the 
business of designing, producing and selling of anti-personnel mines.” PAX, ‘’Singapore Technologies 
Engineering stops production of cluster munitions,’’ 19 November 2015, bit.ly/PAXSingapore19Nov2015.
65 The 2020 policy rolls back the 2014 policy pledge to “not produce or otherwise acquire any anti-personnel 
munitions that are not compliant with the Ottawa Convention in the future, including to replace such 
munitions as they expire in the coming years.”
66 US Department of Defense, “Memorandum: DoD Policy on Landmines,” 31 January 2020, 
bit.ly/DoDLandminesPolicy31Jan2020.
67 The last time the US produced antipersonnel mines was in 1997, when it manufactured 450,000 ADAM 
and 13,200 CBU-89/B Gator self-destructing/self-deactivating antipersonnel mines for US$120 million. 
The last non-self-destruct antipersonnel mines were procured in 1990, when the US Army bought nearly 
80,000 M16A1 antipersonnel mines for US$1.9 million.
68 Ministry of Defence Export Center (MINDEX), “Bounding Mines,” undated, mindexcenter.ir/product/
bounding-mines; and MINDEX, “Self Neutralized Mines,” undated, mindexcenter.ir/product/self-
neutralized-mine-ym-i-s. 
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In August 2019, South Korea informed the ICBL that it had not produced any antipersonnel 
landmines in the previous five years.69 Until South Korea renounces future production, it 
remains listed as a producer of antipersonnel mines.
Production of antipersonnel mines by India appears to be ongoing into 2020. Purchase 
order records retrieved from a publicly accessible online government procurement database 
list private companies providing component parts for APER-1B antipersonnel mines to Indian 
Ordnance Factories, a state-owned enterprise, into June 2020.70 Previously, in September 
2018, Indian military officials told the Monitor that the final assembly of complete mines 
remains under the exclusive control of Indian Ordnance Factories.71 In the previous two 
years, components were produced under these contracts and supplied to the Ammunition 
Factory Khadki, in Maharashtra state.72
NSAGs have produced improvised landmines in Afghanistan, Colombia, Myanmar, Pakistan, 
and Yemen.73 Antipersonnel mines are prohibited regardless of whether they were assembled 
in a factory or improvised from locally available materials.        
TRANSFERS OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES
A de facto global ban on the transfer of antipersonnel mines has been in effect since the 
mid-1990s. This ban is attributable to the mine ban movement and the stigma created by the 
Mine Ban Treaty. Landmine Monitor has never conclusively documented any state-to-state 
transfers of antipersonnel mines since it began publishing annually in 1999.
At least nine states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have enacted formal moratoriums 
on the export of antipersonnel mines: China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, 
Singapore, South Korea, and the US. Other past exporters have made statements declaring 
that they have stopped exporting, including Cuba and Vietnam. Iran also claims to have 
stopped exporting in 1997, despite evidence to the contrary.74
69 Email to the ICBL, from Soonhee Choi, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the 
United Nations, 22 August 2019.
70 Components for M-14 mines were tendered for Dum Dum Ordnance Factory in February and June 2020. 
Components for M-14 mines and AP 1B mines were tendered in June 2020 and during 2019. 
71 Landmine Monitor meeting with Cdre. Nishant Kumar, Ministry of External Affairs, and Col. Sumit Kabthiyal, 
Ministry of Defense, Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) 
on lethal autonomous weapons systems, in Geneva, 27 August 2018.
72 The following companies were listed as having concluded contracts listed for production of components 
of antipersonnel mines on the Indian Ordnance Factories Purchase Orders between October 2016 and 
November 2017: Sheth & Co., Supreme Industries Ltd., Pratap Brothers, Brahm Steel Industries, M/s 
Lords Vanjya Pvt. Ltd., Sandeep Metalkraft Pvt Ltd., Milan Steel, Prakash Machine Tools, Sewa Enterprises, 
Naveen Tools Mfg. Co. Pvt. Ltd., Shyam Udyog, and Dhruv Containers Pvt. Ltd. In addition, the following 
companies had established contracts for the manufacture of mine components: Ashoka Industries, 
Alcast, Nityanand Udyog Pvt. Ltd., Miltech Industries, Asha Industries, and Sneh Engineering Works. Mine 
types indicated were either M-16, M-14, APERS 1B, or “APM” mines. Indian Ordnance Factories, “Purchase 
Orders,” undated, bit.ly/PurchaseOrdersIOF; and Indian Ordnance Factories, “Registered Vendors,” undated, 
bit.ly/RegisteredVendorsIOF. 
73 Previous lists of NSAGs producing antipersonnel mines have included Iraq, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, and 
Yemen. 
74 Landmine Monitor received information in 2002–2004 that demining organizations in Afghanistan were 
clearing and destroying many hundreds of Iranian YM-I and YM-I-B antipersonnel mines, date stamped 
1999 and 2000, from abandoned Northern Alliance frontlines. Information provided to Landmine Monitor 
and the ICBL by HALO Trust, Danish Demining Group, and other demining groups in Afghanistan. Iranian 
antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were also part of a shipment seized by Israel in January 2002 off the 










The Monitor estimates that as many as 30 
of the 33 states not party to the Mine Ban 
Treaty stockpile antipersonnel landmines.75 
In 1999, the Monitor estimated that, 
collectively, states not party stockpiled 
about 160 million antipersonnel mines, but 
today the global collective total may be less 
than 50 million.76
It is unclear if all 30 states are currently 
stockpiling antipersonnel mines. Officials 
from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
have provided contradictory information 
regarding its possession of stocks, while 
Bahrain and Morocco have stated that they 
possess only small stockpiles which are used 
solely for training purposes in clearance and 
detection techniques.
States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty 
routinely destroy stockpiled antipersonnel 
mines as an element of ammunition 
management programs and the phasing out 
of obsolete munitions. In recent years, such 
stockpile destruction has been reported in 
China, Israel, Mongolia, Pakistan, Russia, 
South Korea, the US, and Vietnam.
STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION BY MINE BAN TREATY STATES 
PARTIES
At least 160 of the 164 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty do not stockpile antipersonnel 
mines. This includes 93 states that have officially declared completion of stockpile destruction 
and 67 states that have declared they never possessed antipersonnel mines (except in some 
cases for training in detection and clearance techniques).
Collectively, States Parties have destroyed more than 55 million stockpiled antipersonnel 
mines, including more than 269,000 destroyed in 2019 (Greece destroyed 53,039 and Ukraine 
destroyed 216,291).
Three States Parties possess a collective total of almost four million antipersonnel mines 
left to destroy: Ukraine (3.3 million), Greece (343,413), and Sri Lanka (62,510). 
Sri Lanka declared a significant stockpile of antipersonnel mines in November 2018 when 
it submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report. Its deadline for completion of destruction 
is 1 June 2029, but Sri Lanka has stated its intent to complete stockpile destruction by 
75 Three states not party, all in the Pacific, have said that they do not stockpile antipersonnel mines: signatory 
the Marshall Islands, in addition to non-signatories Micronesia and Tonga. 
76 In 2014, China informed Landmine Monitor that its stockpile is “less than” five million, but there is a 
degree of uncertainty about the method China used to derive this figure. For example, it is not known 
whether antipersonnel mines contained in remotely-delivered systems, so-called “scatterable” mines, are 
counted individually or as just the container, which can hold numerous individual mines. Previously, China 
was estimated to have 110 million antipersonnel mines in its stockpile.




Pakistan estimated 6 million
India estimated 4–5 million
China “less than” 5 million
US 3 million
Total approximately 45 million

































the end of 2020.77 Sri Lanka reported that the destruction of 57,033 antipersonnel mines 
had occurred prior to November 2018, for a total stockpile prior to destruction of 134,898 
antipersonnel mines. In its May 2019 Article 7 report, Sri Lanka declared the destruction of 
15,355 antipersonnel mines since its initial report.78  As of 15 October 2020, Sri Lanka had 
not submitted an updated Article 7 report for calendar year 2019. 
Greece and Ukraine remain in violation of Article 4 after failing to complete the 
destruction of their stockpiles by their four-year deadline.79 Neither state has indicated 
when the obligation to destroy its remaining stockpiles will be completed. The Oslo Action 
Plan adopted at the Mine Ban Treaty’s Fourth Review Conference in 2020 urges states that 
have failed to meet their stockpile destruction deadlines to “present a time-bound plan for 
completion and urgently proceed with implementation as soon as possible in a transparent 
manner.”80 
State Party Tuvalu must provide an initial Article 7 transparency report for the treaty, to 
formally confirm that it does not possess stockpiled antipersonnel mines.81 
MINES RETAINED FOR TRAINING AND RESEARCH 
(ARTICLE 3)
Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty allows a State Party to retain or transfer “a number of anti-
personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or 
mine destruction techniques…The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum 
number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.”
A total of 64 States Parties have reported that they retain antipersonnel mines for training 
and research purposes, of which 29 retain more than 1,000 mines and three (Sri Lanka, 
Finland, and Bangladesh) each retain more than 12,000 mines. Ninety-eight States Parties 
have declared that they do not retain any antipersonnel mines, including 40 states that had 
stockpiled antipersonnel mines in the past.82  
In addition to those listed above, another 32 States Parties each retain fewer than 1,000 
mines and together possess a total of 13,758 retained mines.83
Botswana, Brazil, and Uruguay all reported in 2020 that they destroyed their remaining 
retained mines (1,002, 364, and 260, respectively) during calendar year 2019. 
The ICBL has expressed concern at the large number of States Parties that are retaining 
mines but apparently not using those mines for permitted purposes. For these States Parties, 
the number of mines retained remains the same each year, indicating none are being 
consumed (destroyed) during training or research activities. No other details have been 
provided about how the mines are being used. A total of seven States Parties have never 
reported consuming any mines retained for the permitted purposes since the treaty entered 
into force for them: Djibouti, Nigeria, and Oman (which each retain more than 1,000 mines).
77 Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form B, November 2018, bit.ly/SriLankaArt72018.
78 Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form B, April 2019, bit.ly/SriLankaArt72019.
79 Greece had a deadline for stockpile destruction of 1 March 2008, while Ukraine had a deadline of 1 June 2010.
80 Oslo Action Plan, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, 29 November 2019, bit.ly/OsloActionPlan 
2019.
81 Tuvalu has not made an official declaration, but is not thought to possess antipersonnel mines.
82 In 2018, Argentina, Cambodia, and Ethiopia destroyed the entirety of their stockpiles retained for training 
and research, and the UK announced that its stockpile was comprised of inert munitions that do not fall under 
the scope of the treaty. Tuvalu has not submitted an initial Article 7 report, which was originally due in 2012.
83 Zambia (907), Mali (900), Mozambique (900), the Netherlands (868), BiH (834), Honduras (826), Japan 
(803), Mauritania (728), Cambodia (720), Italy (617), Germany (583), South Africa (576), Sudan (528), 
Cyprus (500), Zimbabwe (450), Togo (436), Nicaragua (435), Portugal (383), Republic of the Congo (322), 
Cote d’Ivoire (290), Slovenia (272), Bhutan (211), Cape Verde (120), Eritrea (101), Gambia (100), Jordan 








The Oslo Action Plan calls for any State Party that retains antipersonnel mines under 
Article 3 to “annually review the number of mines retained to ensure that they do not exceed 
the minimum number absolutely necessary for permitted purposes” and to “destroy all anti-
personnel mines that exceed that number.”84
84 Oslo Action Plan, Action #16, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, 29 November 2019, 
bit.ly/OsloActionPlan2019. 
States retaining more than 1,000 antipersonnel mines














Sri Lanka 21,153 (2018) 21,153 0 N/A –
Finland 15,982 (2019) 16,500 210 2019 –
Bangladesh 12,050 (2016) 15,000 0 2013 –
Turkey 6,552 (2019) 16,000 2,707 2019 5,159
Sweden 6,009 (2019) 13,948 0 2018 –
Greece 5,585 (2019) 7,224 14 2019 –
Croatia 4,921 (2019) 17,500 52 2019 –
Venezuela 4,875 (2011) 4,960 N/R 2010 –
Belarus 4,505 (2019) 7,530 0 2017 1,484
Tunisia 4,375 (2019) 5,000 30 2019 –
Yemen 3,760 (2016) 4,000 0 2008 –
Nigeria 3,364 (2011) 3,364 N/R None ever –
Bulgaria 3,318 (2018) 10,466 0 2018 6,446
Serbia 3,134 (2018) 5,000 0 2017 1,970
Djibouti 2,996 (2004) 2,996 N/R Unclear –
Indonesia 2,454 (2015) 4,978 N/R 2009 2,524
Romania 2,249 (2019) 4,000 146 2019 1,500
Czech Rep. 2,155 (2019) 4,859 25 2019 –
Belgium 2,044 (2019) 5,980 22 2019 –
Peru 2,015 (2019) 9,526 0 2012 7,487
Oman 2,000 (2017) 2,000 N/R None ever –
France 1,842 (2019) 4,539 2,099 2019 –
Tanzania 1,780 (2008) 1,146 N/R 2007 –
Uganda 1,764 (2011) 2,400 N/R 2003 –
Denmark 1,736 (2019) 4,991 47 2019 2,900
Canada 1,649 (2019) 1,781 229 2019 –
Namibia 1,634 (2009) 9,999 N/R 2009 –
Spain 1,547 (2017) 10,000 N/R 2017 6,000
Angola 1,304 (2019) 1,460 0 2018 –
Chile 1,192 (2019) 28,647 0 2018 23,694
Slovakia 1,035 (2019) 7,000 0 2018 5,500
Kenya 1,020 (2007) 3,000 N/R 2007 –
Total 131,999 256,947 5,581 64,664
Note: N/A=not applicable; N/R=not reported.
22 
Additionally, States Parties agreed to Action #49, wherein the treaty’s president is given a 
new role to play in ensuring compliance with Article 3. This has been described by some as 
an “early warning mechanism.” The action point states, “If no information on implementing 
the relevant obligations [of Articles 3, 4, or 5] for two consecutive years is provided, the 
President will assist and engage with the States Parties concerned….”85
While laudable in terms of transparency, several States Parties still report retaining 
antipersonnel mines and devices that are fuzeless, inert, rendered free from explosives, or 
otherwise irrevocably rendered incapable of functioning as an antipersonnel mine, including 
by the destruction of the fuzes. Technically, these are no longer considered antipersonnel 
mines as defined by the Mine Ban Treaty. At least 13 States Parties retain antipersonnel 
mines in this condition.86
TRANSPARENCY REPORTING
Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires that each State Party “report to the Secretary 
General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 
days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party” regarding steps taken 
to implement the treaty. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report annually, by 30 
April, on the preceding calendar year.
Tuvalu is the only State Party that has not provided an initial transparency report, after 
missing its 28 August 2012 deadline.
As of 15 October 2020, 46% of States Parties had submitted their annual Article 7 reports 
for calendar year 2019.87 A total of 89 States Parties have not submitted a report for calendar 
year 2019, of which most have failed to provide an annual transparency report for two or 
more years.88
Nigeria, Yemen, and other states with recent allegations or confirmed reports of use of 
improvised landmines by NSAGs have failed to provide information on new contamination 
in their annually updated Article 7 reports.
Morocco, a state not party, submitted voluntary transparency reports from 2017–2020 (as 
well as in 2006, 2008–2011, and 2013). In previous years, Azerbaijan (2008–2009), Lao PDR 
(2010), Mongolia (2007), Palestine (2012–2013), and Sri Lanka (2005) submitted voluntary 
Article 7 reports.
In 2019, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic submitted a voluntary Article 7 report, 
covering the period from June 2014 to November 2019, and which included information on 
contamination and clearance as well as casualties and victim assistance in Western Sahara. 
85 Oslo Action Plan, Action #49, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, 29 November 2019, 
bit.ly/OsloActionPlan2019.
86 Afghanistan, Australia, BiH, Canada, Eritrea, France, the Gambia, Germany, Lithuania, Mozambique, Senegal, 
Serbia, and the UK.
87 Senegal submitted its Article 7 report in October 2020, although the report is not in the correct Article 7 
format.
88 States that have not submitted Article 7 reports for two or more years are noted in italics: Albania, Andorra, 
Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bulgaria, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, 
Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Dominica, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, 
Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, 
Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Moldova, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Niger, Niue, North Macedonia, Palau, Papua New Guinea, 
Paraguay, Qatar, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, 
Sri Lanka, Suriname, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, 























A MAG team marking off a known dangerous area in Canage village, Angola.









This summary highlights developments and challenges in assessing and addressing the 
impact of mines. The first part of this overview covers contamination and casualties, while 
the second section focuses on land release through clearance, risk education, and victim 
assistance. These make up three of the five core components or “pillars” of mine action. 
Reporting in this overview contributes to a baseline for developments under the Oslo 
Action Plan, the five-year action plan of the Mine Ban Treaty adopted in November 2019. 
These actions remain consistent with the fulfillment of the objectives of the treaty, whereby 
States Parties declare that they are: 
“Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel 
mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless 
civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, 
inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe 
consequences for years after emplacement.”
There are 33 States Parties that have declared having obligations under Article 5 of the 
Mine Ban Treaty to clear contaminated land. Most of them reported undertaking clearance 
in areas under their jurisdiction and control in 2019. Three States Parties need to clarify 
the extent of residual contamination while five States Parties need to provide information 
regarding suspected or known contamination by improvised mines. Overall, high numbers of 
casualties due to landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) continued to be recorded 
in 2019, following a sharp rise in casualties due to increased conflict and contamination 
in 2015. The majority of new casualties were reported in States Parties to the treaty that 
also experience contamination by mines of an improvised nature. In 2019, 28 States Parties 
were known to have provided risk education to populations affected by antipersonnel mine 
contamination. At least 34 States Parties have responsibility for significant numbers of mine 
victims—these States Parties have “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest 
needs and expectations for assistance.” Many indicated improvements in the accessibility, 
quality, or quantity of services for victims, but significant challenges remained in all states. 
26 
CONTAMINATION
ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION IN STATES 
PARTIES
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, States Parties are required to clear all antipersonnel 
mines as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the treaty. 
In early 2020, Chile became the latest State Party to declare completion of clearance 
of all mined areas in its territory,1 an achievement that will be formally announced at 
the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2020. Jordan, which had originally 
declared completion in 2012, completed verification and clearance of areas that had not 
been cleared to a humanitarian standard in 2018.2 
No State Party declared completion of clearance in 2019. Since the Mine Ban Treaty came 
into force in 1999, of the 63 States Parties that reported mined areas under their jurisdiction 
and control, 32 States Parties have reported clearance of all antipersonnel mines from their 
territory. 
State Party El Salvador completed clearance in 1994, before the treaty came into force. 
States Parties that have declared fulfilment of clearance obligations 
since 1999
1999 Bulgaria 2010 Nicaragua
2003 Costa Rica 2011 Nigeria**
2004 Djibouti, Honduras, Suriname 2012 Republic of the Congo, Denmark, 
Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Uganda
2005 Guatemala 2013 Bhutan, Germany***, Greece***, 
Hungary***, Venezuela
2006 North Macedonia 2014 Burundi***
2007 Eswatini (formerly Swaziland) 2017 Algeria*, Mozambique***
2008 France, Malawi 2018 Jordan***, Mauritania**
2009 Albania, Rwanda, Tunisia*, 
Zambia
2020 Chile
* Algeria and Tunisia are suspected of having residual or new contamination.
** Mauritania and Nigeria have since reported finding new contamination.
*** Declared fulfilment after verification of contaminated areas found after initial declaration of 
completion.
Several States Parties that have declared themselves free of antipersonnel mines later 
discovered previously unknown mine contamination, or were required to verify that areas 
had been cleared to humanitarian standards.3 Burundi, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Jordan, and 
Mozambique all finally declared fulfilment of Article 5 obligations several years after their 
initial declarations.
Mauritania, which declared itself free of mines in 2018,  reported finding new contamination 
in 2019 and submitted a request for an extension of its Article 5 deadline in 2020. Nigeria 
announced it had fulfilled its obligation under Article 5 in 2011, but indicated newly-mined 
areas in 2019. It was expected to submit an Article 7 report and an Article 5 extension 
request in 2020.  
1 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention press release, “Chile Ends Mine Clearance Operations: The Americas 
a step closer to becoming a mine free region,” 3 March 2020, bit.ly/MBTPressRelease3March2020. 
2 Jordan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), pp. 13-14, bit.ly/JordanMBTArticle 
7Report2019; and email from Col. Breikat, National Director, National Committee for Demining and 
Rehabilitation (NCDR), 19 September 2019.
3 Previously unknown mined areas are often identified through reports of incidents and casualties, or after 








States Parties that verified contaminated areas after declaration of 
clearance
State Party Initial declaration of clearance completion








States Parties with Article 5 obligations 
As of 15 October 2020, a total of 33 States Parties have declared an identified threat of 
antipersonnel mine contamination on territory under their jurisdiction or control and 
therefore have obligations under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty.





































* Argentina is mine-affected by virtue of its assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas 
Malvinas. The UK also claims sovereignty over the islands and exercises control over them.
** Cyprus states that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under Cypriot control.
*** Nigeria has stated its intention to submit an Article 7 transparency report and to develop an Article 
5 extension request to provide detail on its mine contamination.
States Parties suspected of having contamination
Several States Parties that have not declared obligations under Article 5, may have residual 
or newly discovered mine contamination which needs to be reported and clarified.
Residual contamination
Algeria declared fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations in 2017, but continues to find and destroy 
antipersonnel mines. In 2019, Algeria reported that 4,499 “isolated” mines were cleared and 
destroyed, a huge increase from the 188 mines found in 2018.4 In total, 5,150 mines were 
reported cleared and destroyed during 2016–2019. Given the large number of mines found 
in 2019, Algeria needs to provide clarification to States Parties on whether the mines being 
found constitute contaminated areas rather than isolated residual contamination.
There have been several mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties reported in 
Kuwait since 1990. In 2018, there were reports of torrential rain having unearthed landmines 
in the country, presumed to be remnants of the 1991 Gulf War.5 The mines are believed to 
be present mainly on the borders between Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq; areas used by 
4 Algeria Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019) p. 30, bit.ly/AlgeriaMBTArticle 
7Report2020. 
5 Naser Al Wasmi, “Torrential downpour unearths landmines in Kuwait,” The National, 21 November 2018, 
bit.ly/TheNational21November2018. 
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shepherds for grazing animals. Kuwait 
has not made a formal declaration of 
contamination in line with its Article 5 
obligations.
Nicaragua declared completion 
of clearance in April 2010, but has 
since faced a problem of residual 
mine/ERW contamination throughout 
the country. During 2018, Nicaragua 
reported that its contingency 
operations answered 13 reports made 
by the population, resulting in the 
clearance of 2,849m² and removal and 
destruction of 29 items of unexploded 
ordnance. Nicaragua confirmed that 
the contingency operations would 
continue through 2019, but no updated 
information has been shared.6 In May 
2020, two landmines exploded in El 
Bayuncun, San Fernando, in the border 
region with Honduras, injuring one 
person in the first incident and four 
people from a rescue party in the second.7
Improvised mine contamination
Several States Parties that have not declared clearance obligations under Article 5 or 
which do not provide regular Article 7 transparency reports, are suspected of having 
contamination by improvised mines. Improvised devices designed to detonate, or able 
to be detonated, by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person are prohibited by the 
Mine Ban Treaty.8 States Parties with improvised mines have obligations under Article 5 
to clear these devices and, under Article 7, to provide annual reporting on contamination 
and clearance. 
The following States Parties need to clarify their status with regards to their Article 5 
obligations. 
In Burkina Faso, use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by non-state armed groups 
(NSAGs) has been recorded since 2016. Pressure-operated improvised antivehicle mines 
have been increasingly used since 2018. In 2019, 21 civilians died and 14 were wounded 
by these devices. Improvised mines using pressure plates have also been recorded, with 
persistent armed attacks in northern and eastern regions since 2018.9
Cameroon originally declared that there were no mined areas under its jurisdiction 
and control, and its Article 5 deadline expired in 2013. However, since 2014, mines of an 
improvised nature have caused casualties, particularly in Cameroon’s northern districts along 
6 Nicaragua Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), p. 4, bit.ly/NicaraguaMBTArticle 
7Report2019. 
7 La Segovias en Noticias, “One deceased and 4 injured in antipersonnel mines incident in the border with 
Honduras,” 12 May 2020. Facebook, bit.ly/FacebookNicaraguaMay2020. 
8 In Monitor reporting, improvised mines are synonymous with victim-activated IEDs. IEDs are “homemade” 
explosive weapons that are designed to cause death or injury. Improvised mines are victim-activated IEDs 
that are detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or vehicle. These are sometimes 
referred to as artisanal mines, victim-operated IEDs (VO-IEDs), or are referred to by the type of construction 
or initiation system, such as pressure-plate IEDs (PP-IEDs) and crush wire IEDs.
9 United Nations (UN), “Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices: report of the 
Secretary-General,” 17 July 2020, p. 4. Produced for the 75th session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA).
A PMN-2 antipersonnel mine found in Panj district, Tajikistan. 








the border with Nigeria, as Boko Haram’s military activities have escalated.10 The extent of 
contamination is not known but is believed to be small.
Mali has confirmed antivehicle mine contamination and since 2017 has experienced a significant 
increase in incidents caused by IEDs, including improvised mines, in the center of the country.11 The 
United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported to the Monitor that improvised mines in 
Mali are victim-activated by pressure tray or wire trap (see section on casualties).12
Nigeria declared at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, in November 2011, that it had 
cleared all known antipersonnel mines from its territory.13 However, since 2017, there have 
been reports of incidents involving both civilian and military casualties from landmines and 
a range of other locally produced explosive devices planted by Boko Haram in the northeast 
of the country, particularly in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states.14 In November 2019, at the 
Fourth Review Conference in Oslo, Nigeria stated that it intended to submit an Article 7 
transparency report and an Article 5 deadline extension request in order to comply with its 
obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty, although it has yet to do this as of 15 October 2020.15
Tunisia declared completion of clearance in 2009, but there have been reports of both 
civilian and military casualties from landmines and improvised mines in the last five years.16 
The improvised mines causing casualties, particularly to shepherds walking their herds, 
are predominantly found in the mountainous areas of Tunisia’s northwest and southwest 
regions,17 where militants are present and laying mines as an insurgency tactic.18
Extent of contamination in States Parties
Massive antipersonnel mine contamination (defined by the ICBL-CMC as more than 100km²) 
is believed to exist in 10 States Parties: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, 
Croatia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and Yemen. Large contamination (20–
99km²) exists in five States Parties: Angola, Chad, Eritrea, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe. Medium 
contamination (5–19km²) exists in six States Parties: Colombia, Mauritania, Somalia, South 
Sudan, Sudan, and Tajikistan. Less than 5km² of contamination is thought to exist in 11 
States Parties: Cyprus, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ecuador, Niger, Oman, 
Palestine, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, and in the United Kingdom (UK) and Argentina due to their 
claim of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. 
10 Moki Edwin Kindzeka, “Land Mines Hamper Cameroon, Chad in Fight Against Boko Haram,” Voice of America, 
3 March 2015, bit.ly/BokoHaramVOA3March2015; and Moki Edwin Kindzeka, “Boko Haram Surrounds 
Havens with Land Mines,” Voice of America, 24 May 2015, bit.ly/BokoHaramVOA24May2015. 
11 UNMAS, “Programmes: Mali,” 31 August 2019, unmas.org/en/programmes/mali.
12 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Leonie Evers, UNMAS Mali, 5 October 2020.
13 Statement of Nigeria, Mine Ban Treaty Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Phnom Penh, 29 November 
2011. In January 2017, a civil war-era landmine was found in Ebonyi state, which villagers thought was 
an IED. Police forensics concluded it was a landmine left over from the conflict which ended 47 years 
previously, that had washed up in a river. A bomb squad destroyed the device, and according to the police, 
the area was searched and no evidence of other contamination was found. James Eze, “Nigeria: Civil War 
Explosive Found in Ebonyi Community – Police,” AllAfrica, 17 January 2017, bit.ly/AllAfrica17Jan2017.
14 Julia Payne, “Nigeria’s military believes it has Boko Haram cornered, but landmines are getting in the way,” 
Reuters, 2 May 2015, bit.ly/BusinessInsider2May2015; and “Nigeria: Landmine Blast Kills Soldier, Three 
Vigilantes in Sambisa Forest,” AllAfrica, 24 April 2015, bit.ly/AllAfrica24Apr2015. 
15 Statement of Nigeria, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 27 November 2019.
16 In 2016, the Monitor reported the highest number of casualties of mines and victim-activated IEDs in 
Tunisia since monitoring began in 1999. There were 65 casualties in 2016, up from 20 in 2015. Since 
2016, there have been between 17–20 casualties in Tunisia each year. ICBL-CMC, ‘‘Country Profile: Tunisia: 
Casualties,’’ last updated 23 January 2018, bit.ly/TunisiaProfileCasualties2018.
17 Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), Curated file: Africa. Data extracted for 2017–
2019, acleddata.com/#/dashboard. 
18 “Tunisia: Two killed in land mine blast in jihadist hideout near Algeria border,” The Defense 
Post, 25 September 2018, bit.ly/DefensePost25Sept2018; and Matt Herbert, “The Insurgency in 
Tunisia’s Western Borderlands,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 28 June 2018, bit.ly/
TunisiaReportCEIPJune2018. 
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Estimated area of antipersonnel mine contamination in States Parties
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* While Ethiopia’s estimated contamination is massive, it is expected that this will be significantly 
reduced through survey.
** Ukraine estimates around 7,000 km² of contaminated land,19 but this cannot be reliably verified until 
survey has been conducted.
*** Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas, which still 
contain mined areas. 
**** Cyprus states that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under its control. 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen have significantly over 100km2 of contamination, comprising 
both legacy contamination and new contamination, including improvised mines.
Iraq is dealing with contamination by improvised mines in areas liberated from the 
Islamic State. Iraq reported 1,239.17km² of antipersonnel mine contamination at the end of 
2019, and an additional 627.58km² of contamination by improvised mines.20  
Yemen currently has no clear understanding of the size of its contamination as the ongoing 
conflict continues to add to the extent and complexity of contamination.21 Landmines that 
were not part of Yemeni stockpiles have reportedly been laid recently,22 while previously 
cleared areas, such as Aden, have been re-contaminated.23 The most recent estimate of 
contamination, from March 2017, was 323km².24 
19 Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 8 June 2020, p. 1, bit.ly/UkraineExtension 
Request2020. 
20 Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), pp. 20–23, bit.ly/IraqArticle7Report2020. 
In 2019, Mine Action Review reported that the full extent of contamination in Iraq is unclear, 
but estimated it to be at least 500km². See Mine Action Review, “Clearing the Mines 2019,” p. 48, 
bit.ly/MineActionReview2019. 
21 Yemen reported that trying to highlight the exact area of contamination would be misleading and 
possibly damaging to future reports. See, Yemen Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), 
Form D, p. 12. bit.ly/YemenArticle7Report2020.
22 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), “Republic of Yemen Emergency Mine Action Project: 
Annual Progress Report 2019,” 20 January 2020, bit.ly/YemenMineActionUNDP2020. 
23 Yemen Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 8 August 2019, p. 9, bit.ly/Yemen 
RevisedExtRequest2019. 









Afghanistan reported contamination of 191km² at the end of 2019, of which 136km² is 
classified as confirmed hazardous area (CHA) and 55km² as suspected hazardous area (SHA).25 
Afghanistan told the Monitor that new contamination resulting from fighting between the 
government and NSAGs is adding to the extent of contamination to be addressed.26
Cambodia and Thailand still need to verify the extent of contamination along border 
areas where access has been problematic due to a lack of border demarcation.27 Cambodia 
estimates 817km², which includes both CHA and SHA which are not yet differentiated on the 
database of the Cambodian Mine Action Authority (CMAA).28 Thailand reports 218.19km², of 
which 14.55km² are CHA and 203.64km² are SHA.29
Turkey’s contamination of 150.41km² is found along its borders with Armenia, Iran, Iraq, 
and Syria.30 Turkey also has responsibility for the clearance of landmines in areas under its 
control in Northern Cyprus; although its most recent Article 5 extension request, submitted 
in 2013, did not include a timeline for clearance of mines there.31 
BiH has also not defined the full extent of contamination although it has been undertaking 
a country assessment project since 2018, funded by the European Union (EU).32 In its revised 
Article 5 extension request, submitted in August 2020, BiH reports contamination of 
966.68km².33 
At the end of 2019, eight of Croatia’s 21 counties were still mine-affected.34 Croatia reported 
to the Monitor that more than 98% of the remaining contaminated land is in forest areas.35
Ukraine has reported 7,000km² of contaminated land,36 but this cannot be reliably verified 
until survey has been conducted.
Ethiopia, in its Article 7 report for calendar year 2019, reported that 330.28km² had been 
released through technical survey and non-technical survey (NTS).37 It is expected that the 
current figure of remaining contamination (over 10,000km²) will be significantly reduced 
through survey.38
25 Afghanistan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form C, p. 10, bit.ly/
AfghanistanArticle7Report2020. In April 2020, it was reported that antipersonnel mine contamination 
in Afghanistan is 171km² (CHA: 120km² and SHA: 51km²), while contamination from improvised mines 
is 37km² (CHA: 16km² and SHA: 21km²). Response to Monitor questionnaire by Fazel Rahman, Project 
Manager Operations, DMAC, 16 April 2020.
26 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Fazel Rahman, Project Manager Operations, DMAC, 16 April 2020.
27 Improved relationships between Thailand and Cambodia have led to cooperation to survey and clear 
border areas. See, Khouth Sophak Chakrya, “CMAC, Thais join forces to clear mines at border provinces,” 
The Phnom Penh Post, 24 September 2019, bit.ly/PhnomPenhPost24Sept2019. 
28 Cambodia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), pp. 6–7, bit.ly/CambodiaArticle 
7Report2020; and email from Ros Sophal, Database Unit Manager, CMAA, 23 July 2020.
29 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Flt. Lt. Chotiboon Anukulvanich, Interpreter and Coordinator, TMAC, 
2 June 2020.
30 Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form D, p. 8, bit.ly/
TurkeyArticle7Report2020. 
31 Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2013, bit.ly/TurkeyExtension 
Request2013. 
32 BiH Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 25 August 2020, pp. 5 and 10, bit.ly/
BiHArt5ExtRequestRevised2020. 
33 BiH Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 25 August 2020, p. 16, bit.ly/BiHArt5 
ExtRequestRevised2020. 
34 Croatia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), bit.ly/CroatiaArticle7Report2020. 
35 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Tajana Čičak, Internal Supervisor for General Affairs, Civil Protection 
Directorate, 28 April 2020.
36 Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, submitted on 27 
August 2020, p. 2, bit.ly/UkraineAdditionalInformation.
37 Ethiopia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form D, p. 4, bit.ly/EthiopiaArticle 
7Report2020. 
38 Ethiopia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form D, p. 3, bit.ly/EthiopiaArticle 
7Report2020. 
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Sub-Saharan Africa has a number of States Parties with heavy contamination of between 
20–99km². These are Angola, Chad, Eritrea, and Zimbabwe. Sri Lanka also has less than 
100km² of reported contamination.
In 2019, Angola completed non-technical survey in all 18 provinces of the country, 
defining 1,073 confirmed minefields, and 94 suspected minefields which are estimated at 
90km² in total.39 
Chad has about 93.3km² of contamination, of which 93.27km² are CHA and 0.05km² 
SHA.40 This includes 2.93km² of improvised mine contamination. 
Eritrea has not reported on the extent of its contamination since 2013, when it was 
estimated at 33.5km².41 
Zimbabwe’s minefields on its border with Mozambique, and an inland minefield in 
Matebeleland North province, were reported to cover a combined total area of 42.69km² at 
the end of 2019.42 
Sri Lanka reported 24km² of contaminated land as of April 2019.43 The majority of this 
area was confirmed as minefields (22.42 km²). 
Colombia, Mauritania, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Tajikistan are each believed to 
have less than 19km² of mine contamination. 
Colombia’s mine contamination comprises 8.2km², of which 3.3km² are in the process 
of being cleared, and a projected 4.9km² of suspected contamination which has not yet 
been surveyed.44 However, this does not include 166 municipalities that are inaccessible due 
to insecurity, where no survey or clearance has been able to take place. Contamination in 
Colombia also includes improvised mines. 
Mauritania had previously declared clearance of all known contaminated areas in 2018, 
but has since identified further contaminated areas, approximately 8km², a legacy of the 
1976–1978 Western Sahara conflict.45 However, Mauritania needs to confirm whether this 
contamination is actually on its territory.
Somalia reported that at the end of 2019 it had 6.09km² of contaminated land,46 but it 
has also reported an increase in the use of improvised mines.47
South Sudan, Sudan, and Tajikistan all have a relatively clear understanding of the extent 
of their remaining contamination, at 13.27km², 7.37km², and 11.95km² respectively.48 
39 Angola Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form J, p. 10, bit.ly/AngolaArticle 
7Report2020. 
40 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Brahim Djibrim Brahim, Coordinator, National High Commission for 
Demining (HCND), 20 April 2020.
41 Eritrea Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 January 2014, p. 8, 
bit.ly/EritreaExtensionRequest2014. 
42 Zimbabwe Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form D, p. 3, bit.ly/ZimbabweArticle 
7Report2020. 
43 Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), p. 9, bit.ly/SriLankaArticle7Report2019. 
44 Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Clarifications to the Committee, 31 July 
2020, pp. 10–11. 
45 Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), bit.ly/MauritaniaArticle7Report2020; 
and statement of Mauritania, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings (virtual), Committee on Article 5 
Implementation, 2 July 2020.
46 Somalia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), p. 2, bit.ly/SomaliaArticle7Report2020. 
47 Somalia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), p. 5, bit.ly/SomaliaArticle7Report2020. 
48 South Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 21 August 2020, p. 30, 
bit.ly/SouthSudanRevisedExtRequest2020; Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 
2019) Form C, p. 8, bit.ly/SudanArticle7Report2020; and Tajikistan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 








States Parties Cyprus, the DRC, Ecuador, Niger, Senegal, Serbia, Oman, Palestine, Peru, and 
the UK all have less than 5km² of contamination. However, some of the contamination is in 
areas that are contentious or difficult to access, as follows.
Cyprus reports no antipersonnel mines remaining in minefields laid by the National 
Guard that are on territory under its effective control.49 Remaining contamination is in the 
buffer zone and areas of Turkish-controlled Northern Cyprus.50 
The contamination in the DRC is small, but partly located in Ituri and North-Kivu provinces 
which are difficult to access due to the presence of NSAGs and the Ebola epidemic.51 
In Palestine, clearance in the West Bank is constrained by political factors, including the 
lack of authorization granted by Israel for Palestine to conduct mine clearance operations. 
ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION IN STATES NOT 
PARTY AND OTHER AREAS 
In addition to the 33 States Parties contaminated by antipersonnel mines, there are also 22 
states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty and five other areas that have, or are believed to have, 
land contaminated by antipersonnel mines on their territories.




























Note: other areas are indicated in italics.
State not party Nepal and other area Taiwan have completed clearance of known mined 
areas since 1999. 
Extent of contamination in states not party and other areas
Mines are known or suspected to be located along the borders of several states not party, 
including Armenia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Morocco, North Korea, South Korea, and Uzebkistan, 
although the extent of contamination is not known.
The extent of contamination is known in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Israel, and Lebanon; 
although in Azerbaijan significant contamination also exists in the areas that are 
not under government control, particularly in the regions of Nagorno-Karabakh and 
Nakhchivan.52 The outbreak of hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh in late September 2020 had 
added further complexity to the political dynamics in the region, and is resulting in new ERW 
contamination, including cluster munitions.53 
Ongoing conflict, insecurity, and the impact of improvised mines affect states not party 
Egypt, India, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Syria.
49 Cyprus Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form C, p. 4, bit.ly/CyprusArticle 
7Report2019. 
50 UNMAS, “Programmes: Cyprus,” updated October 2020, unmas.org/en/programmes/cyprus. 
51 Statement of DRC, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings (virtual), 2 July 2020.
52 United States Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Office of Weapons 
Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA), “To Walk the Earth in Safety, 2014-2015,” 2016, p. 31, 
bit.ly/ToWalkTheEarthInSafety2016. 
53 ICBL-CMC, “CMC Condemns Cluster Munitions Attacks in Nagorno-Karabakh,” 6 October 2020, 
bit.ly/Nagorno-KarabakhCMC2020. 
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States not party Lao PDR and Lebanon are both party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions 
and have prioritized clearance of cluster munition remnants. The mine contamination in Lao 
PDR has had little human impact, although clearance operators reported mine contamination 
in their areas of operation in 2019.54 In Vietnam, the mine problem is also small compared to 
its ERW problem, although the full extent of mine contamination is not known.
The extent of mine contamination in China, Cuba, Iran, and Russia is unknown. 
Five other areas unable to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty due to their political status are 
known to have mine contamination. 
In Abkhazia, which had been declared free of landmine contamination in 2011,55 The 
HALO Trust identified five previously unknown minefields from June–December 2019, 
amounting to aproximately 9,600m².56 
Kosovo, which completed a socioeconomic baseline of the impact of ERW in 2018 to 
support the prioritization of remaining contamination, has 35 affected areas totaling 
1.35km².57 
The HALO Trust, the only operator in Nagorno-Karabakh, has been undertaking a baseline 
survey of the territory to establish the extent of contamination. A total of 9km² has been 
identified.58 Further progress will be dependent on the outcome of hostilities which erupted 
in September 2020.
As of August 2020, Somaliland had 6.71km² of CHA across ten districts.59 In Western 
Sahara, there are 15 known remaining minefields east of the Berm,60 covering a total area 
of 95.8km².61
CASUALTIES
Landmines of all types, including antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, and improvised 
mines, as well as cluster munition remnants62 and other explosive remnants of war (ERW)—
henceforth mines/ERW—remain a significant threat and continue to cause indiscriminate 
harm. 
MINE/ERW CASUALTIES IN 2019 
At least 5,554 people were killed or injured by mines/ERW in calendar year 2019. Of that 
total, at least 2,170 were killed, and another 3,357 were injured, while in the case of 27 
54 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Julien Kempeneers, Armed Violence Reduction/Humanitarian 
Mine Action (AVR/HMA) Coordinator, Humanity & Inclusion (HI), 20 May 2020; and by Tamsin Haigh, 
Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 30 April 2020.
55 HALO Trust, “Where We Work: Georgia,” undated, bit.ly/HALOTrustGeorgia. 
56 Email from Michael Montafi, Program Officer, HALO Trust, 31 July 2020.
57 Email from Ahmet Sallova, Director, Kosovo Mine Action Centre (KMAC), 10 July 2020; and Mine Action 
Review questionnaire completed by KMAC on antipersonnel landmine contamination, survey, and 
clearance in Kosovo in 2019, received in 2020 and responses shared with Landmine and Cluster Munition 
Monitor. 
58 Email from Alina Aslanian, Program Officer, HALO Trust, 30 July 2020.
59 Email from Eilidh French, Program Officer, HALO Trust, 29 August 2020.
60 A 2,700km-long defensive wall, the Berm, was built during the conflict, dividing control of the territory 
between Morocco on the west, and the Polisario Front on the east. The Berm is 12 times the length of the 
Berlin Wall and second in length only to the Great Wall of China.
61 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Bidi Salec, Information Management Officer, Sahrawi Mine Action 
Coordination Office (SMACO), 4 June 2020. 
62 Casualties from cluster munition remnants are included in the Monitor’s global mine/ERW casualty data. 
Casualties occurring during a cluster munition attack are not included in this data; however, they are 
reported in the annual Cluster Munition Monitor report. For more information on casualties caused by 








casualties it was not known if the victim survived.63 Casualties were recorded in 50 countries 
and five other areas. The 2019 total represents a decline from 6,897 casualties of mines/
ERW in 2018, and a reduction in casualties over the past three years. Previously, a sharp rise 
in casualties was recorded due to increased conflict and contamination in 2015, peaking in 
2016, when 9,439 casualties were recorded.64 The significant upsurge in recorded casualties 
since 2014 is primarily due to large numbers of casualties in relatively few countries with 
intensive armed conflicts, involving the large-scale use of improvised mines.
In 2019, more than two-thirds of all casualties (3,647, or 66%) were reported in States 
Parties. Thus, the impact in terms of casualties caused by mines/ERW in States Parties alone 
was still greater in 2019 than globally in 2013—the year with the lowest annual number of 
casualties recorded since 1999, when 3,457 people were killed and injured in all countries 
and areas.
Civilians represented the majority of mine/ERW casualties compared to military and 
security forces,65 continuing the well-established trend of civilian harm that influenced the 
adoption of the Mine Ban Treaty: 80% of casualties were civilians in 2019, where the status 
was known. 
Child casualties are recorded where the age of the victim is less than 18 years at the time 
of the mine/ERW explosion, or when the casualty was reported by the source (such as media) 
as being a child. There were at least 1,562 child casulaties in 2019, accounting for 35% of 
all casualties for whom the age group was known (4,508); this made up 43% of civilian 
casualties for whom the age group was known (3,598). Children were killed (580) or injured 
(979) by mines/ERW in 34 states and one other area in 2019.66 As in previous years, in 2019, 
the vast majority of child casualties where the sex was known were boys (82%).67 ERW was 
the device type that caused the most child casualties (758, or 49%), followed by improvised 
mines (576, 37%).
In 2019, men and boys made up the majority of casualties, accounting for 85% of all 
casualties for whom the sex was known (3,190 of 3,759). Women and girls made up 15% of 
all casualties for whom the sex was known (569).
In 2019, the Monitor identified 23 casualties among deminers in nine countries (including 
17 men and two women, and four for whom the sex was not recorded).68 Another eight 
casualties were state military, police or other security personnel who were killed or injured 
while clearing, disarming, or dismantling mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).69 
There were two informal village deminer casualties in Cambodia in 2019. These were not 
included in the annual total of deminer casualties.
63 As in previous years, there was no substantial data available on the numbers of people indirectly impacted 
as a result of mine/ERW casualties and this information was not included in the Monitor’s mine/ERW 
casualty database.
64 The revised 2016 casualty number as reported by Landmine Monitor 2019.
65 The category “military” includes police forces and private security forces when active in combat as well 
as members of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and militias. Direct participation in armed conflict, also 
called direct participation in hostilities, distinguishes persons who are not civilians in accordance with 
international humanitarian law, whereby “those involved in the fighting must make a basic distinction 
between combatants, who may be lawfully attacked, and civilians, who are protected against attack unless 
and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities.” International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 
“Direct participation in hostilities: questions & answers,” 2 June 2009, bit.ly/ICRCDirectParticipationFAQ.
66 The survival outcome for three children was not reported. In 2019, child casualties were recorded in 
Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC), India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, Myanmar, 
Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, 
Yemen, and Zimbabwe, as well as other area Somaliland.
67 There were 921 boys and 204 girls recorded as casualties in 2019, while the sex of 437 child casualties 
was not recorded.
68 In 2019, casualties among humanitarian deminers were reported in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, 
Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Ukraine.
69 These casualties occurred in Pakistan and Ukraine. 
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Countries with high and increasing numbers of casualties are 
mostly those with improvised mine casualties. For the fourth 
successive year, in 2019, the highest number of annual casualties was 
caused by improvised mines (2,994). However, the number of recorded 
improvised mine casualties declined significantly from 2018, which 
saw an all-time high of 3,789 improvised mine casualties. 
CASUALTIES IN STATES PARTIES IN 2019 
Casualties occurred in 36 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in 
2019.70 The States Parties with over 100 recorded casualties were: 
Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Ukraine, and Yemen.
States Parties with high and increasing numbers of casualties 
were those with improvised mine casualties. Collectively, States 
Parties recorded only 26% of the commercially-manufactured 
antipersonnel mine casualties reported in 2019 (124). States Parties 
accounted for 62% (1,853) of improvised mine casualties and 74% 
(316) of casualties from undefined landmine types that, in the 
context of media reporting terminology, are also likely to be mines 
of an improvised nature.
There is a clear overall trend of declining annual casualties in 
most States Parties over the 20 years since the Mine Ban Treaty 
came into existence. This trend is particularly evident in most of the 
countries which reported the highest casualty figures after the treaty 
entered into force in 1999 (see the graphic on the opposite page). 
Declining casualty rates have also been recorded over time in 
Colombia, from a peak of 1,228 casualties in 2006 to 111 casualties 
in 2019. However, casualties in 2018 and 2019 increased, having 
dropped below 100 in the preceding two years after the peace 
agreement took effect. Relatively new State Party Sri Lanka had 223 
mine/ERW casualties in 2000 and two in 2019.
It is certain that there are additional casualties each year that are 
not captured in the Monitor’s global mine/ERW casualty statistics, 
with most occurring in severely affected countries and those 
experiencing conflict. In some states and areas, many casualties go 
unrecorded, meaning the true casualty figure is likely significantly 
higher in those countries.
In Afghanistan, data collection was affected by ongoing conflict. 
The existing data collection system records only civilians, and the 
reporting of military casualties was generally rare. Since May 2017, 
the Afghan military has stopped releasing its conflict casualty figures 
entirely. 
In Iraq, as in previous years, it is certain that there were many more 
mine/ERW casualties that occurred in 2019 that were not identified. 
However, United Nations (UN) reporting indicates that there has 
been a significant overall reduction in conflict-related casualties of 
all types since 2018 and decided to stop releasing civilian casualty 
updates on a monthly basis, but rather based on the circumstances.71 
70 Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, DRC, Indonesia, 
Iraq, Italy, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Palestine, Poland, Senegal, Serbia, 
Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.
71 In December 2018, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) reported that its “monitoring 
in recent months has shown a steady reduction in civilian casualties.” UNAMI, “UN Casualty Figures for 
Iraq for the Month of December 2018,” 3 January 2019, bit.ly/UNAMI3Jan2019.
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Data collection in Iraq remains a challenge. In 2019 and 2020, the Information Management 
and Mine Action Program (iMMAP) provided regular updates on explosive hazards.72 However, 
mine/ERW incident casualties were almost never reported among the victims recorded. 
In 2019, a detailed report on data in Iraq by Humanity & Inclusion (HI) found that “there is 
limited to no coordination between the actors involved in victim and accident reporting and data 
management processes.”73 The Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) and Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action 
Agency (IKMAA) reportedly suffer from insufficient staff, lack of technical expertise, inconsistent 
and mismatched reporting forms and a lack of formalized guidelines on roles and responsibilities 
for the many different actors involved in data collection and management. 
In Mali in 2019, as was the case in recent years, only vehicles were involved in mine 
incidents and no casualty occurred while individuals were on foot. The same was true for 
Burkina Faso in 2019. Five of the 233 civilian casualties recorded for Mali in 2019 occurred 
in incidents where they were on an animal-drawn cart, compared to 25 in 2018. Those 
improvised mines causing casualties in Mali and Burkina Faso were believed to have acted 
as de facto “antivehicle mines.” However, in some incidents, reporting may be unclear as to 
whether the improvised device involved was an unused command-detonated IED–and thus 
in effect an explosive remnant rather than a mine–or if it was a victim-activated improvised 
mine. The impact in terms of casualties is largely indistinguishable.
The ongoing conflict in Yemen prevented the effective operation of a national casualty 
surveillance mechanism. Yemen reported that the Yemen Executive Mine Action Center 
(YEMAC) information management system has become outdated and is currently not usable. 
Furthermore, the conflict has presented new mines and mine technologies (improvised 
mines), with which YEMAC has had no previous experience. This is compounded by the scale 
of the conflict and its extensive impact across the country.74 
72 As reported in the iMMAP-IHF Humanitarian Access Response Weekly Explosive Incidents Flash News. 
iMMAP began in 2001 as an independent unit under the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation and 
has supported the establishment of the UN’s Humanitarian Information Management Centre in Iraq, Mine 
Action Coordination Centre and National Mine Action Authority since 2003.
73 Sarah Nijholt, “Study on explosive hazard victim reporting and data management processes in Iraq,” HI, 
April 2019, bit.ly/IraqHIReportApril2019. 
74 Yemen Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2019, p. 9, bit.lyYemenExtensionRequest 
2019. 
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In Yemen, the Monitor recorded 248 casualties for 2019. The Civilian Impact Monitoring 
Project (CIMP) recorded 233 landmine casualties in Yemen, with just under half due to 
incidents involving civilian vehicles: “Landmines accounted for highest number of casualties 
in incidents impacting on civilian vehicles, with 36 landmine incidents resulting in 114 
casualties; 41% of the total.”75 In May 2019, Yemen reported having collected data on 820 
victims and injured persons since the beginning of 2019.76 In its Article 7 report for calendar 
year 2019, Yemen reported 1,050 victims surveyed in 2019. Previous data indicates that 
aggregate annual casualty figures reported by Yemen include casualties for all time surveyed 
during that year, rather than casualties which occurred in the calendar year itself.
The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) recorded casualty data in Nigeria for 
calendar year 2019. From 2016–2019, data for Nigeria was initially and regularly recorded by 
Mines Advisory Group (MAG), which significantly heightened understanding and awareness 
of the extent of the impact of mines/ERW (especially improvised mines) in the country. 
Subsequently, Nigeria’s acknowledgement of its obligation to clear improvised mines under 
Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty further indicated that the improvised mine casualties 
included those from antipersonnel types.
CASUALTIES IN STATES NOT PARTY AND OTHER AREAS 
The Monitor identified 1,834 mine/ERW casualties in 2019 in 14 states not party.77 More than 
a thousand of the casualties were recorded in Syria (1,125), which represents a continuing 
decrease from 1,465 in 2018, and 40% less than the 1,906 casualties recorded in 2017.78 
However, since the Syrian Civil War began in 2011, annual totals of recorded mine/ERW 
casualties in the country are thought to be an undercount. Casualty totals have fluctuated in 
part due to inconsistent availability of data and sources. 
For Syria, ambiguity in the way that casualties and explosive incidents are reported in 
the media often leaves it unclear whether an explosive device was command-detonated or 
victim-activated. Many casualties, including civilian casualties in Syria that were reported 
to be from mines, booby-traps, roadside bombs, or IEDs, and which were not explicitly 
reported as ‘targeted’, were excluded from the Monitor 
annual casualty dataset if the cause of activation was not 
adequately defined.79 Due to the preference for conflict 
fatality reporting systems in situations of armed conflict, 
there are many more people recorded as dead compared 
to those recorded injured. The Monitor recorded 636 
people killed and 489 people injured in Syria in 2019, 
whereas generally only just over a quarter of all mine/
ERW casualties will be fatalities. Therefore, it is certain, 
based on the probable proportion of fatalities to survivors, 
that the actual number of casualties occurring in Syria was 
substantially higher than the annual total recorded. 
The next highest numbers of casualties among the 
countries yet to join the Mine Ban Treaty were recorded in 
Myanmar, with 358 casualties, followed by Pakistan with 
136.
75 CIMP, “2019 Annual Report 1 January–31 December 2019: An annual report on the direct civilian impact 
from armed violence in Yemen,” 2020, p. 15, bit.ly/CIMPYemenReport2020. 
76 Statement of Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 22 May 2019.
77 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, India, Iran, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Myanmar, Pakistan, Russia, Syria, 
and Vietnam. 
78 Not including the occupied Golan Heights.
79 If these casualties were included, the annual casualty total for Syria would be 1,492 (804 killed and 688 
injured).
Mine survivor pictured in Myanmar, near Thai 
border.








Seventy-three casualties were reported in five other areas: Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Somaliland, Taiwan, and Western Sahara.
CASUALTY RECORDING
It is certain that numerous casualties go unrecorded each year. Some of the most mine/
ERW-affected countries, especially conflict-affected states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, 
do not have functional national casualty surveillance systems in place, nor do other forms 
of adequate reporting exist. 
The need to improve the adequacy and efficacy of data collection in mine action and 
conflict situations, as well as the demand for progress in related systems and mechanisms, 
was a key theme during the reporting period. A thematic panel discussion during the May 
2019 Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings highlighted the need to strengthen injury 
surveillance systems to monitor “the physical impact of explosive ordnance” and to identify 
risk groups and factors. This was reflected in the text of the Oslo Action Plan.80
The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) undertook a 
process to define a set of minimum data requirements for mine action that could accompany 
the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core Geographic Information 
System (GIS) data. In March 2020, the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) adopted 
the summary of minimum data requirements, including entries for mine/ERW incidents and 
casualties.81 
In September 2020, the first ever joint statement on casualty  recording was delivered 
at the 45th session of the Human Rights Council, presented by Afghanistan, a country 
consistently among those with the most mine/ERW casualties in recent years. It was co-
signed by 49 other states. 
In 2019, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 
released the first UN publication on casualty recording methodology, after several years of 
the need being highlighted by civil society.82 The OHCHR Guidance on Casualty Recording 
notes that “casualty recording has received increasing recognition as an important and 
effective means of enhancing the protection of civilians in armed conflict situations and 
elsewhere.”83 
However, the new UN casualty reporting system does not differentiate casualties caused 
by antipersonnel mines or any specific explosive device type as defined by disarmament 
regulation contexts. According to the OHCHR standards in place to monitor the Sustainable 
Development Goal indicator on conflict-related deaths (16.1.2), disaggregation for the cause 
of death includes the broader category of “planted explosives and unexploded ordnance.”84
The Monitor’s casualty records include only mine/ERW casualties: people killed or injured 
in incidents involving explosive items detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a 
person or vehicle.85 Casualties from incidents caused or reasonably suspected to have been 
caused by remotely detonated mines or IEDs—those that were not victim-activated—are not 
80 Oslo Declaration, adopted at the final plenary meeting of the Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, 
APLC/CONF/2019/5/Add.1, Oslo, 29 November 2019, para. 54, bit.ly/OsloReviewConference2019. 
81 As an additional annex to the IMAS 05.10 on Information Management for Mine Action. See, IMAS, 
“Minimum Data Requirements,” 23 March 2020, bit.ly/DataRequirementsIMAS2020. 
82 See, for example, Jacob Beswick and Elizabeth Minor, “The UN and Casualty Recording: Good practice and 
the need for action,” Oxford Research Group, April 2014, bit.ly/UNCasualtyRecordingORG2014. 
83 OHCHR, “Guidance on Casualty Recording,” 2019, bit.ly/CasualtyGuidanceOHCHR2019. 
84 OHCHR, “Technical Guidance Note on SDG Indicator 16.1.2: Number of conflict-related deaths per 100,000 
population, by sex, age and cause,” undated, bit.ly/GuidanceNoteOHCHR. 
85 Such as all antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO), unexploded 
ordnance (UXO), and improvised mines (victim-activated IEDs.) AXO and UXO are collectively referred to 
as ERW. Cluster munition casualties are disaggregated and reported as distinct from ERW casualties. Not 
included in the totals are estimates of casualties where exact numbers were not given.
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included. Mines/ERW therefore differs from the IMAS classification of explosive ordnance.86 
That is because the IMAS definition of explosive ordnance additionally includes devices that 
are activated manually or by remote control.
In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic has represented an additional challenge to mine action 
program activities in most affected countries, including data collection.
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, 2020 was a 
challenging year for mine action and an unusual 
reporting period for the Landmine Monitor. Mine 
clearance in many countries was affected by 
restrictions imposed to curb the spread of the 
pandemic. It was reported to the Monitor that 
clearance operations were temporarily suspended 
in States Parties Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), 
Chad, Colombia, Peru, Senegal, and Zimbabwe; 
states not party Armenia, Lebanon, and Vietnam; 
and other areas Kosovo and Western Sahara, as 
well as the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas.87 
In Cambodia, clearance teams received 
COVID-19 prevention training. It was reported that 
mine clearance programs in Cambodia and Thailand were not greatly affected by the 
pandemic, at least in part because operations are conducted in remote areas.
Other mine action activities affected by the pandemic included activities related to 
resources, survey, planning, and training. 
BiH reallocated €10 million (US$10.9 million)88 of European Union (EU) funds for 
humanitarian demining projects to COVID-19 response and migration issues. Chile 
anticipated a possible need to reallocate mine action funding to respond to sanitary and 
social needs. A mission to Mauritania to collect additional information on contamination 
was delayed. Resource mobilization activities for mine action were suspended in Senegal. 
In Ukraine, the adoption of amendments to the Law on Mine Action was delayed. In 
Yemen, the development of national mine action standards was postponed, and the 
training of information management personnel on the use of IMSMA Core was deferred. 
Several national mine action centers anticipated delays in their operational calendars, 
including delays which may impact their clearance completion date.89 In some countries, 
mine action and risk education teams were repurposed to deliver hygiene products and 
86 International Mine Action Standards 04.10, “Glossary of mine action terms, definitions and abbreviations,” 
1 January 2003, last amended February 2019, bit.ly/MineActionGlossaryIMAS. Term 3.99. Explosive 
Ordnance (EO) (2018): “interpreted as encompassing mine action’s response to the following munitions: 
Mines, Cluster Munitions, Unexploded Ordnance, Abandoned Ordnance, Booby traps, Other devices 
(as defined by CCW APII), Improvised Explosive Devices.” Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) 
Amended Protocol II, Article 2 - Definitions: “other devices” include “improvised explosive devices which 
are activated manually, by remote control or automatically after a lapse of time.”
87 Argentina and the United Kingdom (UK) both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas, 
which still contain mined areas. See Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), “APMBC Falklands Demining 
Programme Workplan under Article (5),” 30 April 2020, pp. 4–5, bit.ly/FalklandIslandsWorkplan2020. 
88 Average exchange rate for April 2020: €1=US$1.0871. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates 
(Annual),” 1 July 2020, www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g5/20200701.
89 In the Falkland Islands, the UK’s aspiration to complete mine clearance by 30 December 2020 was under 
review in 2020 given the COVID-19 pandemic and related restrictions. Chad and other area Western 
Sahara also expected delays in completion of mine clearance due to the COVID-19 outbreak.
COVID-19 pandemic impacts on clearance, risk education and 
victim assistance
A Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) 
team of deminers in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in the time of COVID-19.








COVID-19 prevention messages. The HALO Trust mobilized its vehicle fleet and workforce 
in 21 countries and four other areas to deliver medical and sanitation supplies.90
Risk education programs have been greatly impacted by the pandemic and related 
restrictions, but have also been an area where efforts to combine mine action and a 
COVID-19 response are most significant. An important proportion of risk education 
programs are based on face-to-face sessions, which are often considered the most 
appropriate way to reach affected communities in remote areas and to promote behavior 
change. 
Face-to-face risk education sessions were suspended in States Parties Afghanistan, 
BiH, Eritrea, Senegal, and Yemen, as well as in states not party Armenia, Lebanon, Myanmar, 
Syria, and Vietnam. In some countries, community-based risk education was generally not 
impeded by COVID-19 restrictions, for example in Lao PDR and Somalia. In Palestine, 
UNMAS was able to continue to disseminate risk education messages widely through 
its “informal street sessions.”91 In Cambodia and Nigeria, risk education sessions were 
conducted for much smaller groups. In Thailand, small group sessions continued to be 
provided in nine refugee camps. In South Sudan, only emergency risk education was 
permitted. 
However, due to the creativity of mine action centers, service providers, and the broader 
mine action community, in many countries risk education programs were adapted to 
constraints and restrictions imposed due to COVID-19. In some countries, risk education 
operators integrated COVID-19 prevention messages into their usual activities.92 In Iraq, 
the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA) temporarily reassigned the risk education 
workforce to COVID-19 response efforts. In Senegal, Humanity & Inclusion (HI) reallocated 
unused mine action funding to COVID-19 prevention efforts. In Thailand, village health 
volunteers, tasked with disseminating COVID-19 messages, worked with the Thailand 
Mine Action Centre (TMAC) to provide mine risk education messages in affected areas.93
Risk education programs explored alternative means of disseminating messages 
electronically and remotely. In Vietnam, text and voice messages were used to pass on 
messages about risk education and COVID-19.94 In Afghanistan, TV and radio and vehicles 
with loudspeakers were used to continue risk education programs.95 The use of technology 
and social media was however not as effective in reaching affected communities in some 
remote areas of Cambodia and Lebanon, where use of social media is relatively low. 
Victim assistance activities and services were strongly impacted by COVID-19 
restrictions, including in Afghanistan, Armenia, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, Georgia, Iraq, 
Libya, Myanmar, Senegal, Syria, Thailand, Uganda, Vietnam, and Yemen. In Yemen, the 
healthcare system was “on the brink of collapse” in 2019.96 It “in effect collapsed” with 
the additional impact of COVID-19.97 Operators reported that during the pandemic 
90 HALO Trust, “World’s No 1 landmine clearance charity pivots to emergency COVID response,” 15 April 2020, 
bit.ly/HaloTrustCOVID-19April2020; and HALO Trust, “Thank you for supporting our COVID-19 Response,” 
16 July 2020, bit.ly/HaloTrustCOVID-19July2020. 
91 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Soula Kreitem, Palestine Programme and Support Officer, UNMAS, 
30 April 2020.
92 Including in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Nigeria, Palestine, Syria, 
Thailand, and Vietnam.
93 ASEAN Regional Mine Action Center (ARMAC), “Key Discussions from Regional Webinar on 
Explosive Ordnance Risk Education in ASEAN in a Time of Pandemic,” 19 May 2020, bit.ly/
ASEANMineActionWebinarMay2020. 
94 Ibid.
95 Email from Zareen Khan Mayar, HI Afghanistan, to the International Mine Risk Education Working Group, 
2 June 2020.
96 Julie Lorenzen, ‘‘Yemen’s Healthcare System on the Brink of Collapse,’’ International Federation of the Red 
Cross (IFRC), 15 October 2019, bit.ly/YemenIFRC15Oct2019. 
97 ‘‘Coronavirus: Yemen’s healthcare system ‘in effect collapsed,’’ BBC, 22 May 2020, bbc.co.uk/news/world-
middle-east-52769919. 
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coordination was weak or non-existent in countries that had already experienced 
organization limitations, including Chad, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. 
Mitigation strategies included assessments of mine victims’ needs or the socio-
economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic,98 the provision of psychological support 
and follow-up rehabilitation services remotely, and the provision of hygiene kits and 
information on COVID-19 prevention measures to beneficiaries and technical personnel. 
In Colombia, only urgent services continued uninterrupted and follow-up services instead 
were provided by telephone. Coordination of victim assistance efforts was reportedly 
maintained in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Libya, and Myanmar. 
Responses to Monitor questions on COVID-19 noted that survivors and other persons 
with disabilities were not able to access services and rights on an equal basis to others 
during the pandemic in a number of mine-affected countries, including in Cambodia,99 
Lao PDR, Senegal, Sierra Leone,100 Syria, Tajikistan, and Yemen. This finding is consistent 
with a United Nations study that found persons with disabilities were at greater risk of 
discrimination in accessing healthcare during the COVID-19 pandemic.101 
ADDRESSING THE IMPACT
COORDINATION
The Oslo Action Plan, agreed by States Parties in November 2019 at the Fourth Review 
Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, highlights a number of best practices agreed by States 
Parties that contribute to the effective implementation of mine action programs. These include 
demonstrating high levels of national ownership; developing evidence-based, costed and 
time-bound national strategies and workplans; and keeping national mine action standards 
up to date in accordance with the latest International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).
CLEARANCE COORDINATION
In 2019, clearance programs in the majority of States Parties with remaining contamination 
were managed and coordinated through national mine action centers. Afghanistan, Angola, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC), Ecuador, Iraq, Mauritania, Niger, Palestine, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South 
Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, and Zimbabwe all had national bodies in 
place responsible for their national mine action programs. 
Croatia, in a move to form an integrated and widely functioning civil protection system, 
dissolved the Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC) as a legal entity and integrated it into 
the Ministry of the Interior as a Civil Protection Directorate on 1 January 2019.102 The Civil 
Protection Directorate has taken on all roles previously undertaken by CROMAC.103 
Cyprus has no national mine action center, as the remaining contamination is reported 
to be in areas under Turkish control. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) 
coordinates mine action on behalf of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).104 
98 In BiH and Vietnam.
99 Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, persons with disabilities did not access services and rights on an equal basis 
to others in Cambodia. Email from Edith van Wijngaarden, Country Manager Cambodia, HI, 18 May 2020.
100 Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, persons with disabilities did not access services and rights on an equal 
basis to others in Sierra Leone. Email from Chloé Charpentier, West Africa Division, HI, 29 April 2020.
101 UN, “Policy Brief: A Disability-Inclusive Response to COVID-19,” May 2020, bit.ly/UNCOVID-
19DisabilityResponse. 
102 Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Ministry of the Interior, Republic of Croatia, 20 September 2019.
103 Statement of Croatia, Mine Ban Treaty Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties, Santiago, 29 November 2016; 
Croatia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form A, bit.ly/CroatiaArticle7Report2018; 
and email from Slavenka Ivšić, Ministry of the Interior, Republic of Croatia, 20 September 2019. 








Eritrea has provided few updates on its mine action program, although noted in its Article 
5 extension request submitted in 2019 that it was in the process of restructuring the Eritrean 
Demining Authority.105 It was stated that this restructuring had presented obstacles to Eritrea 
submitting its extension request and a workplan beyond its deadline of February 2020.106
Ethiopia moved responsibility for its mine action program from the Ethiopian Mine Action 
Office (EMAO) to the Head Office of the Ministry of Defense. This was reportedly to allow 
the Defense Minister to manage mine action activities and resources directly, to ensure an 
adequate level of authority for dealing with the remaining contaminated areas on Ethiopia’s 
borders, and to better communicate with donors.107 
Nigeria has no mine action authority, but the UN Humanitarian Response Program 
includes a mine action sub-sector that takes responsibility for planning, coordination, the 
mapping and marking of hazardous areas, risk education and referral of survivors.108 An Inter-
Ministerial Committee was formed in 2019 and tasked with developing a national mine 
action strategy and a workplan for survey and clearance.109 
Oman’s Article 7 transparency report for 2018 stated that it was working towards 
establishing a national mine action center.110
Ukraine’s mine action program is currently managed by the Ministry of Defense with 
support from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).111 A Law on 
Mine Action in Ukraine, adopted in January 2019, which would enable the establishment of 
a mine action center, has not been implemented. An amendment to the law was submitted 
to parliament in February 2020.112
In Yemen, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is supporting the 
establishment of a Yemen Mine Action Coordination Centre (YMACC) in Aden. It is anticipated 
that the YMACC will ensure better coordination among mine action entities, and will take 
the lead on national standards, longer-term plans for survey and clearance, staffing and 
procurement, and national support plans.113 The process has advanced significantly in the 
south of the country, but UNDP has little or no access in the north.114
National Mine Action Strategies 
Mine Action Strategies and the development of workplans are crucial for strengthening 
national ownership of a mine action program and to enable greater transparency and 
accountability through monitoring and reporting. It can also help states align their mine 
action efforts with broader humanitarian and development efforts and boost their ability to 
leverage international funding. 
105 Eritrea Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 11 November 2019, p. 3, bit.ly/
EritreaExtensionRequest2019. 
106 Ibid.; and Eritrea Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request Decision, 29 November 2019, bit.
ly/EritreaExtRequestDecision2019. Eritrea’s Article 5 deadline was extended until 31 December 2020.
107 Ethiopia Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 21 March 2019, p. 9, 
bit.ly/EthiopiaExtensionRequest2019. 
108 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), “Humanitarian Response 
Plan Nigeria,” 31 March 2020, p. 88, bit.ly/UNOCHANigeriaResponsePlan2020; and Protection Cluster, 
“Protection Monthly Update,” 11 September 2020, bit.ly/ProtectionClusterNigeria2020. 
109 Statement of Nigeria, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 27 November 2019.
110 Oman Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), bit.ly/OmanArticle7Report2019. 
111 United States (US) Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety, January–December 2019,” April 2020, 
p. 36, bit.ly/ToWalkTheEarthInSafety2020. 
112 Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, 27 August 2020, p. 
6, bit.ly/UkraineAdditionalInformation. 
113 UNDP, “Republic of Yemen Emergency Mine Action Project: Annual Progress Report 2019,” 20 January 
2020, p. 12.
114 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Emma Simons, Explosive Ordnance Risk Education Technical 
Coordinator, HI Yemen. 
44 
Twenty States Parties had national mine action strategies in place in 2019, although 
Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Palestine, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Tajikistan all have 
strategies in place up to 2020 and need to update them. The Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has plans to support the update of strategies in Afghanistan 
and Somalia.115 Afghanistan intends to develop the next strategic plan in 2020–2021 and 
has a 10-year workplan in place for April 2013–2023.116 
Strategy 
end date States Parties
2020 Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Palestine, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan
2021 Iraq
2022 Ecuador
2023 South Sudan, Thailand
2024 Peru
2025 Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, Turkey, Zimbabwe
2026 Croatia, Senegal
Chad, the DRC, and Sudan had strategies that expired in 2019 and need updating. Sudan 
and the DRC have reported that the development of their strategies is in process.
States Parties Cyprus, Eritrea, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Serbia, and Ukraine do not have mine 
action strategies in place. The GICHD plans to work with Ukraine to develop a mine action 
strategy, with a workshop due to be held in 2022.117
Iraq provided a strategic plan with its Article 5 deadline extension request in 2017, 
although this was outdated by the need to address the massive contamination resulting from 
the conflict with the Islamic State. The plan provides general priorities for implementation. 
In 2018, Iraq reported that it has formed a committee with the purpose of updating the plan 
so that it covers the period up to its Article 5 deadline of 2028.118
Serbia has a workplan to completion provided in its Article 5 extension request, which 
was submitted in 2018.119
Yemen’s original mine action strategy is now outdated and does not reflect the current 
situation in Yemen due to the ongoing conflict.120 UNDP plans to assist Yemen to update its 
strategy when there is a lasting cessation to hostilities.121
Information management
States Parties not yet using the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) 
include BiH, Croatia, Eritrea, Niger, Oman, Serbia, and the United Kingdom (UK). 
The first goal of BiH’s National Mine Action Strategy for 2018–2025 is to ensure sound 
information management standards, tools and processes.122 Through 2019, the BiH Mine Action 
Centre (BHMAC) was using its own information management system, the BiH Mine Action 
115 GICHD presentation, “The Importance of NMAS,” at the German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO) Conference 
on Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA): Innovations and Strategies in HMA, 22 September 2020.
116 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Fazel Rahman, Project Manager Operations, DMAC, 16 April 2020.
117 GICHD presentation, “The Importance of NMAS”, at the GFFO Conference on HMA: Innovations and 
Strategies in HMA, 22 September 2020.
118 Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), p. 17, bit.ly/IraqArticle7Report2019. 
119 Serbia Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 14 March 2018, bit.ly/SerbiaExtRequest2018. 
120 UNDP, “Republic of Yemen Emergency Mine Action Project: Annual Progress Report 2019,” 20 January 
2020, p. 6.
121 Ibid.








Information System (BHMAIS).123 UNDP is supporting a European Union (EU) funded project 
to improve information management through the development of a web-based database.124
Croatia has an information management system that is compliant with IMAS and allows 
disaggregation of contamination by type and land release method.
It is not clear what information management systems are used by Eritrea, Niger, and Oman.
The UK does not use IMSMA but has an information management system in place.
As of 15 October 2020, five States Parties with clearance obligations had not submitted 
Article 7 transparency reports for calendar year 2019: the DRC, Eritrea, Niger, Senegal, and 
Sri Lanka.125 Eritrea has not submitted an Article 7 report since 2014.
National Mine Action Standards
In March 2019, the Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) updated its national 
standards and introduced new standards for the clearance of improvised mines.126
In Iraq, the challenge of contamination by improvised mines and other improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs), particularly in urban areas such as Mosul, led to the development 
of new standards on IED disposal, published in February 2019.
During 2019, national standards were being reviewed in Angola, while Sudan’s national 
standards were awaiting endorsement as of May 2019. UNMAS reported constant review of 
national technical standards and guidelines for South Sudan.
Turkey reported elaborating its national standards in 2019 with support from UNDP and 
the GICHD. A land release national mine action standard is under development in Colombia. 
Somalia’s revision of national standards was due to be completed in 2019. In April 2019, 
Ukraine adopted Mine Action, Management Processes, and Basic Provisions to IMAS, which 
were adapted to the specific situation in Ukraine. They are now being tested.127
UNDP is planning to work with the GICHD to update and develop the Yemen National 
Standards, which are out of date and need to be revised.128
Chad reported that it will revise its standards on land release, supervision of organizations, 
and inspection of contaminated land in 2020.129
RISK EDUCATION COORDINATION
In 2019, 23 States Parties had national institutions in place for coordinating risk education. 
In most cases, risk education is coordinated by the mine action center, although for states 
with school-based programs, the Ministry of Education takes on a coordination role.
In Croatia, the Civil Protection Directorate was responsible for risk education. 130  UNMAS 
is responsible for risk education in Cyprus, Palestine, and in Gaza, and UNDP coordinates risk 
education in Ukraine.
123 Email from Ljiljana Ilić, BHMAC, 24 April 2019.
124 Statement of GICHD, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 7 June 2018; and BiH 
Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), September 2018, p. 6, 
bit.ly/BiHRevisedExtRequest2018. 
125 Senegal submitted a transparency report in October 2020, although the report is not in the correct Mine 
Ban Treaty Article 7 format.
126 Afghanistan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form F, p. 14, 
bit.ly/AfghanistanArticle7Report2020.
127 Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, 27 August 2020, p. 
4, bit.ly/UkraineAdditionalInformation. 
128 UNDP, “Republic of Yemen Emergency Mine Action Project: Annual Progress Report 2019”, 20 January 
2020, p. 17.
129 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Brahim Djibrine Brahim, Coordinator, National High Commission 
for Demining (HCND), 15 April 2020.
130 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Tajana Čičak, Internal Supervisor for General Affairs, Civil Protection 
Directorate, 28 April 2020.
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States Parties that did not report risk education coordination included Oman and the UK. 
Eritrea provided no information.
In 2019, risk education coordination meetings were reported in 10 States Parties: 
Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, the DRC, Iraq, Palestine, Senegal, South Sudan, Sudan, 
and Yemen. The main topics discussed at risk education coordination meetings are usually 
coordination, sharing information and innovation best practices, and developing or updating 
plans and strategies. 
In Chad, Somalia, Thailand, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe, risk education may be discussed as 
part of broader mine action meetings.131 In the DRC, Somalia, South Sudan, and Ukraine, it 
was reported that risk education is discussed during mine action sub-cluster meetings.132
No risk education working groups were reported for Angola, BiH, Croatia, Cyprus, Ecuador, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Niger, Peru, Serbia, Tajikistan, or Turkey.
In Afghanistan, it was reported that risk education technical working group meetings are 
led by the Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC). The meetings take place every 
two months and also on an ad hoc basis as required.133
In Colombia, coordination meetings for risk education are held three times a year, 
but there is currently no system for assigning municipalities to risk education operators. 
Operators must coordinate among themselves to avoid duplication.134
In the DRC, the National Risk Education Program of the Congolese Mine Action Center 
(Centre Congolais de Lutte Antimines, CCLAM) organizes meetings on a quarterly basis.135
In Iraq, coordination meetings for risk education are supposed to be held every month, 
but only one meeting was reported during 2019.136 Risk education messages and materials 
are validated by the Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) and the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action 
Agency (IKMAA).137
Yemen has two risk education technical working groups, one based in the north of the 
country and another based in the south. Topics at group meetings include the signing of 
memoranda of understanding, aligning materials and messaging, coordination, tasking and 
advocacy.138
In Senegal, there is no regular coordination meeting, although the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported meeting every two to three months with the 
Senegal National Mine Action Centre (CNMAS).139 Similarly, in BiH, there is no risk education 
coordination mechanism, but the ICRC reported meeting regularly with the regional offices 
and upon need with the BHMAC.140
Risk education is reported to be included within the national mine action strategies of 
Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, the DRC, Somalia, and Tajikistan. In addition, Colombia, 
Ethiopia, and Turkey reported having national risk education workplans.
131 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Brahim Djibrim Brahim, Coordinator, HCND, 15 April 2020; and by 
Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed, UNMAS, 9 May 2020.
132 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Jessica Rice, HALO Trust Somalia, 4 May 2020; and Hussein Ibrahim 
Ahmed, UNMAS Somalia, 13 May 2020.
133 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Zareen Khan Mayar, Explosive Ordnance Risk Education Technical 
Advisor, HI Afghanistan, 22 May 2020; by Angela Gosse, Programme Officer, UNMAS Afghanistan, 12 May 
2020; and by Fazel Rahman, Project Manager Operations, DMAC, 16 April 2020.
134 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sean Tjaden, Program Officer, HALO Trust Colombia, 30 April 2020.
135 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sudi Alimasi Kimputu, National Coordinator, CCLAM, 18 August 
2020.
136 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Celine Cheng, Risk Education Team Lead, UNMAS, 11 May 2020.
137 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Alexandra Letcher, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 21 May 2020.
138 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Emma Simons, Explosive Ordnance Risk Education Technical 
Coordinator, HI Yemen, 22 May 2020.
139 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mamady Gassama, ICRC Senegal, 30 April 2020.








Not all States Parties have national standards to guide risk education operations at a 
national level, although operators implementing risk education reported working to IMAS 
and their own Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Risk education national standards 
were reported to be in place in Afghanistan, BiH, Chad, Colombia, the DRC, Iraq, Palestine, 
Senegal, South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand, and Zimbabwe. In Palestine, it was reported that 
there were risk education standards that were used in the West Bank, but not in Gaza.141
Thailand was updating its risk education standards in 2019. In Angola and Somalia, 
standards were under review and awaiting approval,142 while in Cambodia they were under 
development.143 Chad reported that it would review its risk education national standards at 
the end of 2020.144
In certain contexts, risk education, by necessity, needs to work across international borders 
to ensure that populations transiting mine-contaminated border areas are informed of the 
risks. On the Thailand-Myanmar border, Humanity & Inclusion (HI) is the sole risk education 
operator in the nine camps in Thailand for refugees from Myanmar, making it challenging 
to coordinate with risk education actors at a national level in either Thailand or Myanmar. 
In 2019, HI organized an information sharing workshop with risk education and mine action 
actors working along the border.145
VICTIM ASSISTANCE COORDINATION 
Participation of victims and their representative organizations146
Victims were reported to be included through representation in coordination in Afghanistan, 
Albania, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, 
Mozambique, Peru, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Thailand. States Parties rarely 
reported on the actual process to include input from victims in decision-making or on the 
outcomes of victim participation. Therefore, there is little direct evidence that the input from 
victims is considered or acted upon. In some states, victims’ representative organizations and 
other service providers involved in coordination and planning reported that the concerns 
and contributions of victims were not genuinely taken into account, despite their attendance 
at relevant meetings.
A specific IMAS on victim assistance was developed in 2018–2019, and in May 2020, 
it was approved by the IMAS Review Board with the rationale that the mine action sector, 
under the governance of national mine action authorities, “is well placed, through its direct 
links with [explosive ordnance] EO-affected communities, to gather information about 
victims and their needs, to provide information on relevant services and to refer them to 
the government body.” The ICBL engaged in the process to facilitate groups of survivors 
to define by themselves what they may contribute, given their specific expertise. Although 
contributions from survivor organizations were not included in the final document, in 
responding to the Monitor, they have raised the following points about their work:  
  Assess the needs of network members, disaggregated by sex, age, and disability, 
in order to inform the development of victim assistance national action plans and 
other policies relevant to the sectors that victim assistance is part of;
141 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Soula Kreitem, Palestine Programme and Support Officer, UNMAS, 
30 April 2020.
142 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Jeanette Dijkstra, Country Director, MAG Angola, 13 May 2020.
143 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Rebecca Letven, Country Programme Manager, and Jason Miller, 
Community Liaison Manager, MAG Cambodia, 7 April 2020.
144 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Brahim Djibrine Brahim, Coordinator, HCND, 15 April 2020.
145 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Hser Htee Praikammasit, Country Director, HI Thailand, 22 May 
2020.
146 Oslo Action Plan, Action #4; Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) Article 1 – 
Purpose; and CRPD Article 29 – Participation in Political and Public life.
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  Contribute to the development of relevant national strategic plans in other sectors; 
  Enable survivors and other persons with disabilities at the community level to 
facilitate efforts for their rehabilitation and socioeconomic inclusion; 
  Conduct peer support and serve as a role model for other organizations and institutions; 
  Link and refer to services;
  Support the participation of survivors during initial data collection to identify victims, 
including survival outcomes, types of injuries, age, gender, pre-existing impairments, 
civilian or military status, and specific needs;
  Develop partnerships and facilitate networking; 
  Collaborate with relevant government sectors, including national mine action offices 
and actors;
  Represent victims at national and international meetings, conferences and other 
events relevant to victims;
  Share experiences and good practice with other 
organizations; 
  Map and compile detailed profiles of service 
providers and disseminate to the relevant sectors;
  Facilitate mine risk education sessions while raising 
awareness of the rights of victims at the local 
community level; and
  Conduct rights advocacy at the national level.
In 2020, the Monitor began a rolling survivor survey, 
engaging active survivors to ask other survivors about what 
has happened in relation to victim assistance over the last five 
years, the current situation, and what needs to happen next. 
The questions are based on the victim assistance actions of 
the Mine Ban Treaty action plans and the ICBL-CMC strategic 
plan. A snowballing format is applied, whereby survivors engage 
other mine-affected members of the population for the survey.
A relevant government agency to coordinate victim assistance147 
Of the States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, 21 reported victim assistance coordination 
linked to disability coordination mechanisms that considered issues related to the needs of 
mine/ERW victims. The States Parties with coordination mechanisms in 2019–2020 were: 
Afghanistan, Angola, Albania, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, the DRC, El Salvador, Ethiopia, 
Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Turkey. Angola’s 
coordination mechanism is not interconnected with disability rights coordination. While 
Croatia has designated several ministries, which include those responsible for disability 
rights, they do not have inter-ministerial coordination nor demonstrate awareness of victim 
assistance. Serbia’s victim assistance coordination had also stalled.
Multi-sectoral efforts in line with the CRPD148
Adopting, and implementing, a comprehensive inter-ministerial plan of action that identifies 
gaps and aims to fulfill the rights and needs of victims and, or among, other persons with 
disabilities, is a key step toward ensuring a coordinated response to the needs of mine 
victims in each State Party.
Albania, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, 
Peru, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Thailand, all have a current plan that addresses national victim 
assistance activities, while Zimbabwe has a set of measurable objectives.
Afghanistan, Algeria, Burundi, Cambodia, Croatia, Senegal, South Sudan, Uganda, and 
Yemen need to revise, finalize, or adopt a draft and implement their national disability 
147 Oslo Action Plan, Action #32; and CRPD Article 33 – National Implementation and Monitoring.
148 Oslo Action Plan, Action #34; and CRPD Article 33 – National Implementation and Monitoring.
Mine survivors conducting the Monitor survey 
on the provision of victim assistance in 
northern Albania and the impacts of COVID-19 
pandemic.








plan, policy, or strategy that includes objectives responding to the needs of victims and 
recognizing its victim assistance obligations and commitments, together with a monitoring 
structure. Mozambique still has to implement the Action Plan for Assistance to Victims 
through relevant government departments and ministries. 
States Parties that need to develop a plan or strategy include the DRC, Eritrea, Guinea-
Bissau, Nicaragua, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, and Turkey. In the meantime, the DRC 
requires a sustainable planning and coordination mechanism, working at both national 
and local levels, to increase efforts to implement the victim assistance objectives of its 
national mine action strategy. Turkey, which now has coordination, must develop a plan for 
implementation of victim assistance. Newer States Parties, Palestine and Sri Lanka, are yet 
to create a strategic framework for victim assistance.
National referral mechanisms149 
States Parties can improve accessibility to services for mine victims by ensuring that existing 
data collection, needs assessments, and service providers have the capacity to make referrals 
to the appropriate health and rehabilitation facilities. Some victims may require referral to 
specialized services, referral from one health facility to another, or referrals for travel and 
treatment abroad. Referral mechanisms can involve national level mechanisms as well as 
local referral networks, including through community-based rehabilitation systems. 
National governmental bodies providing referrals included a range of both mine action 
centers and government ministries, such as: Albania’s Mines and Munitions Coordination 
Office; Algeria’s Ministry of National Solidarity, Family and the Status of Women; Angola’s 
Ministry of Assistance and Social Reintegration; the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim 
Assistance Authority’s data department; Colombia’s Directorate for Comprehensive Mine 
Action (Descontamina Colombia) and the broader government-run reparations program 
at the Victims’ Unit; the Rehabilitation and Integration Division within Eritrea’s Ministry 
of Labor and Human Welfare; Iraq’s Directorate for Mine Action; and the Tajikistan Mine 
Action Center. In Thailand, although victim assistance is primarily implemented by the social 
security and health ministries, the Thailand Mine Action Center (TMAC) conducted follow-up 
trips to visit mine victims in clearance operation areas. Yemen reported referrals as part of 
an ongoing victim survey and referral mechanism. 
Many more non-governmental organizations (NGOs) provided referrals at a national or 
local level in the States Parties with victims, including a range of survivor networks, national 
NGOs, disabled persons’ organizations (DPOs), and international NGOs—notably HI—as well 
as the ICRC and national Red Cross and Red Crescent movements.
However, in States Parties where survivors are not aware of their rights due to a lack of 
survivor assistance coordination, as reported in the DRC, existing measures benefiting mine/
ERW survivors, such as free medical care and prostheses, may remain inaccessible.150 
Centralized database with needs and challenges151
States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty commit to assess the needs of victims. This commitment 
includes assessing availability and gaps in services and support, and assessing existing or 
new activities that are required to meet the needs of victims in the frameworks of disability, 
health, education, employment, development, and poverty reduction. Assessment also 
provides an initial opportunity to refer victims to existing services. 
The Oslo Action Plan calls for States Parties to use a centralized database that includes 
information on persons killed and injured, and the needs and challenges of mine survivors.152 
In 2013, new updates to the IMSMA NG (Next Generation) included a victim assistance 
149 Oslo Action Plan, Action #37; and CRPD Article 4 – General Obligations.
150 Statement of DRC, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 28 November 2019.
151 Oslo Action Plan, Action #35; and CRPD Article 31 – Statistics and Data Collection.
152 GICHD, “IMSMA Core,” undated, gichd.org/en/imsmacore/. 
50 
module, which will facilitate the monitoring and tracking of victims’ access to their rights 
and the accountability of victim assistance processes.153 However, some data management 
systems based on more modern technologies may not be centralized.
Survey activities and assessments were often ongoing. Afghanistan’s National Disability 
Database was under development and planned to be installed in 2020. These statistics on 
persons with disabilities and the families of those killed will be used to coordinate with 
the Ministry of Finance, Pension Department, and Population Registration Department to 
provide the necessary services. In Cambodia, village level quality of life assessments for 
victims and other persons with disabilities continued through 2019. Data collection on the 
needs of mine/ERW victims was ongoing in Colombia and new data management systems 
were put into use during the period. 
Croatia’s development of a unified database on the needs of mine/ERW victims has stalled 
since 2017. Thailand reported that mine survivors are included in disability assessments. In 
Ukraine, the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and Danish Demining Group (DDG) conducted a 
joint needs assessment of child mine/ERW survivors in 2019 in government-controlled areas 
of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, with support from the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF).154 
In Yemen, mine/ERW victims were registered with the national mine action center through 
ongoing survey. Somalia, Ukraine, and Yemen needed to significantly improve the collection 
of data and create a usable database of victims’ needs. Iraq needed to establish a unified 
and coordinated system of data collection and analysis for survivors and other persons with 
disabilities.
According to Action #35 of the Oslo Action Plan, data should be disaggregated by gender, 
age and disability, and this information should be made available to relevant stakeholders 
to ensure a comprehensive response.
The Oslo Action Plan highlights the importance of 
gender and ensuring that the different needs and 
perspectives of women, girls, men, and boys are 
considered and inform all areas of Mine Ban Treaty 
implementation and national mine action programs, 
in order to deliver an inclusive approach. States 
Parties are encouraged to remove barriers to full, 
equal and gender-balanced participation in mine 
action and treaty meetings. The Oslo Action Plan 
has some 37 references to gender.155 Moreover, after 
significant input on the theme, each committee of 
the Mine Ban Treaty, including those for Article 5 and 
Victim Assistance, adopted a gender focal point.156
The previous five-year plan of the Mine Ban Treaty, the Maputo Action Plan adopted in 
2014, had just seven references about gender. However, under that previous plan States 
Parties did already commit to implementation in an inclusive and gender-sensitive 
manner.
153 Angela Desantis and Daniel Eriksson “The New IMSMA and Victim Assistance,” The Journal of ERW and Mine 
Action: Vol. 17: Issue 3, October 2013, commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol17/iss3/8/. 
154 DRC-DDG and UNICEF, “Assessment Report: Mine Victim Assistance Needs,” October 2019, 
bit.ly/UkraineVictimAssistanceNeeds. 
155 Final document, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, APLC/CONF/2019/5/Add.1, Oslo, 9 December 
2019, bit.ly/FinalDocumentOslo2019.
156 See, document submitted by Finland, “How to implement and monitor gender mainstreaming in the 
APMBC. Practical recommendations,” APLC/CONF/2019/WP.29/Rev.1, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review 
Conference, Oslo, 29 November2019, bit.ly/FinlandFourthRevCon2019.
A Danish Demining Group (DDG) woman 
deminer searches a mine-contaminated 
agricultural field in Luhansk, Ukraine.










The increased focus on gender in mine action coincides with the 20-year anniversary 
of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS), which was 
adopted unanimously in October 2000. Resolution 1325 emphasizes a gender-based 
approach to mine action among its provisions, specifying “the need for all parties to 
ensure that mine clearance and mine awareness programmes take into account the special 
needs of women and girls.” Resolution 1325 provided a basis for future developments.157 
In 2019, the third revision of the UN’s Gender Guidelines for Mine Action Programmes 
was produced.158 The guidelines were first released in February 2005, with a second revision 
in 2010. In March 2019, the Gender and Mine Action Programme (GMAP) integrated into 
the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), gaining a stronger 
institutional placement although no longer having an advocacy role as it did previously. 
That role was taken up by ICBL members and other civil society organizations and is 
reflected in the Oslo Review Conference Working Group on Gender, which was established 
in the lead up to the Fourth Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty.
Intersectionality became a strong contextual focus of gender considerations in mine 
action as the Oslo Action Plan period commenced.159 This was concurrent with a broader 
trend in international law and policy. For example, UN Women also highlighted the 
need for this approach: “Injustices must not go unnamed or unchallenged now different 
communities are battling various, interconnected issues, all at once. Standing in solidarity 
with one another, questioning power structures, and speaking out against the root causes 
of inequalities are critical actions for building a future that leaves no one behind.”160
States Parties Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, the DRC, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan, 
Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Zimbabwe have all included gender as a component 
of their national mine action strategies. GMAP has supported several States Parties to 
integrate gender into their strategies and workplans.
In Afghanistan, gender and diversity mainstreaming is one of the goals of their 
national mine action strategy, and the Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan has 
a gender and diversity strategy.161 Within the framework of this strategy, proposals to 
conduct mine action activities are evaluated based on their technical approach, budget 
and consideration of gender.
The BiH Mine Action Strategy for 2018–2025 sets five key strategic goals, including 
gender-sensitive awareness raising.162
Cambodia is implementing a Gender Mainstreaming in Mine Action Plan for 2018–
2022, which includes the development of gender mainstreaming guidelines.163 Cambodia 
also reports promotion of the equal participation of women in mine action processes, 
services for survivors, risk education, and advocacy activities by updating report formats 
through inclusion of age, sex, and disability.
In Chad, government policy exists to ensure the integration of gender-based 
considerations at all levels of mine action. In 2020, the National High Commission for 
157 Gemma Huckerby and Takeshita Mugiho, “The Hidden Impact of Landmines: Why Gender Mainstreaming 
Matters in Mine Action,” Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines, April 2007.
158 UN, “United Nations Gender Guidelines for Mine Action Programmes,” 3rd Edition, 2019, bit.ly/UNGender 
GuidelinesMineAction.
159 See, statement by Erin Hunt, Mines Action Canada, “Gender and Diversity at CCW APII,” YouTube.com, 30 
September 2020, bit.ly/GenderDiversityCCW2020.
160 UN Women, “Intersectional feminism: what it means and why it matters right now,” 1 July 2020, bit.ly/Feminism 
UNJuly2020.
161 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Fazel Rahman, Project Manager Operations, DMAC, 16 April 2020.
162 BiH Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 22 June 2020, p. 19, bit.ly/BiH 
ExtensionRequest2020.
163 Cambodia Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 March 2019, p. 10, bit.ly/Cambodia 
ExtensionRequest2019.
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Demining (HCND) reported that its staff included women, while it is noted that the Deputy 
Coordinator of the HCND is a woman.164 
Croatia also has national legislation on gender, which is mainstreamed through the 
mine action sector, and in particular in its risk education activities.165 
Colombia continued to receive technical support from the GICHD for the development 
of Gender Guidelines for Comprehensive Action Against Antipersonnel Mines (Acción 
Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal, AICMA).166 
In the DRC, the Congolese Mine Action Center (CCLAM) reported that its gender unit 
sits within the advocacy department and aims to ensure the mobilization and inclusion 
of women in mine action.167 The Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) in Iraq has also had a 
Gender Unit in place since 2017.168
Many states now have greater numbers of women working in the sector, including 
in mine clearance teams. Mixed or all-women clearance teams have been reported in 
Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Colombia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Senegal, South Sudan, 
Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Vietnam, Zimbabwe, as well as other area Nagorno-Karabakh.
Serbia reported that there is equal access to employment in the fields of survey and 
clearance for qualified women and men.169 Sudan reported that women are included in 
all aspects of mine action, from key departments at the national mine action center, to 
field operations.170 In Ukraine, around 20% of deminers are women,171 while Zimbabwe 
reported that 30% of the staff at its national mine action center are women.172
In both Thailand and Turkey, military regulations are reported to prevent women from 
working in demining teams.173 In 2019, the Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC) reported 
that 40% of its staff were women, although they were mainly in administrative positions. 
The Turkish Mine Action Center (TURMAC) reported that 45% of its staff were women.174
While men and boys represent the majority of reported mine casualties, women 
and girls are likely to be disproportionally disadvantaged as a result of mine/ERW 
incidents. They often suffer multiple forms of discrimination as survivors. Gender is a 
key consideration in victim assistance programming, but reporting was often limited to 
statistical disaggregation of casualties and service beneficiaries.
In Cambodia in 2019, the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, with the support of the Australia-
Cambodia Cooperation for Equitable Sustainable Services (ACCESS) Program, conducted 
the first consultative workshop involving women with disabilities under the National 
Action Plan to Prevent Violence Against Women.175
164 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Brahim Djibrine Brahim, Coordinator, HCND, 15 April 2020.
165 Croatia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), bit.ly/CroatiaArticle7Report2020. 
166 Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), p. 67, bit.ly/ColombiaArticle 
7Report2020.
167 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sudi Alimasi Kimputu, National Coordinator, CCLAM, 18 August 2020.
168 Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), p. 29, bit.ly/IraqArticle7Report2020. 
169 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Slađana Košutić, Senior Advisor for Planning, International 
Cooperation and European Integrations, Serbian Mine Action Center (SMAC), 6 April 2020.
170 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Hatim Khamis, Technical Advisor, Sudan National Mine Action 
Center (SNMAC), 30 March 2020.
171 UNHCR press release, “UNHCR says Ukraine landmine risk needs urgent action,” 2 April 2019, 
bit.ly/UNHCRSudanApril2019.
172 Response to Monitor questionnaire by the Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC), 14 May 2020.
173 Response to Monitor questionnaire by TMAC, 2 June 2020; and Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 
calendar year 2019), Form H, bit.ly/TurkeyArticle7Report2020.
174 Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form H, bit.ly/TurkeyArticle7Report2020.
175 ACCESS, “Consultative Workshop with Women with Disabilities on the 3rd National Action Plan to Prevent 








Guidance on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse was published by GMAP 
in 2019. The publication consultation process, with partners both in Geneva and in mine-
affected countries, was conducted by the GICHD in collaboration with the Monitor’s victim 
assistance gender focal point from the ICBL-CMC, with financial support and leadership 
from Canada.176
ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CLEARANCE 
MINE CLEARANCE IN 2019
The Mine Ban Treaty obligates each State Party to undertake to destroy or ensure the 
destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as 
soon as possible but not later than 10 years after the entry into force of the treaty for that 
State Party. 
Among States Parties, total clearance of landmines in 2019 was at least 156km².177 
This represents an increase from the estimated 146km² cleared in 2018. At least 123,375 
landmines were cleared and destroyed in 2019.
Based on the reported data, Iraq has cleared the most land in 2019 at 46.56km². Of this, 
40.24km² was clearance of improvised mines in Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) managed 
areas and 3.17km² in areas managed by the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA).178 
In the past, reporting of clearance of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) has not been 
consistently included in clearance figures, but in its Article 7 transparency report for 2019, 
Iraq recorded all abandoned IED areas as antipersonnel mine contamination until cleared.
176 GMAP, “Guidance on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse,” November 2019, 
bit.ly/GMAPGuidance2019.
177 This refers to land cleared and does not include land released or cancelled through survey. The figures 
should be taken with caution due to the difficulty in obtaining accurate and consistent data. States Parties 
have sometimes provided conflicting data regarding clearance and have not always disaggregated mine 
clearance figures from the amount of land reduced through technical survey or canceled through non-
technical survey. Not all States Parties have provided annual Article 7 transparency reports. Clearance by 
actors such as the armed forces, the police or commercial operators may not be systematically reported. 
For further details of land release results for 2019, see individual country profiles on the Monitor website: 
www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/our-research/country-profiles. 
178 Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), pp. 24–28, bit.ly/IraqArticle7Report2020.
Humanity & Inclusion (HI) deminer at work in the surroundings of Bashir, Iraq. 
© Shwan Nawzad/HI, September 2019
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Antipersonnel mine clearance in 2018–2019179
State Party
2018 2019
Clearance (km²) APM destroyed Clearance (km²) APM destroyed
Afghanistan 30.04 8,947 28.01 7,801
Angola 1.04 1,707 1.92 1,943
Argentina* See clearance figures under UK
BiH 0.92 2,101 0.53 963
Cambodia 36.66 10,031 20.93 15,425
Chad N/R N/R 0.29 998
Chile 0.65 4,000 0.55 4,093
Colombia 0.84 322 1.39 311
Croatia 48.82 1,095 39.16 2,530
Cyprus** 0 0 0 0
DRC 0.28 5 0.21 26
Ecuador 0.014 247 0.002 62
Eritrea N/R N/R N/R N/R
Ethiopia 1.40 582 1.75 128
Iraq 4.03 7,944 46.56 12,378
179 Figures are from Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports (for calendar year 2019) unless otherwise stated. 
For Cambodia clearance data in 2019: the figures of mines destroyed include 4,111 antipersonnel 
mines cleared during minefield clearance and 11,314 cleared through EOD callouts. Email from Ros 
Sophal, Database Unit Manager, CMAA, 27 July 2020. Cambodia’s CCW Article 13 Report (for calendar 
year 2019) gives a total of 15,808 antipersonnel mines destroyed, 342 antivehicle mines and 55,306 
items of ERW. For Chad clearance data in 2019: HCND reported no land released in 2019, although HI 
reported to the Monitor 0.29km² cleared and 998 antipersonnel mines cleared. MAG reported 10km² 
released, although it is not clear if this was through clearance or survey. See, MAG, ‘‘Where we work: 
Chad,’’ undated, bit.ly/ChadProfileMAG. For Colombia clearance data in 2019: the figures include 268 
APMs and 43 improvised mines. Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), bit.
ly/ColombiaArticle7Report2020. For DRC clearance data in 2018: a figure of 422,461m² is also given for 
the period 1 January 2018–March 2019. DRC Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), p. 
6, bit.ly/DRCArticle7Report2019; in 2019: the figure includes 21 antipersonnel mines and five improvised 
mines. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sudi Alimasi Kimputu, National Coordinator, CCLAM, 18 
August 2020. For Iraq clearance data in 2019: this figure includes 3.15km² antipersonnel mine clearance 
and 43.41km² IED clearance. Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), pp. 24–28, 
bit.ly/IraqArticle7Report2020. For Palestine clearance data in 2018: US Department of State Bureau of 
Political-Military Affairs and CISR, “To Walk the Earth in Safety: January–December 2018,” 2019, p. 46, bit.
ly/ToWalkTheEarthInSafety2019. For Somalia clearance data in 2018: Somalia did not report how much 
land was cleared in its Article 7 report for 2018 but noted clearance of 52 mines. However, Mine Action 
Review reported that 1.6km² was cleared in 2018 and 297 mines cleared and destroyed; in 2019: Somalia 
reported clearing 15.4km² of which 0.12km² was mixed antipersonnel mines and antivehicle mines, and 
6.86km² was explosive ordnance. However, it does not provide any information on the device type included 
under explosive ordnance, and whether improvised mines were included. Somalia Mine Ban Treaty Article 
7 Report (for calendar year 2019), bit.ly/SomaliaArticle7Report2020. For Ukraine clearance data in 2019: 
in its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request Additional Information, submitted on 27 
August 2020, Ukraine noted that 24 areas measuring 170 hectares (1.7km²) had been handed over to 
representatives and 460,000 explosive devices identified and destroyed. It was not specified whether 
the land had been cleared or released through other methods, and how many antipersonnel mines were 
identified and destroyed, bit.ly/UkraineAdditionalInformation. For UK clearance data in 2019: the UK 
records the number of antipersonnel mines cleared annually in its Article 7 reports and the amount of 
land released, but it is not disaggregated into land cleared or released through survey. Clearance figures 
for the UK are from Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), “Falklands Demining Programme Workplan 
Under Article 7,” 30 April 2020, pp. 8–9, annexed to the UK Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar 
year 2019), bit.ly/UKArticle7Report2020. For Yemen clearance data in 2019: UNDP, ‘‘Republic of Yemen: 










Clearance (km²) APM destroyed Clearance (km²) APM destroyed
Niger N/R N/R 0.01 323
Oman 0 0 0.13 0
Palestine 0.026 626 0.01 106
Peru 0.015 140 0.08 1,113
Senegal 0 25 0 0
Serbia 0.21 29 0.60 22
Somalia N/R 52 0.12 6 
South Sudan 8.53 1,166 1 405
Sri Lanka N/R N/R N/R N/R
Sudan 0.97 31 0.87 1
Tajikistan 0.59 4,998 0.53 5,219
Thailand 0.52 7,405 0.09 2,677
Turkey 2.08 22,220 0.67 25,959
Ukraine N/R N/R 1.70 N/R
UK* 6.44 619 3.61 319
Yemen 0.64 1,691 3.10 1,536
Zimbabwe 2.11 22,013 2.75 39,031
TOTAL 146.82 97,996 156.57 123,375
Note: N/R=not reported; APM=antipersonnel mines.
* Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas, which still 
contain mined areas.
** Cyprus states that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under Cypriot control.
Afghanistan cleared 28.01km² despite ongoing conflict in some areas. This is a reduction 
from the 30.04km² cleared in 2018. The Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) 
reported to the Monitor that it had only been able to secure about 50% of the funding 
required, and thus could only achieve half of the planned clearance.180 
Yemen was able to clear 3.1 km² and destroy 1,536 antipersonnel mines in 2019, despite 
the ongoing conflict and insecurity. A total of 66,701 explosive remnants of war (ERW) were 
cleared and destroyed in 2019.181 Clearance operations in Yemen are focused on high-threat 
and high-impact spot tasks with the aim to allocate resources where they will have a more 
significant impact for local communities.182
Zimbabwe cleared and destroyed the largest number of landmines in 2019, reporting 
39,031 devices cleared from 2.75km². 
Chile announced the completion of its clearance obligations in March 2020, with the last 
mines removed on 27 February 2020. Chile reports having cleared 159 areas over the last 
18 years, clearing and destroying a total of 177,725 mines.183 During 2019, Chile reported 
the release of 1.74km² of land (0.55km² through clearance), and the clearance of 4,093 
antipersonnel mines and 1,187 antivehicle mines. In the first two months of 2020, Chile 
180 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Fazel Rahman, Project Manager Operations, DMAC, 16 April 2020.
181 UNDP, “Republic of Yemen: Emergency Mine Action Project. Annual Progress Report 2019,” 20 January 
2020, p. 14.
182 Ibid. 
183 Chile Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form F, p. 19, bit.ly/ChileArticle 
7Report2020. 
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released a further 2.69 km² of land, including 0.60km² which was cleared. A total of 12,526 
antipersonnel mines and 10,170 antivehicle mines were reportedly cleared during this two-
month period.184
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ecuador, 
Niger, Oman, Palestine, Peru, Serbia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand and Turkey all cleared under 
1km² in 2019. However, despite clearing only 0.67km², Turkey cleared and destroyed 25,959 
landmines. 
Three States Parties reported no clearance in 2019. Senegal has not reported any clearance 
since 2017. Cyprus states that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under 
its control.185 Argentina reports that it is mine-affected as a result of its claim to sovereignty 
over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas, but that it is unable to meet its Article 5 obligations 
because it has not had access to the islands due to the “illegal occupation” by the United 
Kingdom (UK).186
Niger reported clearance of 0.01km² in 2019 and the destruction of 323 antipersonnel 
mines. This is the first time that Niger has reported clearance since 2017.187
Oman, which has reported no clearance in recent years, reported 0.13km² cleared in Al 
Mughsail in 2019, but no landmines were cleared and destroyed while one 81mm mortar 
was found and destroyed.188 Oman reported that this related to clearance of seven zones of 
suspected mined areas, which had been identified based on historical records of battlefield 
areas, unit positions and incident reports.189
Sri Lanka has not provided an annual update for clearance in 2019, but in 2018 projected 
that by the end of 2020, 271 areas totaling 22.42km² would be cleared of antipersonnel 
mines, and that nine areas totaling 1.39km² suspected to contain antipersonnel mines 
would be released in Northern, Eastern and North Central provinces.190 Sri Lanka had an 
“ambitious plan to return mine contaminated lands to its people by 2020.”191 However, this 
goal has not been realized. Media reporting highlighted the lack of available information 
and data sharing in 2019, noting that “[t]he National Mine Action Center, the operational 
body that executes the policies of the National Steering Committee for Mine Action and the 
focal point for coordinating all mine action activities on the ground, could not be reached 
for comment.”192
CROSS-BORDER CLEARANCE ACTIVITIES
Areas with antipersonnel mine contamination are suspected along Croatia’s borders with 
BiH, Hungary, and Serbia. Croatia reported that mutual cooperation and exchange with BiH 
on hazardous border areas, as well as the exchange of technology and equipment, continued 
in 2019.193
184 Chile Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form F, pp. 15–17,  bit.ly/ChileArticle 
7Report2020. 
185 Cyprus Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form C, p. 4, bit.ly/CyprusArt7Report2020/. 
186 Argentina Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form A, p. 3, bit.ly/ArgentinaArticle 
7Report2020. 
187 The request reported clearance taking place between July 2019 and March 2020. Niger Mine Ban Treaty 
Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 17 March 2020, p. 8, bit.ly/NigerExtensionRequest2020.
188 Oman Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), bit.ly/OmanArticle7Report2020. 
189 ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Oman: Mine Action,” updated 8 December 2019, the-monitor.org/en-gb/
reports/2020/oman/mine-action.aspx. 
190 Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), p. 10, bit.ly/SriLankaArticle 
7Report2019.
191 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention press release, “South Asia closer to total landmine ban with Sri 
Lanka officially becoming a State Party to landmark treaty,” 1 June 2018, bit.ly/SriLankaPressRelease2018. 
192 Nicholas Muller, “Sri Lanka’s Landmine Legacy,” The Diplomat, 28 January 2020, thediplomat.com/2020/01/
sri-lankas-landmine-legacy/. 
193 Response to Monitor questionnaire by the Civil Protection Directorate, 28 April 2020; and Croatia Mine 








Afghanistan has signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Tajikistan, requiring 
Tajikistan’s government to provide support to Afghanistan for cross-border mine action 
activities in the border area of Badakhshan province, which is more easily accessible from 
the Tajikistan side. In 2019, the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (Fondation Suisse de 
Déminage, FSD) continued demining operations and risk education activities in the Afghan 
province of Badakhshan, accessing the area from Tajikistan.194
Cambodia and Thailand have extensive mine contamination along their shared border. 
Both countries are working towards the completion of a baseline survey to provide a more 
accurate picture of contamination,195 although lack of agreement regarding demarcation 
of the border between the two countries has delayed survey and clearance of those areas. 
In its 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Cambodia indicated that the Cambodia-
Thailand General Border Committee meeting held in March 2017 agreed to support 
demining cooperation between the Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC) and the Cambodian 
Mine Action Centre (CMAC) in border areas.196 It was reported in September 2019 that an 
agreement was signed between CMAC and TMAC regarding survey and clearance along the 
border.197
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINES AND EXTENSION REQUESTS
If a State Party believes that it will be unable to clear and destroy all antipersonnel mines 
contaminating its territory within 10 years after the entry into force of the convention for the 
State Party, it is able to request an extension for completing the destruction of antipersonnel 
mines, for a period of up to 10 years.
At the Third Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo, Mozambique, in June 
2014, States Parties agreed to “intensify their efforts to complete their respective time-
bound obligations with the urgency that the completion work requires.” This included a 
commitment “to clear all mined areas as soon as possible, to the fullest extent by 2025.”
As of 15 October 2020, 25 States Parties have deadlines to meet their Article 5 obligations 
before and no later than 2025. Seven States Parties have, or have requested, deadlines after 
2025: BiH (2027), Croatia (2026), Iraq (2028), Palestine (2028), Senegal (2026), South Sudan 
(2026) and Sri Lanka (2028). 
Palestine and Sri Lanka became States Parties in 2018 and are within their first 10-year 
deadline for completion of their Article 5 obligations. Oman is also within its first 10-year 
deadline. While Croatia has requested an extended deadline of 1 March 2026, it foresees 
that survey and clearance operations will be completed by the end of 2025, leaving only 
administrative and paperwork issues to be settled at the beginning of 2026.198 
Afghanistan reported to the Monitor that it will not be able to meet its deadline of 2023 
due to decreased funding, which has meant that it has only been able to achieve about 
50% of the planned clearance in 2019.199 Afghanistan noted that ongoing survey of legacy 
contamination and new contamination by improvised mines has added to the contamination. 
It is expecting to have to submit an extension request for at least five additional years, from 
2024–2028.
194 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Fazel Rahman, Project Manager Operations, DMAC, 16 April 2020.
195 Cambodia Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 March 2019, pp. 2–3, 
bit.ly/CambodiaExtensionRequest2019; and Cambodia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar 
year 2019), pp. 6–7, bit.ly/CambodiaArticle7Report2020; Thailand Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 
calendar year 2019), Section 4, p. 3, bit.ly/ThailandArticle7Report2020. 
196 Cambodia Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, 8 August 2019, 
p. 4, bit.ly/CambodiaAdditionalInformation2019. 
197 Khouth Sophak Chakrya, “CMAC, Thais join forces to clear mines at border province,” Phnom Penh Post, 24 
September 2019, bit.ly/PhnomPenhPostSept2019. 
198 Croatia Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2018, 
bit.ly/CroatiaExtensionRequest2018. Additional Information in relation to its extension request was 
submitted by Croatia on 21 June 2018, p. 1, bit.ly/CroatiaAdditionalInformation2018. 
199 Response to Monitor questionnaire from Fazel Rahman, Operations Manager, DMAC, 16 April 2020.
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Summary of Article 5 deadline extension requests (as of October 2020)200






Afghanistan 1 March 2013 10 years (1st) 1 March 2023 Behind target. 
Expects to submit 
a request for an 
extension until 2028






Progress to target not 





Argentina* 1 March 2010 10 years (1st)
3 years (2nd)
1 March 2023 See UK obligations
BiH 1 March 2009 10 years (1st)
2 years (2nd)
1 March 2021 Behind target. 
Requested extension 
until March 2027






Progress to target not 
known. A strategy has 
been developed until 
2025





4 years (4th) 
1 January 2025 Behind target. 
Reported the 
deadline is realistic 
if they have technical 
and financial 
resources in place




200 Chad: response to Monitor questionnaire by Brahim Djibrim Brahim, Coordinator, HCND, 15 April 2020; 
Croatia: Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), bit.ly/CroatiaArticle7Report2020; 
Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2018, bit.ly/
CroatiaExtensionRequest2018; and Additional Information submitted by Croatia on 21 June 2018, p. 1, 
bit.ly/CroatiaAdditionalInformation2018. Peru: it has reported setbacks to its demining progress after 
a helicopter crash in May 2019 killed two demining personnel and wounded two others. Demining 
operations in Peru were also impacted by COVID-19. Serbia: it has reported that progress will be 
contingent on funding and has calculated that it requires €2.5 million (US$ 2.8 million) to complete the 
release of all remaining mined areas. The SMAC also reported the discovery of previously unknown mined 
areas due to explosions when land was being burnt. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sladjana 
Košutić, SMAC, March 2020. Sudan: the SNMAC reports that the country is on track to meet its Article 5 
deadline. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Hatim Khamis, Technical Advisor, SNMAC, 30 March 2020. 
Tajikistan: response to Monitor questionnaire by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, TNMAC, 25 April 2020. 
Thailand: response to Monitor questionnaire by Flt. Lt. Chotiboon Aukulvanich, TMAC, 2 June 2020. Turkey: 
it has committed additional resources and budget to addressing its mine contamination and appears 
committed to meeting its Article 5 deadline. See, Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar 
year 2019), Form A, p. 2, bit.ly/TurkeyArticle7Report2020. UK: it had projected completing clearance of 
its remaining mined areas by 30 December 2020, but reported that it is checking the timescale due 
to delays caused by COVID-19. UK Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), bit.ly/
UKArticle7Report2020; see also, FCO, “APMBC Falklands Demining Programme Work Plan under Article 
(5),” 30 April 2020, p. 4, bit.ly/FalklandIslandsWorkplan2020. Zimbabwe: response to Monitor questionnaire 














Croatia 1 March 2009 10 years (1st)
7 years (2nd)
1 March 2026 On target. Croatia 
hopes to have 
finished clearance by 
the end of 2025
Cyprus 1 July 2013 3 years (1st)
3 years (2nd)
3 years (3rd)
1 July 2022 Progress to target not 
known. Cyprus claims 
all mined areas under 
its control have been 
cleared




1 January 2021 Behind target. 
Requested extension 
until June 2022







Behind target. A 
workplan is in place 
for their extension, 
but the clearance 
targets were not met 
in 2019








Expected to submit 
an extension request




On target. Has a 
workplan for survey 
and clearance of all 
areas by 2025
Iraq 1 February 
2018
10 years (1st) 1 February 2028 Progress to target not 
known




1 January 2021 Requested extension 
until January 2022 
due to finding new 
contamination









until December 2024 
Oman 1 February 
2025
N/A 1 February 2025 On target
Palestine 1 June 2028 N/A 1 June 2028 On target (in 
Palestinian-controlled 
areas)




Progress to target not 
known
Senegal 1 March 2009 7 years (1st)
5 years (2nd)
1 March 2021 Behind target. 
Requested extension 
until 2026
Serbia 1 March 2014 5 years (1st)
4 years (2nd)
1 March 2023 Progress to target not 
known
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Somalia 1 October 
2022
N/A 1 October 2022 Behind target
South Sudan 9 July 2021 N/A 9 July 2021 Behind target. 
Requested extension 
until July 2026
Sri Lanka 1 June 2028 N/A 1 June 2028 Progress to target not 
known
Sudan 1 April 2014 5 years (1st)
4 years (2nd)
1 April 2023 On target
Tajikistan 1 April 2010 10 years (1st)
6 years (2nd)
1 April 2025 On target 
Thailand 1 May 2009 9 years (1st)
5 years (2nd)
31 October 2023 On target
Turkey 1 March 2014 8 years (1st) 1 March 2022 Progress to target not 
known
Ukraine 1 June 2016 5 years (1st) 1 June 2021 Behind target. 
Requested extension 
until December 2023 
UK* 1 March 2009 10 years (1st)
5 years (2nd)
1 March 2024 On target
Yemen 1 March 2009 6 years (1st)
5 years (2nd)
3 years (3rd)
1 March 2023 Behind target









* Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas, which still 
contain mined areas.
In response to a Monitor questionnaire, Chad reported that it felt uncertain whether it would 
meet its deadline of 1 January 2024 due to not being able to mobilize resources until September 
2021. Chad also noted that the COVID-19 pandemic had compromised its progress.201
It is unlikely that Iraq will meet its deadline of 2028 due to the extent of existing and 
new contamination in the country.
Yemen, which has a current deadline of March 2023, requested an interim extension in 
2019 to enable it to better define the extent of contamination through the re-survey of areas 
where the security situation allows. This would allow Yemen to establish a new baseline and 
a realistic plan to address new contamination as a result of the conflict.202 It is expected that 
Yemen will submit a further extension request in March 2022.
Ethiopia, in its Article 7 transparency report for 2019, reported that it is likely to complete 
clearance by its deadline of 31 December 2025.203 Oman, in its Article 7 transparency report 
201 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Brahim Djibrine Brahim, Coordinator, HCND, 15 April 2020.
202 Yemen Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form D, p. 6, bit.ly/YemenArticle 
7Report2020. 









for 2018, provided a workplan for the release of all remaining suspected mined areas before 
its Article 5 deadline in 2025.204
Zimbabwe, a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty since 1999, has requested the most 
extensions to its Article 5 deadlines. Its fifth extension request has a deadline of 31 December 
2025. In the past, Zimbabwe’s demining program was constrained by economic sanctions, a 
shortage of equipment, and a lack of international assistance.205 However, Zimbabwe is now 
likely to meet its Article 5 deadline obligations. 
EXTENSION REQUESTS IN 2019 AND 2020
In 2019, seven countries submitted extension requests: Argentina (until 2023); Cambodia 
(until 2025); Chad (until 2025); Ethiopia (until 2025); Eritrea (an interim extension until 
December 2020 to prepare a comprehensive request); Tajikistan (until 2025); and Yemen (an 
interim extension until March 2023).
In 2020, 10 countries were expected to request extensions to their Article 5 deadlines: 
BiH, Colombia, the DRC, Eritrea, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Sudan, and Ukraine. 
However, by 15 October 2020, Eritrea and Nigeria were yet to submit their requests.
The decision on approval of these extension requests will take place at the Eighteenth 
Meeting of States Parties in November 2020.
BiH has requested a third extension, following an interim extension from March 2018 
to March 2021. The request is for a period of six years up until March 2027.206 The interim 
period was intended to gain a better understanding of contamination, but due to delays, the 
projected targets for cancellation and clearance were only partially met.207 
Colombia’s second request for an extension to 
its Article 5 clearance deadline asks for four years 
and 10 months, until 31 December 2025.208 The 
extension request presents a plan based on 156 
municipalities that are currently accessible and 
where demining operations are ongoing. However, 
a further 166 municipalities with contamination 
are in areas that are currently not accessible due 
to insecurity. No survey or clearance has taken 
place in these municipalities and the extension 
request reports that in 2024–2025, efforts will be 
made to establish an estimate of contamination in 
these areas, suggesting that any clearance in the 
additional municipalities will not take place until 
after the current requested deadline.209 
The DRC has submitted an extension request for 
a period of 18 months until July 2022 to clear 33 
remaining mined areas, totaling 0.13km².210 This 
204 Oman Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), bit.ly/OmanArticle7Report2019.
205 Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the Mine Ban 
Treaty Eighth Meeting of States Parties on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyze requests for 
extensions, 24 November 2008. 
206 BiH Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 22 June 2020, bit.ly/BiHExtensionRequest2020.
207 BiH Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 22 June 2020, p. 5, bit.ly/BiHExtension 
Request2020. 
208 Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 19 March 2020, bit.ly/ColombiaExtension 
Request2020. 
209 Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, 7 August 2020, p. 
10, bit.ly/ColombiaAdditionalInfo2020. 
210 DRC Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, August 2020, p. 10, bit.ly/DRCExtension 
Request2020. 
Handmade marking sign to inform the community of 
the presence of landmines in Putumayo, Colombia.
©Luis Ayala/CCCM, June 2019
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includes 0.019km² left from the previous nationwide survey, and 22 newly discovered areas 
covering 0.1km². The DRC reported to the Monitor that it will be on track to meet this 
deadline if sufficient funding is available, and if security issues and the situation in relation 
to the COVID-19 pandemic improves.211
Eritrea has a deadline to meet its Article 5 obligations on or before 31 December 2020, 
but as of 15 October 2020, it has yet to submit an extension request. 
In November 2018, Mauritania declared it had completed clearance of all known mined 
areas.212 However, in its Article 7 report for the calendar year 2019, it reported the discovery 
of previously unknown mined areas and requested in 2020 a year-long extension until 31 
January 2022 to clarify the situation regarding the contaminated areas and whether these 
areas are in the territory of Mauritania.213
Niger submitted its fourth Article 5 extension request in May 2020, despite having done 
little clearance in the last few years. It is requesting four years until 31 December 2024.214 
Niger’s remaining contamination is relatively small, totaling 0.17km²,215 but the request 
lacks a detailed workplan or annual clearance projections. 
At the Fourth Review Conference in November 2019, Nigeria stated it had been 
experiencing “the tragic consequences of the production and use of antipersonnel mines 
of an improvised nature,” declaring newly mined areas in the northeastern region of the 
country.216 It noted that it would prepare an updated Article 7 transparency report and an 
Article 5 extension request with the aim to meet the 2025 deadline. Yet by 15 October 2020, 
neither had been submitted.
Senegal has requested a five-year extension to its Article 5 deadline until 2026, although 
the estimated remaining contamination is relatively small at 0.49km² of confirmed hazardous 
areas (CHA) and an estimated 1.1km² requiring non-technical survey (NTS).217 Senegal has 
asserted that clearance activities must be approved by the non-state armed group (NSAG) 
Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la 
Casamance, MFDC), and that this approval is closely tied to the overall peace negotiations.218 
Senegal also has landmines placed around active national military installations. According 
to Senegal’s own Article 7 transparency reporting, the last clearance operations took place 
in 2017. 
South Sudan has submitted a request for a five-year extension to 9 July 2026.219 While 
it will not have completed clearance by 2025, it hopes to have cleared all contamination, 
including landmines, antivehicle mines, cluster munitions and other ERW by the 2026 
deadline.220  
211 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sudi Alimasi Kimputu, National Coordinator, Congolese Mine Action 
Center (CCLAM), 18 August 2020.
212 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention press release, “Mauritania 31st Country to Declare Itself Mine-Free,” 
29 November 2018, bit.ly/MauritaniaPressRelease2018. 
213 Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 January 2020, p. 3, bit.ly/MauritaniaExt 
Request2020. 
214 Niger Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 17 March 2020, p. 8, bit.ly/NigerExtension 
Request2020. 
215 Niger Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 17 March 2020, pp. 5–6, bit.ly/Niger 
ExtensionRequest2020. 
216 Statement of Nigeria, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 25–29 November 2019.
217 Senegal Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 15 June 2020, pp. 8 and 53. On p. 53, it states 
that remaining contamination is 1.59km² including the 0.49km² of CHA; bit.ly/SenegalExtRequest2020. 
218 Senegal Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 15 June 2020, p. 8, bit.ly/Senegal 
ExtRequest2020. 
219 Presentation by Jurkuc Barach Jurkuc, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 7–8 June 2018.









Ukraine is requesting a two-year extension to its Article 5 deadline until December 
2023.221 The request suggests that clearance can be completed within this timeframe, 
but notes that this is dependent on the cessation of hostilities in the occupied territories 
of Donetsk and Luhansk. Ukraine has not provided information in its extension request 
regarding any progress since the original estimate of 7,000km² of suspected hazardous 
areas (SHA). The request also does not give a clear understanding of the workplan for the 
requested extension period. 
In Monitor reporting, the term “improvised 
mines” is synonymous with victim-activated 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs). IEDs 
are “homemade” explosive weapons that are 
designed to cause death or injury. Improvised 
mines are victim-activated IEDs that are 
detonated by the presence, proximity, or 
contact of a person or vehicle. These are 
sometimes referred to as artisanal mines, 
victim-operated IEDs (VO-IEDs) and booby-
traps. They are also sometimes described by 
the type of construction or initiation system, 
such as pressure-plate IEDs (PP-IEDs) or 
crush wire IEDs. Improvised antipersonnel 
mines—being those types that are detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of 
a person—are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty and must be addressed accordingly 
by States Parties, in fulfillment of treaty obligations and commitments. For the entire 
period since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force in 1999, the greatest number of 
improvised mine casualties have been recorded in Colombia (10,532), closely followed by 
Afghanistan (9,272).
Improvised mines have been used well before the Mine Ban Treaty came into existence. 
They were used in Cambodia during the 1990s, with the Khmer Rouge deploying “primitive 
mines using sticks of T.N.T.” among other booby-trap devices.222 In BiH, a wide variety of 
mines were also used, “from high tech mines all the way to crude, hastily fabricated 
mines.”223 
Yet, while not a new issue, the scale of use of improvised mines has increased the 
scale of mine contamination and the number of casualties dramatically. Action #21 of the 
Oslo Action Plan addresses this issue, committing that “States Parties affected by anti-
personnel mines of an improvised nature will ensure that they apply all provisions and 
obligations under the Convention to such contamination as they do for all other types 
of anti-personnel mines, including during survey and clearance in fulfilment of Article 5 
and disaggregate by types of mines when reporting in fulfilment of Article 7 obligations.”
Improvised mines are being found in the Americas, South and Southeast Asia, and Sub-
Saharan Africa. States Parties with extensive antipersonnel mine contamination, such as 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen, are seeing the scale of their overall contamination increase. 
Other States Parties suspected or known to have contamination by improvised mines 
221 Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 8 June 2020, p. 5, bit.ly/UkraineExtension 
Request2020. 
222 “Khmer Rouge claim booby trap success,” UPI, 5 August 1994, bit.ly/KhmerRougeUPI1994. 
223 Philip Shenon, “Main Peril for G.I.’s in Bosnia Lies Just Beneath the Surface,” The New York Times, 10 
December 1995, bit.ly/NYTimes10Dec1995. 
Improvised mines
A week’s haul: Improvised landmines made 
safe by MAG teams await destruction close to 
mount Sinjar, Iraq. 
© Sean Sutton/MAG, April 2019
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include Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, the DRC, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Somalia, Tunisia, Turkey, and Ukraine. 
States not party Egypt, India, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Syria also have 
contamination by improvised mines.
Clearance and the provision of risk education about improvised mines can be sensitive 
in some contexts, such as Afghanistan, because they are used by parties actively engaged 
in conflict.
Improvised mines are also frequently found in urban and peri-urban areas in addition 
to rural areas. In urban areas, the threat can be more complex, and the boundaries between 
safe and unsafe areas are often less clear. Improvised devices can be found above ground 
in buildings, and in and around homes, and device types may vary from area to area. In 
risk education, this creates challenges in terms of developing clear messaging regarding 
recognition of devices and unsafe areas. An International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 
technical note (12.10/1) for IED risk education was drafted in 2018 to help address these 
challenges.
States Parties that have reported to the Monitor risk education messaging including 
improvised mines are Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Burkina Faso, Chad, Colombia, Iraq, Mali, 
Niger, Nigeria, Palestine, the Philippines, Somalia, Thailand (on the Thai-Myanmar border), 
Ukraine, and Yemen. Risk education including improvised mines has also been conducted 
in states not party Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Syria.
In 2019, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) contributed to protecting 
civilians from the effects of IEDs in Afghanistan, Colombia, Chad, Iraq, Libya, Myanmar, 
Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen, through integrated programs 
that included risk education, child-focused victim assistance and injury surveillance.224
RISK EDUCATION
Risk education is a core pillar of mine action,225 but one that has received little attention or 
acknowledgement by the broader mine action community in the last decade and, as a result, 
has frequently been under-funded. However, 2019 marked a turning point for risk education, 
also known as Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE).
A new international advisory group was formed in 2019 to steer efforts related to 
risk education. The EORE Advisory Group, consisting of international non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and United Nations (UN) bodies based in Europe and North America, 
has a mandate to ensure standards, guidelines, methods and approaches are relevant, 
effective and adapted to emerging threats and requirements; that risk education is well 
integrated in mine action programs; that synergies are increased with other humanitarian 
and development sectors; that guidance on priority setting is provided to support the 
prioritizing of resources for groups of highest risk and need; and that donors are aware of 
gaps and mechanisms to address them.226
During 2019, the advisory group has supported the review and update of the International 
Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 12.10 on risk education, which was expected to be approved 
by the IMAS review board during the final quarter of 2020.227 The EORE Advisory Group also 
commissioned a number of studies in 2019 to provide models and methodological guidance 
to the sector. This included a study on the use of new technologies and methodologies for 
224 United Nations, ‘‘Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices: report of the Secretary-
General,’’ 17 July 2020, pp. 9–10, bit.ly/IEDReportUN2020. 
225 The five pillars of mine action are stockpile destruction, clearance, risk education, victim assistance, 
and advocacy. See, United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), ‘‘5 Pillars of Mine Action,’’ undated, 
unmas.org/en/5-pillars-of-mine-action. 
226 Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), “Explosive Ordnance Risk Education 
(EORE) Advisory Group: Terms of Reference,” August 2019, bit.ly/EORETermsOfReference2019. 








EORE,228 and a desk review of good practices for measuring the effectiveness and impact of 
EORE in diverse contexts, which was ongoing at the end of September 2020.
The international Mine Risk Education Working Group (MREWG), hosted by the United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), continued to actively provide information and a platform 
to share methodologies and materials among over 400 registered members. In 2020, the 
group instigated some in-depth discussion on COVID-19 and risk education messaging.
Of particular relevance to the Mine Ban Treaty, the Oslo Action Plan, adopted by States 
Parties in November 2019, included a dedicated section with five concrete action points on 
risk education and risk reduction. The Monitor also took on the responsibility to report again 
on risk education for the first time since 2008.
OBLIGATIONS REGARDING RISK EDUCATION
The Mine Ban Treaty requires States Parties to “provide an immediate and effective 
warning to the population” in relation to all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which 
antipersonnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced. 
The Oslo Action Plan further recognizes the importance of mine risk education in helping 
to prevent mine incidents and save lives, providing five actions for States Parties with 
regard to risk education. These are to integrate risk education with wider humanitarian, 
development, protection, and education efforts, and with mine action activities; to provide 
context-specific risk education to all affected populations and groups at risk; to prioritize 
people most at risk through analysis of available casualty and contamination data and an 
understanding of people’s behavior and movements; to build national capacity to deliver risk 
education that can adapt to changing needs and contexts; and to report on risk education 
in annual Article 7 reports.229
REPORTING
Action #32 of the Oslo Action Plan requires States Parties to report on mine risk education and 
other risk reduction programs in their Article 7 reports, including the methodologies used, the 
challenges faced and the results achieved, with information disaggregated by gender and age.
Of the 28 mine-affected States Parties that submitted Article 7 reports for 2019, reporting 
on risk education was provided by 20 states, although the extent of detail was varied. 
Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand, and Yemen provided risk 
education beneficiary data that was disaggregated by age and sex. Afghanistan, Cambodia, 
Iraq, and Thailand provided detailed narrative information regarding risk education activities 
conducted in 2019. Afghanistan also included challenges faced and how they were addressed. 
Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BIH), Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Mauritania, Serbia, 
Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe provided no disaggregated beneficiary data and 
only a brief description of risk education activities.
Argentina, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Oman, Palestine, Peru, and the United Kingdom (UK) provided 
no information on risk education.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sri Lanka 
did not submit Article 7 transparency reports for 2019, as of 15 October 2020.230
Including a plan for risk education in Article 5 deadline extension requests is important 
from the perspective of ensuring that risk education programs are planned, budgeted for, 
and integrated within the overall obligations of States Parties.
228 GICHD, “Review of New Technologies and Methodologies for EORE in Challenging Contexts,” September 
2020, bit.ly/EORETechMethods2020. 
229 Oslo Action Plan, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, 29 November 2019, pp. 8–9, 
bit.ly/OsloActionPlan2019. 
230 Senegal submitted a transparency report in October 2020, although the report is not in the correct Mine 
Ban Treaty Article 7 format.
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In 2019, Cambodia, Chad, Ethiopia, Tajikistan, and Yemen all included risk education within 
their Article 5 deadline extension requests. In 2020, BiH, Colombia, the DRC, Mauritania, 
Senegal, and South Sudan included risk education within their extension requests. Niger and 
Ukraine did not. 
However, the extent to which risk education is included in extension requests is often 
lacking, with only a description of activities rather than a costed and detailed multi-year 
plan. While South Sudan provided a clear explanation of risk education plans and budget, 
Mauritania and Senegal only provided brief statements about risk education conducted in 
previous years rather than for the extension period. 
PROVISION OF RISK EDUCATION
In 2019, 28 States Parties are known to have provided risk education to populations who 
may be at risk due to antipersonnel mine contamination.
The DRC, Eritrea, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sri Lanka did not submit Article 7 reports 
in 2019 and so did not report on risk education activities. Palestine and Peru did submit an 
updated Article 7 report, but did not report on risk education. However, it is known that risk 
education took place in most of these countries. UNICEF supported risk education activities 
in Eritrea (training 100 community-based rehabilitation volunteers), Niger, Nigeria, and Sri 
Lanka,231 while other operators reported to the Monitor on risk education activities in the 
DRC and Senegal. Ecuador, in its Article 7 report, provided information on a cross-border risk 
education activity with Peru.232 The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported 
on risk education activities in Gaza.233
Argentina, Cyprus, Oman, and the UK are not believed to have conducted any risk education 
in 2019. 
Of the 22 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty and five other areas contaminated by 
antipersonnel mines, the majority had some risk education conducted during 2019. Only 
China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and Uzbekistan 
did not conduct any risk education. 
RISK EDUCATION PRIORITIZATION 
The Oslo Action Plan requires States Parties to prioritize people most at risk by linking 
mine risk education and risk reduction programs and messages to an analysis of available 
casualty and contamination data. In 2019, it was reported that national level Information 
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) victim data is used to inform the prioritization 
and planning of risk education in all States Parties where IMSMA data is available. 
Afghanistan conducted a nationwide knowledge, attitudes and practices survey in 2018 
and maintains a priority scoring matrix to enable it to prioritize the most affected populations 
in terms of their proximity to the hazards, the number of recent casualties, and incidences 
of armed conflict.234 
The Cambodian Mine Victim Information System (CMVIS)—which incorporates information 
related to all types of explosive remnants of war (ERW)—operated by the Cambodian Mine 
Action Authority (CMAA), is used by risk education operators to plan and target their activities 
231 Risk Education Strategic Monitoring Questions data for 2019, provided by Hugues Laurenge, UNICEF, 2 
June 2020. 
232 Ecuador Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), p. 14, bit.ly/EcuadorArticle7Report2020. 
233 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Soula Kreitem, Palestine Programme and Support Office, UNMAS, 
30 April 2020.
234 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Fazel Rahman, Project Manager Operations, Directorate of Mine 








in Cambodia.235 Cambodia also reported that an evaluation of the risk education program in 
the country, coordinated by the CMAA and supported by UNICEF, started in 2019, with the 
evaluation report expected to be released in December 2020.236 
In Chad, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) conducted a situational analysis carried out with 
local authorities, community and opinion leaders, leaders of civil society associations, young 
people and women, to determine more closely the risks at the local level and those most 
exposed.237
In Turkey, the Turkish Mine Action Center (TURMAC) conducted analysis through its 
database to target and prioritize villages for risk education, while South Sudan reported the 
conduct of a needs analysis survey to better understand and respond to at-risk groups.
In several States Parties, victim information is not comprehensive or publicly available. 
In BiH and Iraq, it was reported that victim databases are incomplete, and in the case of 
Iraq, not openly available for interrogation.238 In Ukraine, victim casualty data was available 
but was not considered to be comprehensive. The HALO Trust reported to the Monitor that 
it follows open source media, news websites and reports from other organizations and the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to collect information on risk 
behaviors and mine incidents across eastern Ukraine.239 In Yemen, it was reported to the 
Monitor that the lack of a functioning IMSMA database makes it difficult to identify risk 
groups, highly contaminated areas or risk-taking behaviors.240 In Zimbabwe, it was reported 
that there is data available for both human and animal related mine casualties, and a 
national database on civilian accidents, although it is not routinely updated.241
TARGET AREAS AND RISK GROUPS 
Action #29 of the Oslo Action Plan requires States Parties to provide context-specific risk 
education that is tailored to the threat encountered by the population; sensitive to gender, 
age and disability; and takes the diverse needs and experiences of people in affected 
communities into account. Consideration of target areas, risk groups and the activities and 
behaviors that put people at risk is crucial to the design and implementation of effective 
risk education programs.
Target areas
During 2019, risk education was conducted in both rural and urban areas in States Parties 
Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Colombia, Croatia, the DRC, Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, 
and Ukraine. In Croatia, risk education was conducted in 2019 through public campaigns 
at city and municipal level concerning contamination in remote areas. Risk education was 
conducted only in rural areas in States Parties Cambodia, Chad, Senegal, Thailand, and 
Zimbabwe. 
In Afghanistan, Angola, the DRC, Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Yemen and on the 
Thailand-Myanmar border, risk education was conducted in camps for refugees and internally 
displaced persons (IDPs). In some situations, IDPs were also reached in host communities. 
BiH reported conducting risk education in camps for migrants.
235 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Rebecca Letven, Country Programme Manager, MAG Cambodia, 7 
April 2020; by Jason Miller, Community Liaison Manager, MAG Cambodia, 7 April 2020; and by Josh Ridley, 
Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 21 April 2020.
236 Email from Chhaya Plong, UNICEF Cambodia, 9 July 2020.
237 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Kouassi Ludovic, MAG Chad, 29 May 2020.
238 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Zorica Lucic, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 29 
April 2020; by Goran Knezevic, Humanity & Inclusion (HI), 7 April 2020; and by Madeline Achurch, Program 
Officer, HALO Trust, 30 April 2020.
239 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ronan Shenhav, HALO Trust Ukraine, 11 May 2020.
240 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Emma Simons, EORE Technical Coordinator, HI Yemen, 22 May 
2020.
241 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Katie Wellington, HALO Trust Zimbabwe, 22 April 2020.
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Both Afghanistan and BiH reported risk education 
targeted at people on the move, with Afghanistan 
targeting drivers at bus stations, and BiH targeting 
migrants as they travelled.
Risk education was also reported to have been 
conducted across borders in 2019. The Peruvian Mine 
Action Center (Centro Peruano de Acción contra las 
Minas Antipersonal, CONTRAMINAS) and Ecuador‘s 
National Center for Humanitarian Demining (Centro de 
Desminado del Ecuador, CENDESMI) have collaborated 
in the development of cross-national risk education 
campaigns to ensure communities along the Ecuador-
Peru border are aware of the danger posed by 
antipersonnel mines. The campaigns are bilingual 
and multisectoral, involving ministries of health, 
education, defense and interior. Five campaigns have 
been conducted, with the sixth campaign carried 
out in 2019.242 In Afghanistan, the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (Fondation Suisse de 
Déminage, FSD) provides risk education to communities who undertake livelihood activities 
in the Panji valley—a past confrontation line between the former Soviet Union and the 
Mujahedeen. The area is accessed from across the border in Tajikistan.243 
Risk groups
Children are a key risk group with regard to antipersonnel mines in many States Parties 
because they are often growing up in contaminated areas, lack knowledge of the risks, and are 
prone to picking up and playing with items. 
In Angola, it was reported that children are at greater risk of accidents due to their lack of 
exposure to the war, which ended 18 years ago.244 In BiH, children are seen as a major risk 
group because of their lack of awareness of the threat and their curiosity.245 In Croatia, 
schoolchildren and college students were the primary risk education target group in 2019.246 
In some countries, such as Angola, children are often responsible for looking after animals 
and undertaking household chores, such as collecting firewood, which may take them into 
mined areas. 
However, in several countries it was noted that children are often more at risk from ERW 
rather than from landmines. In Angola, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, and Ukraine, it was 
reported that children are more affected by ERW because they pick up and play with items. In 
Angola, it was also reported that children were at more risk of finding ERW when going out 
to collect natural resources.247 In Palestine, most of the accidents recorded among children 
were the result of curiosity, a lack of awareness of the dangers, and the tendency to play in 
open and contaminated areas.248
Adult men were cited by the majority of States Parties and risk education operators to be 
the primary risk group in relation to antipersonnel mines. BiH, Cambodia, Croatia, the DRC, 
Iraq, South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe, among others, all noted men as a high-
risk group. Adult men are seen to be most at risk because of their roles and responsibilities, 
242 Ecuador Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form D, p. 14, bit.ly/Ecuador 
Article7Report2020. 
243 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Philluppus Jakobus Fouche, Operations Manager, FSD Afghanistan, 
14 April 2020.
244 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Carlota Moura, Project Officer, HALO Trust Angola, 23 April 2020.
245 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Zorica Lucic, ICRC BiH, 29 April 2020.
246 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Civil Protection Directorate Croatia, 28 April 2020.
247 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Carlota Moura, Project Officer, HALO Trust Angola, 23 April 2020.
248 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Soula Kreitem, Palestine Programme and Support Office, UNMAS, 
30 April 2020.
Children in Janmarje Bala village, Afghanistan, are 
educated about the risk of mines and other explosive 
remnants of war.








which often involve partaking in higher risk activities such as agriculture, fishing, hunting 
and animal herding. Men are more likely to move further away from home in search of work 
and livelihood opportunities, increasing their chance of exposure to mine risk. 
In Afghanistan, BIH, Cambodia, Croatia, Iraq, and Ukraine, men were at risk from mines due 
to their work in rural areas, including cultivation, the collection of forest products, hunting, 
fishing, foraging, and tending animals. In BiH, the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) noted that men often entered mined areas consciously out of economic necessity. 
This included farmers, hunters, fishermen and firemen.249 In Croatia, target groups included 
members of hunting associations, the Croatian Mountain Rescue Service, firefighters, forestry 
workers, hikers, farmers and tourists.250 In Ukraine, working age men are the largest affected 
group due to their traditional gender roles working in farming, cattle herding, fishing and 
firewood collection.251 It was also reported that farmers and people in isolated villages who 
had to use unpaved roads were at high risk from antivehicle mines. 
Fewer reported mine incidents involve women and girls, and risk education operators 
noted that they were often less likely to engage in unsafe behaviors or to travel as far from 
the home as men. However, women and girls are often an important group to target in risk 
education as they can help promote safer behavior among men and among children and 
peers.252 In contexts where female social and economic roles are limited, women and girls 
are sometimes harder to reach for risk education.253
Poverty and a lack of viable livelihood alternatives often force people to take risks on 
contaminated land. Risk education operators reported to the Monitor that it is often the rural 
poor and economically disadvantaged that are at greatest risk from landmines. 
In Cambodia, significant numbers of villagers will knowingly access contaminated land 
due to a lack of viable livelihood options. Landless farmers were forced to access vacant or 
forest land which has a higher likelihood of being contaminated.254 In eastern Ukraine, the 
15km buffer zone from the “line of contact” had disproportionally affected a large number of 
elderly people. Insufficient pensions forced them to continue to cultivate plots of land, pick 
mushrooms and collect firewood in areas contaminated with mines and ERW.255 FSD in Ukraine 
reported providing risk education sessions at employment centers along the contact line.256
Equally, economic development can also increase pressure on the land and the risk 
from mines. In Cambodia, one of Southeast Asia’s fastest growing economies,257 economic 
development and population in-migration to the northwest and northeast has increased the 
demand for land and the threat from contamination in these formerly remote areas.258 The 
greater mechanization of farming has also led to an increased incidence of accidents caused 
by antivehicle mines.259
249 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Zorica Lucic, ICRC BiH, 29 April 2020.
250 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Civil Protection Directorate Croatia, 28 April 2020; and Croatia 
Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), bit.ly/CroatiaArticle7Report2020. 
251 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Srdjan Jovanovic, Weapon Contamination Coordinator, ICRC, 30 
April 2020; by Ronan Shenhav, Project Officer, HALO Trust Ukraine, 11 May 2020; and by Olena Kryvova, 
FSD Ukraine, 9 June 2020.
252 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Rebecca Letven, Country Programme Manager, MAG Cambodia, 2 
June 2020; and by Aurelie Fabry, UNMAS DRC, 11 May 2020.
253 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Jessica Rice, HALO Trust Somalia, 4 May 2020.
254 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Rebecca Letven, Country Programme Manager, MAG Cambodia, 2 
June 2020.
255 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Srdjan Jovanovic, Weapon Contamination Coordinator, ICRC, 30 
April 2020; by Ronan Shenhav, Project Officer, HALO Trust Ukraine, 11 May 2020; and by Olena Kryvova, 
FSD Ukraine, 9 June 2020.
256 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Olena Kryvova, FSD Ukraine, 9 June 2020.
257 CMAA, “National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025,” p. viii, bit.ly/MineActionStrategyCMAA2018-2025. 
258 Casualty data received by email from Nguon Monoketya, Deputy Director, Socio-Economic Planning and 
Database Management Department, CMAA, 17 February 2017.
259 See for example, Khouth Sopheak Chakrya, “Oddar Menachey farmer dies after ploughing over landmine,” 
Phnom Penh Post, 14 May 2020, bit.ly/PhnomPenhPost14May2020. 
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Migrant and itinerant workers are a high-risk group in BiH, Cambodia, and Thailand.260 
In Cambodia, internal and cross-border migration into Thailand in search of employment in 
agriculture or construction is common, and these itinerant workers are at risk due to working 
in unfamiliar areas and crossing the border, often at informal crossing points. The Thailand 
Mine Action Centre (TMAC) reported that mobile risk education teams are dispatched to 
mine-affected areas along the commuting routes during the long holidays to ensure people 
use safe paths.261 In BiH, due to in-migration, the BiH Mine Action Center (BHMAC) organized 
a number of meetings in 2019 with actors such as the border police, Norwegian People’s 
Aid (NPA), the Red Cross Society, and the ICRC, to ensure that migrants are warned about the 
threats of contamination.262
Drivers were a key target group due to the danger of contamination on roads, including 
from improvised mines, in Afghanistan, Mali, and Ukraine. Drivers are sensitized to the 
dangers of overtaking and using short-cuts on roads in Afghanistan.263 In Mali, UNMAS 
developed an improvised explosive device (IED) risk awareness course on devices planted 
on main roads for drivers from humanitarian organizations and private sector companies.
Nomadic and pastoral communities were target groups for risk education in States Parties 
Afghanistan, Chad, Iraq, Mali, Mauritania, Somalia, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe. In South 
Sudan, cattle herders, particularly from the two main tribes, the Dinka Ngok and Misseriya, 
constantly move looking for grazing areas and water for their cattle, which puts them at risk 
from landmines.264 
Pastoralists in Somalia and nomadic communities and shepherds in Iraq are also at risk 
because of their movement patterns across contaminated areas.265 Iraq conducted intensive 
awareness campaigns during the grazing season due to increased mine casualties.266 Nomads, 
travelers, traditional guides and trackers were at risk from mines in contaminated desert 
areas in Chad. Guides and trackers were trained to pass on risk education messages to those 
they guide across the desert, supported by MAG.267 A memorandum of understanding (MoU) 
with the Independent Directorate of Kuchie [Nomad] Affairs  in Afghanistan was signed with 
the Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) to support the risk education program.268 
In Zimbabwe, due to high numbers of mine accidents involving animals, animal herders are 
targeted for risk education.269 
Indigenous reserves in high mountainous areas of Colombia were often mined as strategic 
posts by non-state armed groups (NSAGs), exposing the most vulnerable indigenous ethnic 
groups to the risk of mines. The HALO Trust reported to the Monitor that providing risk 
education to indigenous populations can pose a significant challenge based on their semi-
autonomous nature and cultural sensitivities. Separate permissions must be secured with 
each of the indigenous authorities to access the areas. Messages and delivery methodology 
must also comply with the cultural complexities of indigenous populations.270
In urban areas, particularly in Iraq, high-risk activities include construction work and street 
cleaning. Afghanistan also cited scrap metal collection as a high-risk activity. Ukraine targets 
workers who are exposed to risk from day-to-day activities such as repairing electrical lines.271
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261 Thailand Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), p. 10, bit.ly/ThailandArticle7Report2020.
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266 Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), p. 55, bit.ly/IraqArticle7Report2020. 
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IDPs, refugees and returnees are often particularly vulnerable to the threat posed by 
mines due to being displaced by war and living or returning to areas where they may be 
unfamiliar with the contamination. A lack of occupation and livelihood security may also 
force them to engage in intentional risk-taking activities. 
Risk education for IDPs and returnees was undertaken in 2019 in States Parties Afghanistan, 
Angola, the DRC, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan, and Thailand. In Afghanistan, Afghans returning 
from Iran and Pakistan were provided risk education on the border. Risk education campaigns 
were also provided in Iraq in liberated areas for communities who, following the cessation 
of hostilities, were keen to return home.272 In Angola, MAG reported providing risk education 
to refugees in Luanda Norte as part of the response to a refugee crisis.273 On the Thailand-
Myanmar border, Humanity & Inclusion (HI) provided risk education in nine refugee camps 
during 2019.274 In South Sudan, UNMAS provided risk education to IDPs and refugees being 
hosted in United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) ‘Protection of Civilians’ sites as 
an integrated part of the humanitarian intervention.275
Reaching people with disabilities has not always been well addressed by risk education, 
but in 2019 there were some positive examples of risk education involving people with 
disabilities. 
HI conducted risk education projects targeting people with disabilities, or risk education 
was integrated into victim assistance projects.276 In Afghanistan, since mid-2018, the 
HI Mobile Team Project incorporated physical rehabilitation, psychosocial support and 
risk education for IDPs, returnees and host communities. Risk education teams provided 
sessions in rehabilitation centers for victims of explosive ordnance and other people with 
disabilities.277 MAG in Angola and HI in Thailand both recruited landmine survivors to support 
risk education efforts. In Iraq, risk education campaigns were combined with sports activities 
for people with disabilities.278 FSD in Ukraine implemented a small project in specialized 
education institutions for children with disabilities. This included risk education using a 
sign language trainer.279 HI in Iraq produced risk education videos with sign language and 
subtitles, and plans to produce a risk education “talking book” for children in Afghanistan. HI 
in Colombia used braille for risk education messages;280 while in Yemen, UNICEF supported 
a risk education program for hearing-impaired children.281
Emergency risk education was reported by most operators as being delivered in response 
to landmine/ERW accidents. The HALO Trust in Somalia reported providing risk education to 
communities displaced by flash floods in Hirshabelle State in October 2019.282 In Yemen, the 
Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) continued to conduct risk education sessions 
as part of its emergency response.283
272 Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), p. 55, bit.ly/IraqArticle7Report2020; 
response to Monitor questionnaire by Alexandra Letcher, Community Liaison Manager, MAG Iraq, 21 May 
2020; and response by Goran Knezevic, Risk Education Technical Coordinator, HI Iraq, 22 May 2020.
273 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Jeanette Dijkstra, Country Director, MAG Angola, 13 May 2020.
274 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Hser Htee Praikammasit, HI Thailand, 22 May 2020.
275 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Itta Betty Oliver Lowela, UNMAS South Sudan, 8 May 2020.
276 The HI Comprehensive Approach to Humanitarian Mine Action encompasses integrated programs with 
advocacy, clearance, risk education, and victim assistance. Such programs are implemented by HI in States 
Parties Afghanistan and Iraq. 
277 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Zareen Khan Mayar, EORE Technical Advisor, HI, 22 May 2020.
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279 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Olena Kryvova, FSD Ukraine, 9 June 2020.
280 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Johana Huertas, AVR Field Specialist, HI Colombia, 19 May 2020.
281 UNICEF, “MRE for hearing impaired children in Yemen,” presentation at UNMAS webinar on 
“Persons with Disabilities in Armed Conflict; Inclusive Protection Perspectives,” 28 May 2020, 
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282 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Jessica Rice, Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 4 May 2020.
283 UNDP, “Republic of Yemen: Emergency Mine Action Project. Annual Progress Report 2019,” 20 January 
2020, p. 14.
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Several organizations in States Parties Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, Somalia, and Ukraine, 
reported providing risk education to the staff of NGOs or service providers. In Afghanistan, a 
landmine safety program was implemented for aid workers, while in Iraq, risk education was 
provided to international NGOs, local NGOs and staff of commercial organizations working in 
contaminated areas. This included factory staff, quarry and construction workers, municipality 
cleaners and journalists.284 In Somalia, UNMAS provided risk education to partners working 
to implement humanitarian and stabilization activities in the country. Risk education was 
also integrated into other humanitarian activities such as through support to IDPs and 
returnees.285 In Cambodia, risk education was provided to NGOs working in contaminated 
areas and to companies and construction workers. UNMAS in South Sudan provided risk 
education to UN peacekeepers. 286
RISK EDUCATION DELIVERY METHODS 
Action #28 of the Oslo Action Plan recommends integrating risk education activities with 
wider humanitarian, development and protection efforts, and as part of survey, clearance 
and victim assistance activities. Action #31 refers to the need to build national capacity to 
deliver risk education.
Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, 
Colombia, Iraq, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Ukraine, 
Yemen, and Zimbabwe all reported that risk education 
was carried out as an integrated part of survey and 
clearance activities in 2019. This was often crucial to 
generating reports of potentially contaminated areas 
and landmine or ERW accidents. Several countries, 
including Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Iraq, have hotline 
numbers for communities to report ordnance, and this 
is disseminated through risk education sessions. 
In 2019, in States Parties Angola, BiH, Cambodia, 
Colombia, Iraq, Somalia, Tajikistan, and Zimbabwe, 
NPA undertook risk education in support of land 
release, either integrated within non-technical 
survey or technical survey operations, or by trained 
deminers while clearance was taking place.287 UNMAS 
in Afghanistan reported that deminers provide risk 
education to community members when conducting 
clearance, and quick response teams conduct risk education alongside explosive ordnance 
disposal (EOD).288
The vast majority of risk education reported in States Parties is delivered through the 
primary means of face-to-face risk education sessions, often with specialized risk education 
or community liaison teams, and the distribution of small, printed materials such as leaflets 
and posters. Many of the organizations delivering risk education used mixed gender teams 
to ensure that all age and gender groups in the population were adequately reached. 
However, despite this being the most popular means of risk education delivery, some 
States Parties reported challenges in delivery. In South Sudan and Colombia, the range 
of languages and dialects spoken poses a challenge for both team deployment and the 
284 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Madeline Achurch, Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 30 April 2020; 
and by Goran Knezevic, Risk Education Technical Coordinator, HI Iraq, 22 May 2020.
285 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed, Project Manager, UNMAS Somalia, 9 May 
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2020.
A farmer passes by as an EOD team prepares a 
controlled demolition of explosive ordnance near 
Pailin, Cambodia.








development of risk education materials.289 In South Sudan, the remote and dispersed nature 
of populations combined with poor road infrastructure makes it challenging for teams to 
reach people. Limited literacy in South Sudan also reduces the effectiveness of written 
materials, and it was reported that leaflets are often thrown away.290 
In both Somalia and South Sudan, local communities often mistrust people from 
international organizations, and messages are better delivered by people from the 
community.291 Face-to-face delivery by mobile risk education teams was also challenging due 
to insecurity or ongoing conflict in States Parties Afghanistan, Mali, South Sudan, Ukraine, 
and Yemen.
Despite being most at risk, men are regarded as the most difficult group to reach as 
they are often away when risk education teams visit communities. This suggests that more 
effort is required to prioritize and better target risk education for men. In Palestine (Gaza), 
risk education includes “street sessions” which are shorter face-to-face sessions held on 
the street with the aim of targeting men who are hard to reach via regular risk education 
sessions.292
The use of mass media, including TV, radio and billboards, is commonly used for risk 
education, including in States Parties Afghanistan, BiH, Iraq, and Thailand. Afghanistan aired 
two one-minute videos on popular TV channels in the national languages; one geared 
toward adults and the other specifically aimed at men.293 Afghanistan also used radio public 
service announcements in five provinces, with messages concerning travelling, protecting 
children from the risk of mines, and what to do after a conflict.294 The DRC also employed 
radio for the delivery of risk education, while BiH used billboards. Thailand used local press 
and community radio to deliver risk education.295
The HALO Trust in Colombia implemented a ‘Creating Safer Environments’ campaign in 
2019 in the Chaparral, Planadas and Rio Blanco municipalities in the Tolima department. 
The campaign focused on disseminating risk education information to the largest audience 
possible through the distribution of printed materials and public service announcements on 
local radio stations and on TV.296 The campaign ensured that cultural diversity was reflected, 
having local people record the messages to ensure that regional dialects and accents were 
captured.
Delivery through interactive means such as theatre, puppet shows, and mobile cinema 
were reported in States Parties Afghanistan, Iraq, and Ukraine. 
In the risk education sector, there has been increasing interest in the use of digital media 
and mobile phone applications for the delivery of risk education messages, particularly in 
more remote or challenging contexts where traditional risk education delivery methods are 
not feasible.297 
MAG in Iraq piloted a risk education project with Facebook, the Directorate of Mine Action 
(DMA) and the United States (US) government in 2019 and had plans to roll this out on a 
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290 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Angelo Lawrence, MAG South Sudan, 12 May 2020; and by Vivky 
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2020.
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larger scale in 2020.298 UNMAS in Iraq also developed mass media campaigns through radio, 
TV and social media platforms.299 Facebook is used by UNMAS in Afghanistan and HI in Iraq. 
Croatia developed an application, Minefields.info, for Android and IOS smartphones, which 
warns people if they are approaching a dangerous area. The application also includes a “call 
for help” option and allows reporting of ERW.300
In Nigeria, UNMAS is exploring the use of a risk education technical device to disseminate 
risk education messages to hard-to-reach and inaccessible at-risk populations. It was hoped 
that the application might be used to deliver risk education messages and basic COVID-19 
prevention awareness messages.301
Afghanistan, Angola, Colombia, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe all reported limited 
communication infrastructure such as mobile networks, and access to and use of social 
media.
Risk education in Afghanistan, BiH, the DRC, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, and South Sudan 
has been integrated into the humanitarian and protection sectors. In BiH, this is done through 
the work of the Red Cross, and in Afghanistan, risk education has been provided for returnees 
through the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and at International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) encashment and transit centers.302 In South Sudan, UNICEF 
funded partners integrate risk education with other thematic components such as psychosocial 
support, family tracing and reunification activities, and with other humanitarian activities such 
as water, sanitation, hygiene, health, nutrition and food security programs.303
In Senegal and other countries where the ICRC works, the approach is to link risk education 
to the provision of community infrastructure, to avoid communities being exposed to mine 
contamination, in line with the ICRC ‘Risk Awareness and Safer Behavior’ approach.304
Risk education was implemented into the school curriculum in Afghanistan, Cambodia, 
Colombia, the DRC, Mali, Sudan, and Thailand. In Afghanistan, key risk education messages are 
included in the curriculum for children in grades 2 to 12, while in Cambodia risk education 
is included in the curriculum for primary and lower secondary schools. In Sudan, mine risk 
education features in the curriculum for primary and secondary levels in Darfur state. 
In BiH, Croatia, Iraq, Mauritania, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe risk 
education is provided in schools, but not as part of the formal curriculum.305 Iraq is currently 
coordinating with the Iraqi Ministry of Education on curriculum development for primary 
school level.306 South Sudan also reported the development of a risk education curriculum, 307 
and reported building the national capacity of nursery and primary level teachers to deliver risk 
education.308 Also in South Sudan, UNICEF worked with the Ministry of General Education and 
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Instruction and the national mine action authority to ensure risk education is implemented 
through life skills subjects in schools.309 Zimbabwe introduced a pilot literacy and mine 
action program in four primary schools, led by MAG and the Ministry of Education.310
In Afghanistan, DMAC has introduced child-focused risk education materials that have been 
piloted and will be used in field operations. DMAC sees this as a significant step towards employing 
content that will help to engage and change the behavior of children and young adults.311
Training community volunteers or networks to provide risk education was reported 
in Afghanistan, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, the DRC, Iraq, Mali, Senegal, Somalia, 
South Sudan, Thailand, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. This mainly involved training 
representatives of affected communities to deliver basic risk education messages. This 
is seen as advantageous in terms of maintaining risk education in hard-to-reach areas, 
ensuring risk education is delivered through somebody who is trusted by the community, 
and in supporting sustainability. MAG and HI trained community focal points in many of the 
countries where they work to reinforce safety messages and to report items. 
In some States Parties, risk education is being conducted in partnership with the national 
police. In Cambodia, a Village and Commune Safety policy, launched in 2010, includes a program 
to train the Cambodian National Police to implement risk education and awareness regarding 
the Law on Weapons, Explosives and Ammunitions Management.312 In Croatia, as part of the 
“Less Arms, Less Tragedies” campaign, the Croatian police educate civilians to hand in ERW.313  
In Turkey, as part of its national mine risk education plan implementation, a protocol was 
planned to be signed with the Turkish Gendarmerie in 15 provinces to train them on risk 
education between 2020–2022.314 In Somalia, NPA also planned to implement a project in 
2020 focusing on training the Puntland police in risk education and non-technical survey. 
In Zimbabwe, The HALO Trust partnered with local police stations in 2019 to provide safety 
advice.315 UNICEF planned to undertake risk education training with army officers in Chad in 
2019, but the training was halted due to the deteriorating security situation.316
VICTIM ASSISTANCE AND THE OSLO ACTION PLAN 
Actions to address the impact of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in relation to 
victim assistance in the Oslo Action Plan include activities and services to implement the 
following:317
  Effective and efficient emergency medical response and ongoing medical care;318
  Comprehensive healthcare, rehabilitation support services, and psychological and 
psychosocial support services;319
309 UNICEF, Risk Education Strategic Monitoring Questions data for 2019, provided by Hugues Laurenge, 
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313 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Civil Protection Directorate, 28 April 2020; and Croatia Convention 
on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form F, bit.ly/CroatiaCCMArt7Report2020. 
314 Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form G, p.14, bit.ly/TurkeyArticle 
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316 UNICEF, Risk Education Strategic Monitoring Questions data for 2019, provided by Hugues Laurenge, 
UNICEF, 2 June 2020.
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bit.ly/OsloActionPlan2019.
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  Social and economic inclusion;320
  Protection in situations of risk, including situations of armed conflict, humanitarian 
emergencies, and natural disasters.321
EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT EMERGENCY MEDICAL 
RESPONSE AND ONGOING MEDICAL CARE322
Timely first aid response for casualties and adequate pre-hospital trauma care includes 
interventions such as first aid and field trauma response, emergency evacuation, availability 
of transport, and immediate medical care that involves assessment and pre-hospital 
communication of critical information for patient handover. The provision of appropriate 
emergency medical services can considerably affect the chance of the survival and the speed 
of recovery of mine victims, as well as outcomes of injuries and the severity of impairments. 
Improvements in medical care services to strengthen emergency response capacities for 
people injured by mines/ERW and others in affected communities were reported in Afghanistan, 
where immediate care packages are also distributed to civilian conflict causalities through 
the Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians (COMAC) Programme, funded by the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID). In Croatia, all mine/ERW survivors 
are entitled to healthcare and social protection measures.323 In Nigeria, an International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) mobile surgical team operated on patients free of charge. 
Wounded people were referred, when necessary, for specialized care, physical rehabilitation 
and/or mental health and psychosocial support provided by ICRC-trained volunteers. There 
is a drastic problem of accessibility to immediate healthcare across the DRC, where in most 
cases people injured cannot receive appropriate assistance, resulting in death. 
In South Sudan, incidents often occurred in remote areas far from access to health services. 
In eastern Ukraine, along the line of contact, primary healthcare centers and satellite services 
received the required equipment and medicines. As public health facilities in Ukraine’s 
conflict-affected regions gradually resumed services, Doctors Without Borders (Médecins 
Sans Frontières, MSF) began transferring patients to the Ministry of Health for treatment. By 
the end of 2019, all were provided with care through the public health system.324
International organizations continued to provide much-needed assistance in conflict-
affected areas. In Iraq, healthcare services for all persons with disabilities have decreased 
over time, in part due to the recent security situation. In Yemen, many medical facilities have 
been damaged, and ongoing conflict has further undermined the struggling health system, 
which has been in a precarious state for several years due to ongoing conflict.325 In late 
2019, Yemen’s healthcare system was reported to be “on the brink of collapse” (see section on 
COVID-19 Response).326
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326 Julie Lorenzen, “Yemen’s Healthcare System on the Brink of Collapse,” International Federation of the Red 








REHABILITATION SUPPORT SERVICES, AND 
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOSOCIAL SUPPORT 
SERVICES327
Rehabilitation, including physiotherapy and the supply of assistive 
devices such as prostheses, orthoses, mobility aids, and wheelchairs, 
aims to help the person regain or improve mobility, and to engage 
in everyday activities. Effective rehabilitation is aimed at improving 
personal autonomy and empowering people to have mobility and 
independence. Rehabilitation services with a comprehensive or 
multidisciplinary approach involve a team including a medical doctor, 
physiotherapist, prosthetist, and social worker, as well as other 
specialists as required. Psychosocial support is often also an integral 
aspect of rehabilitation, while it can also be a standalone service or 
combined with social integration, for example through peer support.
During the reporting period, all of the ICRC’s MoveAbility Foundation 
activities were being integrated into the ICRC’s Physical Rehabilitation 
Programme (PRP), established in 1979. The MoveAbility Foundation 
was formerly called the ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD). The 
SFD was created in 1983 from a resolution at the 1981 International 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Conference, which recommended that “a 
special fund be formed for the benefit of the disabled and to promote 
the implementation of durable projects to aid disabled persons.” It 
has been an independent foundation under Swiss law since 2001. 
The SFD marked a strategic shift from humanitarian assistance to 
development, to ensure continuity of the ICRC-PRP’s work. The 2017 
change from the SFD to the MoveAbility Foundation was an ambitious 
strategy shift, planning activities for growth and development over 
five years, however integration of the SFD into the ICRC-PRP occurred 
before the plan ended. 
States Parties can increase the sustainability of rehabilitation activities by allocating 
a specific budget line for the physical and functional rehabilitation needs of all persons 
with disabilities, including victims. In Afghanistan, authorities have acknowledged that it 
is unrealistic to consider the government capable of ensuring the required rehabilitation 
services. New physical rehabilitation centers were established in three provinces of 
Afghanistan, however at least seven more centers are still needed. Access to rehabilitation 
centers is also extremely limited in Mozambique, South Sudan, and Uganda.
In Iraq, the entire rehabilitation system lacked capacity to deliver enough services and 
devices to meet increased needs. In Cambodia, progress was made in the handover of 
rehabilitation centers to government management, while resources were secured for their 
sustainability. In Nigeria, construction began in August 2019 for a new physical rehabilitation 
center, under the ICRC’s Programme for Humanitarian Impact Investment and in partnership 
with a university teaching hospital.328 The government of Uganda has identified human 
resources for health as one of the core causes of financial inefficiency in the health system. 
The two main problems are significant rates of work absenteeism and the existence of “ghost 
workers” on the public payroll, which are attributed to weak personnel management and 
demotivation.329  
In Palestine, the main prosthetic unit in Gaza, the Artificial Limb and Polio Centre (ALPC), 
continued to face significant pressure on its limited resources while addressing an increase 
327 Oslo Action Plan, Action #39; CRPD Article 25 – Health; CRPD Article 20 – Personal Mobility; and CRPD 
Article 26 – Habilitation and Rehabilitation.
328 ICRC, “Annual Report 2019,” 29 June 2020, p. 215, icrc.org/en/document/annual-report-2019. 
329 Wemos Health Unlimited, “Country Report Uganda: Uganda’s Human Resources for Health: Paradoxes and 
Dilemmas,” October 2019, bit.ly/WemosUgandaReportOct2019. 
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rehabilitation center in Yei, South 
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has been broken since 2018, and to 
receive new crutches. 
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in patients with amputations, many of whom had been shot in the legs. A new prosthetic 
hospital and disability rehabilitation center—the Limb Reconstruction Center in Khan 
Younis, Gaza, built by the WHO—and a Hamas-run Health Ministry opened in 2020.330 A new 
Rehabilitation Center also opened in Bethlehem in October 2019.331 In 2019, mine/ERW 
victims from Senegal continued to receive prosthetic devices in Guinea-Bissau through an 
agreement between the ICRC, the Senegalese Survivor Network, and the mine action center, 
ongoing since 2015.
Improvement of the rehabilitation facility at the Ukrainian Research Institute for 
Prosthetics and Rehabilitation was reported.332 A USAID-funded project launched in 2019 
in Ukraine and Tajikistan, Strengthening Rehabilitation Services within Health Systems 
(SRSHS), aimed to improve rehabilitation services and increase access to those services in 
the two countries.333
Psychological and psychosocial support activities include professional counselling, 
individual peer-to-peer counselling, community-based peer support groups, networks of 
survivors and associations of persons with disabilities, as well as some types of sports and 
recreational activities.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), there was a program in 2019 to develop structured 
peer-to-peer psychological support, by victims for victims, in healthcare and rehabilitation 
facilities supported by the European Commission. In Eritrea, the United Nations Children’s 
Fund (UNICEF) supports the Ministry of Labor and Human Welfare to provide mental health 
and psychosocial support to families and children with disabilities. In Senegal, mine victims 
supported other victims who received assistance in Guinea-Bissau. Mine/ERW victims in 
Kinshasa, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), hold monthly peer-to-peer support 
meetings. Survivor networks, which often provide peer-to-peer and collective psychosocial 
support, struggled to maintain their operations with decreasing resources available. 
Many countries had improved sports and recreational activities for persons with disabilities, 
including families, such as wheelchair sports. However, access to cultural activities for victims 
and persons with disabilities on an equal basis with others was often lacking.
The following continuing needs for psychological and psychosocial support were 
identified in: 
  Afghanistan: provide psychosocial and psychological support, including peer 
support, in particular to new victims as well as those who have been traumatized 
and live in isolation; 
  Cambodia: improve the quality and availability of existing psychological support 
services; 
  Colombia: include peer support services under the health insurance system; 
  The DRC: improve the availability of psychosocial services significantly, especially 
outside Kinshasa; 
  Mozambique: prioritize assistance based on psychological and socioeconomic needs; 
  Nicaragua: dedicate resources to the implementation of psychosocial support 
programs; and
  Senegal: ensure the sustainability of psychosocial support in the Casamance region.
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INCLUSION
Socio-economic inclusion projects for mine victims through education, sports, leisure and 
cultural activities, vocational training, micro-credit, income generation, and employment 
330 “New ward provides hope for Gazans coping with gunshot wounds,” The Times of Israel, 5 March 2020, 
bit.ly/TimesOfIsrael5March2020. 
331 OPEC Fund for International Development, “Establishing a Special Rehabilitation Facility in Bethlehem,” 
3 August 2017, bit.ly/OPECBethlehem2017; and “ITF helps establish rehab centre for war victims in 
Bethlehem,” Slovenian Press Agency, 8 October 2019, bit.ly/BethlehemRehabCentre2019. 
332 ITF Enhancing Human Security, “Annual Report 2019,” 24 April 2020, p. 54, bit.ly/AnnualReportITF2019. 








was a reported priority need in all affected states. Employment, work training, livelihood 
incentives, and other economic opportunities continued to be areas with the greatest need 
for improvement.
There is a recognized need to increase economic opportunities for survivors and other 
persons with disabilities, as well as to develop education and training that are appropriate 
for victims and persons with disabilities who lack education and literacy, and have no work 
or land from which to make a living. 
One of the last remaining vocational training centers in Cambodia—the long-established 
Banteay Prieb Center near Phnom Penh, run by Jesuit Service Cambodia, which served an 
increasing range of persons with disabilities—stopped running due to the premises being 
reconstructed without consultation by the relevant authorities.
A lack of awareness of disability rights and inclusion principles among teachers and fellow 
pupils can lead to discrimination, isolation, and prevent child victims from participating fully 
in educational activities. National programs to promote inclusive education at all levels, 
as part of national education plans, policies and programs can contribute to the inclusion 
of child survivors and indirect child victims. In Afghanistan, an inclusive education policy 
was drafted, translated into national languages, and shared with the Ministry of Education 
for review and approval by its scientific and academic council. However, a government-
run national inclusive education program that increased the enrollment of children with 
disabilities in the country since 2008 lost core international funding in 2016, and Afghanistan 
reported that there were no continuing activities in 2019. 
PROTECTION OF MINE VICTIMS AND PERSONS WITH 
DISABILITIES IN SITUATIONS OF RISK, INCLUDING 
SITUATIONS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, HUMANITARIAN 
EMERGENCIES, AND NATURAL DISASTERS334
During times of armed conflict or occupation, humanitarian emergencies, and natural 
disasters, mine/ERW victims and other persons with disabilities can face extreme challenges 
and barriers to having their rights respected and fulfilled, as well as to accessing adequate 
and appropriate services. States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have committed to providing 
assistance to victims of these weapons, families of those killed or injured, and affected 
communities in accordance with relevant human rights laws. Those which are States Parties 
to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) also have an obligation, 
under Article 11, to ensure the protection and safety of persons with disabilities in situations 
of risk, including situations of armed conflict and humanitarian emergencies. 
In 2019–2020, several States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with new casualties and 
mine/ERW victims were in situations of armed conflict, including Afghanistan, Colombia, the 
DRC, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, 
and Yemen. In June 2019, the UN Security Council adopted its first text on the protection 
of persons with disabilities in conflict, Resolution 2475.335 Armed conflict and attacks 
on healthcare providers were increasingly concerning and impacted the availability of 
services in the affected countries.336 The Charter on Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities in 
Humanitarian Action was adopted at the World Humanitarian Summit in Turkey in May 2016. 
In November 2019, just prior to the Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference in Oslo, 
the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) released guidelines on the inclusion of persons 
with disabilities in humanitarian action, which include actions that humanitarian actors can 
take to effectively identify and respond to the needs and rights of persons with disabilities 
334 Oslo Action Plan, Action #40; and CRPD Article 11 – Situations of Risk and Humanitarian Emergencies.
335 UN, “Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2475 (2019), Ground-Breaking Text on Protection of 
Persons with Disabilities in Conflict,” 20 June 2019, un.org/press/en/2019/sc13851.doc.htm.
336 See, Health Care in Danger (HCID) website, healthcareindanger.org; See also, Safeguarding Health in 
Conflict website, www.safeguardinghealth.org.
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within humanitarian settings.337 The IASC Task Team on Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities 
in Humanitarian Action was established in 2016 to develop and adopt implementation 
guidelines by the end of 2018. The deadline was later extended to the end of 2019. Some 
mine survivors and their representative organizations were involved in pilot testing and 
regional feedback discussions during the development process.
Armed violence and conflict also directly impact victim assistance efforts. The CRPD 
committee experts reviewing Iraq’s reporting in September 2019 found that the challenges 
and consequences of “18 years of war, armed conflict and terrorism…had ravaged Iraq and…
had had a disproportionate impact on persons with disabilities.”338 The conflict in Syria has 
caused a massive displacement crisis. Refugee host countries, principally Mine Ban Treaty 
States Parties Turkey, Jordan, and Iraq, as well as Lebanon (a State Party to the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions), have received large numbers of persons fleeing Syria. Natural disasters 
during the period were also devastating. In 2019, floods in Mozambique severely affected 
persons with disabilities in remote and rural areas.
A number of international actors sought to improve the situation for children in 
humanitarian settings, citing Landmine Monitor casualty data and other sources on high 
numbers of child casualties resulting from mines/ERW.339 In 2019, the UN’s interagency 
Protection Standby Capacity Project (ProCap) launched a deployment in response to the 
impact of mines/ERW on children. The objectives were to improve interagency collaboration; 
reduce the rate and number of children killed and injured; increase the survival rates of 
child casualties, especially those seriously injured and in a critical state after the incident; 
and provide medium-term healthcare services to improve physical and mental health for 
child survivors, as well as social inclusion, including access to education.340 
337 IASC, “IASC Guidelines, Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities in Humanitarian Action, 2019,” 12 November 
2019, bit.ly/IASCDisabilityGuidelines2019. 
338 OHCHR, “Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities discusses the impact of the armed conflict 
on persons with disabilities in Iraq,” 11 September 2019, bit.ly/OHCHRIraqDisabilities2019. 
339 Global Protection Cluster, Child Protection Area of Responsibility, ‘‘Webinar: Mitigating the Impact of 
Explosive Ordnance on Children through Collaborative Humanitarian Action,’’ 11 June 2020, cpaor.net/
node/52441. 
340 Global Protection Cluster, Mine Action Area of Responsibility, ‘‘Mine Action and Global Humanitarian 

















































































MAG demining team head to work in Tal Afar, Iraq.














SUPPORT FOR  
MINE ACTION
INTRODUCTION
Article 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty on international cooperation and assistance recognizes the 
right of each State Party to seek and receive assistance from other States Parties in order to 
fulfill its treaty obligations. 
At the Oslo Review Conference, in November 2019, States Parties committed to complete 
their respective time-bound obligations by 2025 and to ensure sustainable and integrated 
support for victims. The Oslo Action Plan contains six action points, along with a series of 
specific indicators, aimed at tracking progress toward enhancing international cooperation 
and assistance. These indicators include, among others: the level of national funding; the 
provision of assistance by States Parties; regular reporting on challenges and needs for 
assistance; the existence of coordinating mechanisms; and the facilitation of dialogue and 
information exchange among affected states, the donor community, and other relevant 
stakeholders. A number of these points have been tracked by the Monitor in the past. 
Since 2010, international support totaled about US$5.2 billion, 10% of which was provided 
in 2019 with 35 donors contributing $561.3 million1 in support of mine action activities in 
41 affected states and other areas. As regards the provision of assistance by and to States 
Parties, in the last decade, a total of 33 States Parties reported contributing some $1.7 
billion in mine action support to 61 affected States Parties. In 2019 alone, 23 States Parties 
provided $207.7 million in mine action support to 29 States Parties, including $146.9 million 
to clearance and risk education activities (71% of the total) and $18.8 million to victim 
assistance (9%).2 This was the highest level of funding provided by and to States Parties 
in the 10-year period, and represented about two-fifths of total support provided in 2019. 
1 This figure represents reported government contributions under bilateral and international programs for 
calendar year 2019, as of October 2020. All dollar values presented in this chapter are expressed in current 
US dollars. Mine action support includes funding specifically related to landmines, cluster munitions, 
explosive remnants of war (ERW), and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) but is rarely disaggregated as 
such. State reporting on contributions is varied in the level of detail and some utilize a fiscal year rather 
than the calendar year.
2 The remaining 20% ($42 million) went to advocacy, capacity-building or stockpile destruction activities 
or was not disaggregated. 
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This is an indication of the shared commitment and collaborative spirit and partnership 
within the mine action community. However, cumulative numbers are just one aspect of 
the story. The distribution of support among affected states and territories, as well as the 
sustainability of the assistance, are also key factors.
Tracking national financial commitments by affected States Parties has proven more 
difficult as a result of under-reporting. Since 2010, the Monitor recorded a total of $1.4 
billion provided by affected states to their own mine action efforts.3 In 2019, only eight 
out of the 33 States Parties that have declared an identified threat of antipersonnel mine 
contamination (24%) reported making such financial contributions.4 National support has 
more than doubled from the 2018 estimated level, but it has remained below $100 million 
for four consecutive years. All affected states do not provide the same level of information 
regarding national resources allocated to mine action activities and some have never done so.
This chapter focuses on financial support for mine action provided for calendar year 2019 
by affected countries and international donors. While focused on financial contributions, it 
remains clear that cooperation and assistance is not only limited to financial assistance. 
Other forms of assistance can include the provision of equipment, expertise, and personnel, 
as well as the exchange of experience, know-how, best-practice sharing, and South-to-South 
or other bilateral and multilateral cooperation.
2019 FIGURES AND DEVELOPMENTS
TOTAL SUPPORT TO MINE ACTION
Thirty-five donors and 10 affected states reported contributing $650.7 million in international 
and national support for mine action in 2019; this is $48.8 million less than the 2018 total 
(a 7% decrease).
International contributions accounted for 86% of overall support for mine action in 2019, 
while states’ contributions to their own national mine action programs accounted for the 
remaining 14% of global funding.
INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS
The level of international support for mine action provided by donors declined from $642.6 
million in 2018 to $561.3 million in 2019; this is more than $81 million less (a 13% decrease) 
and continues the drop recorded in the preceding year when international support fell by 8%.
The majority of the funding came from just a few donors, with the top five donors—the 
United States (US), the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom (UK), Norway, and Germany—
contributing a total of $406.7 million, or 72% of all international funding for 2019.
The top five recipient states—Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Lao PDR, and Colombia—received a 
combined total of $276.5 million, representing half of all international contributions (49%).
International funding was distributed among the following sectors: clearance and risk 
education (56% of all funding), victim assistance (8%), capacity-building (1%), and advocacy 
(1%). The remaining 34% was either not disaggregated by the donors or unearmarked.
NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS
The Monitor identified 10 affected states that provided $89.4 million in contributions to 
their own national mine action programs, up $32.5 million (a 57% increase) from 2018 when 
eight affected countries reported contributing $56.9 million.
3 This figure includes support provided by affected States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and/or to the 
Convention on Cluster Munitions. 
4 In addition, two states not party, Lao PDR and Lebanon, reported contributing to their own mine action 














COVID-19 AND MINE ACTION INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT
The COVID-19 outbreak has presented the mine action community with a new set of 
unanticipated challenges in 2020. However, as of October 2020, it was too early for most 
donors to determine the impact of the pandemic on future mine action support levels and 
potential shifting of their budget priorities. 
There were very few reported instances of diversion of mine action funding to address 
COVID-19 related issues.5
INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN 2019
In 2019, 35 donors contributed a total of $561.3 million in international support for mine 
action in 38 affected states and three other areas—a decline of $81.3 million from the 
$642.6 million reported in 2018.6 
International support for mine action: 2010–2019*
Note: Totals not adjusted for inflation.
* The total amount of international support in 2016 was updated to include revised contributions from 
the Netherlands.
5 Denmark reassigned a United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) contribution for activities in Iraq 
to address COVID-19 issues while planned disbursement for Tetra Tech projects in Iraq and Syria were 
delayed. Email from Natascha Hassan Johns, Head of section, Denmark Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Ministry of Defence, 26 June 2020. In April 2020, the Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) Council of Ministers 
decided that EU funds initially allocated to mine action for 2018–2019 would be diverted to address 
COVID-19 and migration issues. As of June 2020, this was the only instance of diversion of EU funding 
identified. Email from Frank Meeussen, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Arms Export Control, 
European External Action Service (EEAS), 11 June 2020; and Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre 
(BHMAC); “Ten million EUR intended for humanitarian demining projects in BiH diverted to COVID-19 and 
migration issues,” 10 April 2020, www.bhmac.org/?p=6343. Finland proposed to its partner organizations 
to reallocate some mine action contributions to address COVID-19 issues. However as of July 2020, no 
such request had been made. Email from Anni Mäkeläinen, Desk Officer, Unit for Arms Control, Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs of Finland, 13 July 2020. No US Agency for International Development (USAID) funding was 
diverted to address COVID-19, with the exception that a few programs were working with the Ministry of 
Health to support the development of accessible communications while remaining within the scope of 
the initial activity of the contributions. Email from Kirsten Lentz, Senior Technical Advisor, Rehabilitation, 
Technical Support Contract, USAID, Empowerment & Inclusion Division, 16 June 2020.
6 Data for 2019 on international support to mine action is based on reviews of Mine Ban Treaty Article 
7 reports, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 reports, the ITF Enhancing Human Security Annual 

























This is the second year running that donors decreased their international mine action 
assistance, and the first time since 2016 that international support dropped below $600 
million. In 2019, international support fell more sharply (13%) than in 2018 (8%). However, 
it still represents the fourth-highest level of international support recorded by the Monitor.7
In 2019, the level of international mine action funding collectively provided by the 15 
largest donors decreased by $78.2 million.8 Despite this drop, they continued to provide 
most of international mine action funding ($538.8 million, 96% of all support).
DONORS 
In 2019, 27 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, three states not party, the EU, and four 
other institutions9 contributed a total of $561.3 million to mine action. 
In 2019, as in past years, a small group of donors continued to provide the majority of 
international mine action support. The five largest donors—the US, the EU, the UK, Norway, 
and Germany—accounted for approximately three-quarters (72%) of all international support 
with a combined total of $406.7 million. 
The US remained the largest mine action donor with $177.4 million and it alone provided 
more than a fifth (32%) of all international mine action support. The EU ranked second 
with $76 million, or 14% of all contributions. For the second consecutive year, the UK was 
the third largest donor with a total contribution of $71.7 million, representing 13% of all 
support. The next two donors—Norway and Germany—provided more than $35 million each.
Despite variations in the level of support provided, the proportion of total assistance 
from the top five donors has remained constant in recent years. Between 2015 and 2019, 
combined contributions from the five major donors ranged between 70–78% of all 
international support.
Proportion of international mine action assistance by donors: 2018—2019
Note: All figures are expressed in millions of US dollars.
Support from States Parties in 2019 accounted for more than half of all donor funding 
(54%), with 27 countries providing $301.4 million. This represents a 6% decrease from the 
$322 million contributed in 2018.
7 The Monitor maintains records of international support for mine action back to 1996, and national 
support back to 2002.
8 The 15 largest donors in 2018–2019 were: the US, the EU, the UK, Norway, Germany, Japan, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, France, and Italy. They contributed 
combined totals of $617 million in 2018 and $538.8 million in 2019.
9 The three states not party that reported contributions to mine action activities in 2019 were: Russia, 
South Korea, and the US. The four institutions were the Trust Fund for Peace and Security in Mali, the 
United Nations Association (UNA)-Sweden, the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund, and 
the UN Foundation. 
$177.4 $235.9$76.0 $71.7 $43.0$38.6
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Contributions by donors: 2015–201910
Donor
Contribution (US$ million)
2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 Total
US 177.4 201.7 320.6 152.4 159.3 1,011.4
EU 76.0 108.1 67.6 76.9 23.5 352.1
UK 71.7 58.1 26.7 24.9 15.4 196.8
Norway 43.0 47.7 39.2 31.7 22.3 183.9
Germany 38.6 42.5 84.4 37.3 15.2 218.0
Japan 36.9 37.2 32.5 40.7 49.3 196.6
Denmark 17.6 23.4 15.5 10.2 9.2 75.9
Netherlands 14.9 19.4 19.2 26.3 22.1 101.9
Switzerland 14.8 15.0 19.5 16.6 17.4 83.3
Australia 10.8 7.8 4.0 11.1 4.1 37.8
New Zealand 9.1 9.2 5.4 12.5 3.2 39.4
Sweden 8.8 18.6 5.2 6.5 6.1 45.2
Canada 8.7 11.3 10.9 13.3 10.8 55.0
France* 5.3 12.7 11.9 3.2 1.1 34.2
Italy 5.1 4.3 3.9 2.8 3.0 19.1
Belgium 4.3 3.3 0.9 2.9 0.3 11.7
Ireland 3.7 3.9 1.8 3.3 3.6 16.3
Finland** 3.4 3.2 3.3 0 5.5 15.4
Austria 2.0 1.8 1.2 1.1 0.02 6.1
South Korea 1.7 2.0 0.3 2.5 0.3 6.8
UN CERF 1.7 0 0 0 0 1.7
Luxembourg 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.6 7.0
UN Foundation 1.2 0 0 0 0 1.2
Russia 1.0 0 0 0 0 1.0
Slovenia 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 3.5
Other donors*** 1.3 9.4 20.3 5.9 2.5 39.4
Total 561.3 642.6 696.3 484.0 376.5 2,760.7
Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold. UN CERF=United Nations Central 
Emergency Response Fund.
* France 2019 total reflects contributions for which disaggregated data was provided; its actual 
contribution was likely higher (approximately €7 million/$7.8 million).
** Whereas Finland budgeted funding for mine action in 2016, payments could not be disbursed due 
to changes in its administration and the prolongation of the tender processes. No mine action funding 
was reported for that year, and the 2017 total included some of the funding initially budgeted for 2016.
*** Other donors in 2019 included: Andorra, Czech Republic, Estonia, Liechtenstein, Poland, Slovakia, 
Spain, Turkey, the Trust Fund for Peace and Security in Mali, and the United Nations Association (UNA)-
Sweden. 
10 The amount for each donor has been rounded to the nearest hundred thousand. The total amount of 
international support for 2016 was updated to include a contribution not previously reported by the 
Netherlands.
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Overall, nine donors contributed more in 2019 than they did in 2018, including a $13.6 
million increase from the UK (23%) and a $3 million increase from Australia (38%). The 
seven other donors increased their assistance by less than $1 million each. 
Six donors reported new funding in 2019: Russia, Slovakia, Turkey, the Trust Fund for 
Peace and Security in Mali, the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (UN CERF), 
and the UN Foundation.
In contrast, 20 donors decreased their funding, led by the EU (down $32.1 million, a 30% 
decrease) and Sweden (down $9.8 million, a 52% decrease). Additionally, four donors from 
2018 did not report any new contribution to mine action in 2019.
Summary of changes in 2019
Change Donors Combined Total (US$)
Increase of more than 20% Australia, Belgium, Slovenia, Spain, 
and the UK
$18 million increase
Increase of less than 20% Austria, Finland, Italy, and Poland $1.2 million increase
Decrease of more than 20% Andorra, Canada, Czech Rep., 
Denmark, the EU, Estonia, France, 
Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and UNA-Sweden
$62.1 million decrease
Decrease of less than 20% Germany, Ireland, Japan, South 
Korea, Luxembourg, New Zealand, 
Norway, Switzerland, and the US
$34.3 million decrease
New donors in 2019 Russia, Slovakia, Turkey, Trust Fund 
for Peace and Security in Mali, UN 
CERF, and UN Foundation
$4.8 million provided 
in 2019
Donors from 2018 that did 
not report new funding in 
2019
China, Cyprus, OCHA, and OPEC 
OFID
$8.9 million provided 
in 2018
Note: OCHA=Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; OPEC OFID=Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries Fund for International Development.
The opposite table summarizes the changes in mine action funding from the top 15 
donors, expressed in their respective national currencies and in US$ terms, and shows the 
impact of the exchange rates on the US dollar value 
of international contributions: 
In US dollar terms, mine action international 
support rose in three countries: Australia, Italy, and 
the UK. In national currency terms, increases were 
recorded in the same three countries but were 
slightly more pronounced. 
Consequently, whereas 12 states reported 
decreases in their mine action contributions in 2019, 
after conversion into US dollars, these reductions 
were greater in percentage terms for nine countries—
with the exception of Japan and New Zealand, where 
the decreases were reduced as a result of exchange 
rate variation. Deminers Kalthoum and Joumana in southern Lebanon. 














Changes in mine action funding in national currency terms and US$ 
terms11
Donors











Australia +A$5.1 +48% +3.0 +38%
UK +£12.7 +29% +13.6 +23%
Italy +€0.9 +25% +0.8 +18%
Switzerland -CHF0.008 -0.05% -0.2 -2%
Japan -¥88.8 -2% -0.3 -1%
Norway -NOK9.5 -2% -4.7 -10%
Germany -€1.5 -4% -3.9 -9%
New Zealand -NZ$0.5 -4% -0.1 -1%
US -US$24.3 -12% -24.3 -12%
Canada -C$2.0 -15% -2.6 -23%
Netherlands -€3.0 -19% -4.5 -23%
Denmark -DKK30.2 -20% -5.8 -25%
EU -€23.5 -26% -32.1 -30%
Sweden -SEK77.9 -48% -9.8 -53%
France -€6.0 -56% -7.4 -58%
FUNDING PATHS
Donors contributed to mine action through several trust fund mechanisms, notably the 
UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF) administered by the United 
Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and ITF Enhancing Human Security (established by 
the government of Slovenia and formerly known as the International Trust Fund).
In 2019, contributions through UNMAS totaled $72 million from 26 donors.12 Several 
small donors used the VTF to contribute to mine action.13 At least six donors allocated $4.1 
million in 2019 through the ITF for mine action programs.14
While donor funding is frequently used for national activities, implementation is often 
carried out by an array of partnering institutions, non-government organizations (NGOs), trust 
funds, and UN agencies. Organizations that received a significant proportion of contributions 
in 2019 included The HALO Trust ($54.1 million), Mines Advisory Group ($39.3 million), the 
International Committee of the Red Cross  ($31.9 million), Norwegian People’s Aid ($26.1 
million), DanChurchAid ($23.4 million), the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining ($12.8 million), Humanity & Inclusion ($12.4 million), and Danish Demining Group 
($11.8 million).
11 Average exchange rates for 2019: A$1=US$0.6952; C$1.3269=US$1; DKK6.6703=US$1; €1=US$1.1194; 
¥109.02=US$1; NZ$1=US$0.6591; NOK8.8001=US$1; SEK9.4604=US$1; CHF0.9937=US$1; and 
£1=US$1.2768. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 2 January 2020, www.federalreserve.
gov/releases/G5a/current/default.htm.
12 In 2019, Switzerland reported in-kind contributions valued at about $387,000 through UNMAS to support 
operations in Libya and Mali, as well as global activities. Switzerland Convention on Cluster Munitions 
Article 7 Report, Form I, 28 April 2020, bit.ly/SwitzerlandCCMArt7Report2020.
13 The small donors (total contribution under $1 million) included Andorra, Estonia, Liechtenstein, Poland, 
Slovakia, Spain, the Trust Fund for Peace and Security in Mali, and UNA-Sweden.
14 The six donors were: Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, South Korea, Turkey, and the US.
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RECIPIENTS 
A total of 38 states and three other areas received $522.6 million from 31 donors in 2019.15 A 
further $38.7 million, designated as “global” in the table below, was provided to institutions, 
NGOs, trust funds, and UN agencies without a designated recipient state or area.
As in previous years, a small number of countries received the majority of funding.16 The 
top five recipient states—Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Lao PDR, and Colombia—received $276.5 
million, or half of all international support in 2019. 
Since 2015, Iraq has been the largest recipient of mine action assistance. In 2019, the 
country received 17% of all international support from the largest number of donors (19). 
Ten states and one area, or 27% of all recipients, had only one donor.17
More than two-fifths of international support (41%, or $231.4 million) went to eight 
States Parties with massive contamination.18 Most of this funding, $157.5 million, went to 
clearance and risk education projects.









Iraq 95.7 Palestine 1.8
Afghanistan 59.0 Mali 1.5
Syria 42.5 Albania 1.0
Lao PDR 42.0 Serbia 1.0
Colombia 37.3 Palau 0.9
Croatia 27.7 Georgia 0.8
Cambodia 25.5 Chad 0.7
Libya 24.1 Somaliland 0.7
Ukraine 22.3 Thailand 0.6
Lebanon 20.0 Jordan 0.5
Vietnam 19.6 Montenegro 0.5
Yemen 16.1 Kosovo 0.5
Sri Lanka 15.0 Burkina Faso 0.4
Angola 11.1 Mauritania 0.3
Somalia 10.4 Nigeria 0.3
South Sudan 8.8 Western Sahara 0.2
Zimbabwe 7.9 Turkey 0.07
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) 6.9 Benin 0.06
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC)
6.9 Central African Republic (CAR) 0.02
Myanmar 6.3 Sub-total 522.6
Sudan 3.4 Global 38.7
Tajikistan 2.2 Total 561.3
15 An additional four donors only reported contributions to “global” activities (without a designated recipient 
state or area). These donors were: Andorra, Liechtenstein, UNA-Sweden, and UN Foundation.
16 Of the 10 countries receiving the most mine action funding in 2019, nine were in the top 10 in 2018. 
Ukraine ranked the ninth largest recipient of mine action support in 2019, replacing Vietnam which 
became the eleventh largest recipient. 
17 Recipients with one donor included: Albania, Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic (CAR), Croatia, 
Mauritania, Montenegro, Palau, Serbia, Turkey, and other area, Somaliland.
18 Massive contamination is defined by the Monitor as more than 100km². Recipients of international support 
with massive contamination included: Afghanistan, BiH, Cambodia, Croatia, Iraq, Thailand, Turkey, and Yemen.














In 2019, 27 states and areas experienced a change of more than 20% in funding compared 
to 2018, including 15 recipients receiving less support, and 12 recipients receiving more 
support. In addition, seven previous recipients received no new support: Guinea, the Marshall 
Islands, Nepal, the Philippines, Senegal, the Solomon Islands, and Tunisia. These fluctuations 
may reflect shifts in donor priorities and changes in local situations.
Cambodia and Ukraine were the recipients with the largest increases, receiving 
respectively $11 million and $10 million more than in 2018. These were the results of 
changes in donors’ contributions, in particular the EU, Japan, the UK, and the US. 
It is the second consecutive year that mine action funding channeled to Syria decreased, a 
fall of $24.2 million in 2019 (36%). The reduction in contribution to mine action activities in 
the country was the result of sharp decreases in funding from Germany and the US following 
their exceptional contributions in 2017 (combined increase of more than $67 million). The 
US has not reported providing new mine action funding to Syria since then, while funding 
from Germany fell from $13.9 million in 2017 to $4 million in 2019. Croatia was the recipient 
with the second largest drop in 2019, receiving $22.3 million less than in 2018 after the EU, 
its sole international donor, reduced its support to clearance activities by half. Both countries 
remained among the 10 largest recipients of mine action in 2019.
Summary of changes in 2019
Change Recipients Combined Total (US$)
Increase of more than 20% Angola, Cambodia, Lebanon, 
Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, 
Sri Lanka, Turkey, Ukraine, 
Vietnam, Yemen, and 
Zimbabwe
$55.1 million increase
Increase of less than 20% Colombia and Montenegro $4.2 million increase
Decrease of more than 20% Benin, CAR, Chad, Croatia, 
Georgia, Jordan, Palau, 
Palestine, Serbia, South Sudan, 
Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Kosovo, 
and Western Sahara, as well as 
“global”
$92.3 million decrease
Decrease of less than 20% Afghanistan, BiH, DRC, Iraq, 
Lao PDR, Libya, Somalia, and 
Somaliland
$43.7 million decrease
Recipients from 2018 
that did not receive new 
support in 2019
Guinea, Marshall Islands, 
Nepal, Philippines, Senegal, 
Solomon Islands, and Tunisia
$5.3 million received in 2018
New recipients in 2019 Burkina Faso and Mauritania $0.7 million received in 2019
FUNDING BY THEMATIC SECTOR
In 2019, 56% of mine action funding supported clearance and risk education activities, while 
support to victim assistance represented 8% of the total international support to mine action. 
“Various” funding represented 34% of all international support to mine action. This 
includes contributions not disaggregated by the donors, as well as funding not earmarked 
for any sectors.
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Contributions by thematic sector in 201919
Sector Total contribution(US$ million)
% of total 
contribution No. of donors
Clearance and risk education 312.3 56% 28
Various 192.0 34% 28
Victim assistance 43.1 8% 15
Capacity-building 7.4 1% 10
Advocacy 6.5 1% 13
Stockpile destruction* 0.002 < 1% 1
Total 561.3 100% N/A
Note: N/A=not applicable. 
*It is the first time since 2015 that a donor reported new dedicated stockpile destruction funding.
Clearance and risk education
In 2019, $312.3 million, or more than half of all reported support for mine action, went 
toward clearance and risk education activities. This represents a decrease of $84.6 million 
from 2018 (21%). The five largest donors—the US, the EU, the UK, Norway, and Germany—
provided more than three-quarters of all support to clearance and risk education ($238.9 
million).
Many donors reported clearance and risk education as a combined figure. Nineteen donors 
did, however, indicate contributions specifically for clearance activities, providing a total of 
$79.3 million in 25 affected countries and two other areas.20 
Seventeen donors reported contributions totaling $13.3 million specifically for risk 
education projects in 16 countries.21 Syria and Iraq received the most risk education-specific 
funding with a combined total of $7.7 million, more than half of all risk education dedicated 
support. 
Between 2015 and 2019, more than three-fifths of international support went to 
clearance and risk education activities (61%, or $1.7 billion). Risk education-specific funding 
represented just 3% of all dedicated support, totaling $43.3 million. 
Support from States Parties represented 52% of all dedicated clearance and risk education 
funding between 2015 and 2019; with more than $883 million provided.22  
19 In 2018, international support was distributed among the following sectors: clearance and risk education 
($396.9 million, or 62% of total international support), victim assistance ($44.7 million, or 7%), capacity-
building ($14 million, or 2%), advocacy ($4.4 million, or 1%), stockpile destruction ($0 million, or 0%), and 
various activities ($182.6 million, or 28%). 
20 States Parties recipients of international assistance for clearance were: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, 
BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Iraq, Palau, Palestine, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, 
Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. States not party that received international assistance for clearance were: 
Georgia, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Syria, and Vietnam. Other areas that received international 
assistance for clearance activities were: Kosovo and Somaliland.
21 Recipients of international assistance for risk education were: Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Chad, Iraq, 
Jordan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Palestine, Syria, Turkey, Ukraine, and Yemen.
22 In comparison, during the previous five-year period, from 2010–2014, support from States Parties to 
clearance and risk education activities totaled $966.8 million. This represented 56% of all clearance and 














Clearance and risk education dedicated international support: 2015–2019
Note: Figures at the top of each bar indicate dedicated clearance and risk education funding in US$ 
million and as a proportion of total international support.
Victim assistance
Based on information available as of October 2020, direct international support for victim 
assistance activities in 2019 totaled $43.1 million, a 4% decline from the 2018 level ($44.7 million). 
Fifteen23 donors reported contributing to victim assistance projects in 11 States Parties, 
five states not party, and two other areas.24 Twelve States Parties contributed a combined 
total of $28.4 million, representing 66% of all victim assistance funding in 2019.
Victim assistance dedicated international support: 2015–2019
23 Victim assistance donors included: Australia, Canada, the EU, Germany, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, 
Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, and the US. 
24 States Parties recipients of international assistance for victim assistance were: Afghanistan, Cambodia, 
Colombia, Iraq, Jordan, Mali, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen. States not party that 
received international assistance for victim assistance were: Georgia, Lao PDR, Libya, Myanmar, and Syria. 
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Note: Figures at the top of each bar indicate dedicated victim assistance funding in US$ million and as 
a proportion of total international support. 
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Most mine-affected countries did not receive any direct international support for victim 
assistance. As observed in 2018, a large part of the contributions from donors to victim 
assistance activities in 2019 were the result of support within the context of emergency 
operations in conflict-affected countries in the Middle East and Afghanistan. In 2019, nearly 
half of all victim assistance support (49%) went to just four countries—Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, 
and Yemen—receiving a combined total of $20.8 million. 
Approximately $6.6 million, representing 15% of all victim assistance funding, was 
provided to global activities (without a designated recipient state or area). The remaining 
36% went to victim assistance activities in 12 other countries and two other areas, including 
eight affected States Parties. 
As in previous years, a large number of States Parties in which there are significant 
numbers of victims did not receive any victim assistance support, or very little, whereas 
needs remained great and available resources were lacking. In 2019, 24 States Parties with 
significant numbers of victims did not receive such funding,25 while three States Parties with 
landmine survivors received less than $500,000.26
Funding for victim assistance activities remains especially difficult to track because 
many donors report that they provide support for victims through more general programs 
for development and for the rights of persons with disabilities, or are not able to provide 
specific details on dedicated victim assistance funding. However, this annual estimate still 
provides an informative picture of the global victim assistance funding situation. 
Advocacy and capacity-building
In 2019, just 1% of all reported support for mine action went toward advocacy activities 
($6.5 million).27 Of the 35 donors reporting international contributions to mine action, 13 
reported supporting advocacy activities.28
Advocacy and capacity-building dedicated international support:  
2015–2019
25 Albania, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Chad, DRC, Croatia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, 
Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, and 
Zimbabwe. 
26 Cambodia, Jordan, and Mali.
27 Advocacy activities generally include, but are not limited to: contributions to the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions and the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Units, the Gender Mine Action Programme 
(GMAP), the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), Geneva Call, and the ICBL-
CMC and its Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.
28 Advocacy donors in 2019 included: Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
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Note: Figures at the top of each bar indicate dedicated advocacy and capacity-building funding in US$ 














Ten donors collectively provided $7.4 million—1% of all international support—to support 
capacity-building activities in 16 countries.29
NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN 2019
Overall national contributions to mine action 
continue to be under-reported. Few States Parties 
report national funding in their annual Article 7 
reports. States Parties such as Iraq and Sri Lanka, as 
well as states not party India and Vietnam—all mine-
affected states with significant contamination and 
major clearance operations, usually conducted by the 
army—have never reported annual expenditures. 
In 2019, the Monitor identified that at least 10 
affected states provided a combined total of $89.4 
million in contributions to mine action from their 
national budget. This is $32.5 million more than the 
$56.9 million reported in 2018, and similar to the 
$98.3 million reported in 2017.
South Sudan and Yemen indicated that national 
support to their mine action programs has been 
limited to cover the running costs of their respective 
mine action authorities, but did not provide details 
on their levels of contribution.30 Senegal reported 
in its most recent Article 5 extension request that 
it contributed a total of $7.2 million between 2007–
2019 to the operational costs of its mine action 
program.31
FIVE-YEAR SUPPORT TO MINE ACTION  
2015–2019 
Over the past five years (2015–2019), total support to mine action amounted to $3.2 billion, 
an average of about $640 million per year. This is $88 million less than the total support 
provided in the previous five-year period from 2010–2014, constituting a 3% decrease.
Although data about national support remains incomplete, such support accounted for 
about 14% of total mine action funding between 2015–2019 and amounted to some $460 
million. International support totaled $2.8 billion, an average of $560 million per year, and 
represented 86% of all support.
Three donors—the US ($1 billion), the EU ($352 million), and Germany ($218 million)—
contributed $1.6 billion, or 57% of total international support. Four other donors—the UK, 
Japan, Norway, and the Netherlands—contributed more than $100 million each. Switzerland, 
Denmark, and Canada, also ranked among the top 10 mine action donors for the five-year 
period.
29 Recipients of international assistance for capacity-building activities were: Afghanistan, Benin, BiH, 
Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, Palestine, Somalia, South 
Sudan, Syria, and Ukraine.
30 South Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 March 2020, p. 65. ; and 
Yemen Mine Ban Treaty Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 8 August 2019, p. 9, bit.ly/
YemenRevisedExtRequest2019.  















Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban 
Treaty are indicated in bold.
* Lao PDR and Lebanon are States 
Parties to the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions.
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Support from States Parties accounted for exactly half of all international funding 
provided in 2015–2019, with a combined contribution of $1.4 billion.32 
Summary of contributions: 2015–2019
The overall decrease in total support provided in 2015–2019 compared to the previous 
five-year period was mostly driven by a 50% reduction in national support, which fell from 
a combined total of $930.6 million reported in 2010–2014 to $460.8 million in 2015–
2019. This drop was partly offset by the unusually large 2017 contributions from Germany 
and the US to support clearance efforts in Iraq and Syria (combined total increase of $204 
million). There was also an apparent impact from the series of pledging conferences held 
in 2016 to secure funding for mine action in some heavily affected countries as well as 
one-off extraordinary pledges announced around that time.33 This contributed to significant 
increases in support received by Colombia (up $111.2 million), Iraq (up $374.3 million), and 
Lao PDR (up $45 million). 
In 2015–2019, the 10 largest recipients of mine action assistance received the majority 
of available funding, approximately $1.9 billion; this represents on average more than two-
thirds (68%) of total international contributions. Of these 10 recipients, four came from the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, four from Asia-Pacific, one from the Americas, 
and one from Europe. The composition of this group of recipients remained relatively similar 
from one year to another, while there were some variations in the amount of contributions 
received by each of them from one year to the next. 
32 Thirty-one States Parties reported support for mine action contributions in 2015–2019: Andorra, 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the UK. 
33 In 2016, mine action donors reiterated their commitment to secure sufficient resources for mine action 
efforts in the coming years, notably through two pledging conferences in support of: Iraq (Washington, 
DC, July 2016) and Colombia (in New York City, September 2016). In 2016–2017, Canada, Germany, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, the UK, and the US announced significant increases in their funding to support 
mine action efforts. See, Monitor factsheet, “Extraordinary Pledges to Support Mine Action in 2016,” 22 
November 2016, bit.ly/2016PledgingConferences; and Landmine and Cluster Munition Blog, “Pledges of 
New Funding in Support of Humanitarian Mine Action,” 13 April 2017, bit.ly/MBT2017Pledgeblog.











































% change from the 
previous five-year 
period
Iraq 549.1 174.8 +214%
Afghanistan 282.0 370.8 -24%
Syria 232.0 6.2 +3,642%
Lao PDR* 200.0 155.0 +29%
Colombia 178.2 67.0 +166%
Croatia 141.3 59.8 +136%
Cambodia 113.3 140.7 -20%
Libya 92.4 66.0 +40%
Lebanon* 68.6 78.8 -13%
Vietnam 67.7 40.3 +68%
Total 1,924.6 1,159.4 +66%
Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold.






















ICBL Ambassador Tun Channareth calling on States Parties to stay committed to the 2025 
completion goal during the Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Norway. 















STATUS OF THE 
CONVENTION
1997 CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, 
STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF  
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION  
(1997 MINE BAN TREATY)
Under Article 15, the treaty was open for signature from 3 December 1997 until its entry into 
force, which was 1 March 1999. On the following list, the first date is signature; the second 
date is ratification. Now that the treaty has entered into force, states may no longer sign; 
rather, they may become bound without signature through a one-step procedure known as 
accession. According to Article 16 (2), the treaty is open for accession by any state that has 
not signed. Accession is indicated below with (a) and succession is indicated below with (s). 
As of 31 October 2020 there were 164 States Parties.  
STATES PARTIES
Afghanistan 11 Sep 02 (a) 
Albania 8 Sep 98; 29 Feb 00 
Algeria 3 Dec 97; 9 Oct 01 
Andorra 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98 
Angola 4 Dec 97; 5 Jul 02 
Antigua and Barbuda 3 Dec 97;  
  3 May 99 
Argentina 4 Dec 97; 14 Sep 99 
Australia 3 Dec 97; 14 Jan 99 
Austria 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98 
Bahamas 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98 
Bangladesh 7 May 98; 6 Sep 00 
Barbados 3 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99 
Belarus 3 Sep 03 (a) 
Belgium 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98 
Belize 27 Feb 98; 23 Apr 98 
Benin 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 98 
Bhutan 18 Aug 05 (a) 
Bolivia 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 98 
Botswana 3 Dec 97; 1 Mar 00 
Brazil 3 Dec 97; 30 Apr 99 
Brunei Darussalam 4 Dec 97; 24 Apr 06 
Bulgaria 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98 
Burkina Faso 3 Dec 97; 16 Sep 98 
Burundi 3 Dec 97; 22 Oct 03 
Cambodia 3 Dec 97; 28 Jul 99 
Cameroon 3 Dec 97; 19 Sep 02 
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Canada 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97 
Cape Verde 4 Dec 97; 14 May 01 
Central African Republic 8 Nov 02 (a) 
Chad 6 Jul 98; 6 May 99 
Chile 3 Dec 97; 10 Sep 01 
Colombia 3 Dec 97; 6 Sep 00 
Comoros 19 Sep 02 (a)
Congo, Rep 4 May 01 (a) 
Cook Islands 3 Dec 97; 15 Mar 06
Costa Rica 3 Dec 97; 17 Mar 99 
Côte d’Ivoire 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00 
Croatia 4 Dec 97; 20 May 98 
Cyprus 4 Dec 97; 17 Jan 03 
Czech Republic 3 Dec 97; 26 Oct 99
Dem Rep of Congo 2 May 02 (a)
Denmark 4 Dec 97; 8 Jun 98 
Djibouti 3 Dec 97; 18 May 98 
Dominica 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99 
Dominican Republic 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00 
Ecuador 4 Dec 97; 29 Apr 99 
El Salvador 4 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99 
Equatorial Guinea 16 Sep 98 (a) 
Eritrea 27 Aug 01 (a) 
Estonia 12 May 04 (a)
Eswatini 4 Dec 97; 22 Dec 98 
Ethiopia 3 Dec 97; 17 Dec 04
Fiji 3 Dec 97; 10 Jun 98
Finland 9 Jan 12 (a) 
France 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98 
Gabon 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00 
Gambia 4 Dec 97; 23 Sep 02 
Germany 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98 
Ghana 4 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00 
Greece 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 03 
Grenada 3 Dec 97; 19 Aug 98 
Guatemala 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99 
Guinea 4 Dec 97; 8 Oct 98 
Guinea-Bissau 3 Dec 97; 22 May 01 
Guyana 4 Dec 97; 5 Aug 03 
Haiti 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 06 
Holy See 4 Dec 97; 17 Feb 98 
Honduras 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98 
Hungary 3 Dec 97; 6 Apr 98 
Iceland 4 Dec 97; 5 May 99 
Indonesia 4 Dec 97; 16 Feb 07
Iraq 15 Aug 07 (a)
Ireland 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97 
Italy 3 Dec 97; 23 Apr 99 
Jamaica 3 Dec 97; 17 Jul 98 
Japan 3 Dec 97; 30 Sep 98 
Jordan 11 Aug 98; 13 Nov 98 
Kenya 5 Dec 97; 23 Jan 01 
Kiribati 7 Sep 00 (a) 
Kuwait 30 Jul 07 (a)
Latvia 1 Jul 05 (a)
Lesotho 4 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98 
Liberia 23 Dec 99 (a) 
Liechtenstein 3 Dec 97; 5 Oct 99 
Lithuania 26 Feb 99; 12 May 03 
Luxembourg 4 Dec 97; 14 Jun 99 
Macedonia, North 9 Sep 98 (a) 
Madagascar 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 99 
Malawi 4 Dec 97; 13 Aug 98 
Malaysia 3 Dec 97; 22 Apr 99 
Maldives 1 Oct 98; 7 Sep 00 
Mali 3 Dec 97; 2 Jun 98 
Malta 4 Dec 97; 7 May 01 
Mauritania 3 Dec 97; 21 Jul 00 
Mauritius 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97 
Mexico 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98 
Moldova 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00 
Monaco 4 Dec 97; 17 Nov 98 
Montenegro 23 Oct 06 (s)
Mozambique 3 Dec 97; 25 Aug 98 
Namibia 3 Dec 97; 21 Sep 98 
Nauru 7 Aug 00 (a) 
Netherlands 3 Dec 97; 12 Apr 99 
New Zealand 3 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99 
Nicaragua 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98 
Niger 4 Dec 97; 23 Mar 99 
Nigeria 27 Sep 01 (a) 
Niue 3 Dec 97; 15 Apr 98
North Macedonia 9 Sep 98 (a) 
Norway 3 Dec 97; 9 Jul 98 
Oman 20 Aug 14 (a)
Palau 18 Nov 07 (a)
Palestine 29 Dec 2017 (a)
Panama 4 Dec 97; 7 Oct 98 
Papua New Guinea 28 Jun 04 (a) 
Paraguay 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 98 
Peru 3 Dec 97; 17 Jun 98 
Philippines 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 00
Poland 4 Dec 97; 27 Dec 12 
Portugal 3 Dec 97; 19 Feb 99 
Qatar 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 98 















Rwanda 3 Dec 97; 8 Jun 00 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 3 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98 
Saint Lucia 3 Dec 97; 13 Apr 99 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 3 Dec 97; 
   1 Aug 01 
Samoa 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98 
San Marino 3 Dec 97; 18 Mar 98 
São Tomé & Príncipe 30 Apr 98; 31 Mar 03 
Senegal 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98 
Serbia 18 Sep 03 (a) 
Seychelles 4 Dec 97; 2 Jun 00 
Sierra Leone 29 Jul 98; 25 Apr 01 
Slovak Republic 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99 
Slovenia 3 Dec 97; 27 Oct 98 
Solomon Islands 4 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99
Somalia 16 Apr 12 (a) 
South Africa 3 Dec 97; 26 Jun 98 
South Sudan 11 Nov 11 (s)
Spain 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 99 
Sri Lanka 13 Dec 2017 (a)
Sudan 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 03 
Suriname 4 Dec 97; 23 May 02 
 
Sweden 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98
Switzerland 3 Dec 97; 24 Mar 98 
Tajikistan 12 Oct 99 (a) 
Tanzania 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 00 
Thailand 3 Dec 97; 27 Nov 98 
Timor-Leste 7 May 03 (a) 
Togo 4 Dec 97; 9 Mar 00 
Trinidad and Tobago 4 Dec 97; 27 Apr 98 
Tunisia 4 Dec 97; 9 Jul 99 
Turkey 25 Sep 03 (a) 
Turkmenistan 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 98 
Tuvalu 13 Sep 2011 (a)
Uganda 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99 
Ukraine 24 Feb 99; 27 Dec 05
United Kingdom 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98 
Uruguay 3 Dec 97; 7 Jun 01 
Vanuatu 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 05
Venezuela 3 Dec 97; 14 Apr 99 
Yemen 4 Dec 97; 1 Sep 98 
Zambia 12 Dec 97; 23 Feb 01 
Zimbabwe 3 Dec 97; 18 Jun 98
SIGNATORY





































CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, 
STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF  
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION
PREAMBLE
The States Parties
Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel 
mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless 
civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, 
inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe 
consequences for years after emplacement,
Believing it necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated 
manner to face the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the 
world, and to assure their destruction, 
Wishing to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, 
including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims,
Recognizing that a total ban of anti-personnel mines would also be an important 
confidence-building measure,
Welcoming the adoption of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, 
Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be 
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and calling for the 
early ratification of this Protocol by all States which have not yet done so,
Welcoming also United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 S of 10 December 
1996 urging all States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international 
agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines, 
Welcoming furthermore the measures taken over the past years, both unilaterally and 
multilaterally, aiming at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production 
and transfer of anti-personnel mines,
Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced 
by the call for a total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts to that end 
undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International 
Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-governmental organizations around 
the world, 
Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996 and the Brussels Declaration of 27 
June 1997 urging the international community to negotiate an international and legally 
binding agreement prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel 
mines, 
Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, 
and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization in all 
relevant fora including, inter alia, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, 
regional organizations, and groupings, and review conferences of the Convention on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be 















Basing themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of 
the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, on 
the principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and 
materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering and on the principle that a distinction must be made between civilians and 
combatants, 
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1
General obligations
1.  Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:
a) To use anti-personnel mines;
b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly 
or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;
c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited 
to a State Party under this Convention.
2.  Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel 
mines in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.
ARTICLE 2
Definitions
1.  “Anti-personnel mine” means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity 
or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines 
designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to 
a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel 
mines as a result of being so equipped.
2.  “Mine” means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other 
surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a 
vehicle.
3.  “Anti-handling device” means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, 
linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is 
made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine. 
4.  “Transfer” involves, in addition to the physical movement of anti-personnel mines into 
or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does not 
involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced anti-personnel mines.




1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 1, the retention or transfer of a 
number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine 
clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted. The amount of such mines shall not 
exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.
2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of destruction is permitted.
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ARTICLE 4
Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines
Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the 
destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its 
jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into 
force of this Convention for that State Party.
ARTICLE 5
Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas
1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel 
mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than 
ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.
2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or 
control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall 
ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction 
or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to 
ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein 
have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol 
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as 
amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or 
to Have Indiscriminate Effects. 
3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of 
all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit 
a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the 
deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to 
ten years.
4. Each request shall contain:
 a) The duration of the proposed extension;
  b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:
   (i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programs;
   (ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of 
all the anti-personnel mines; and 
   (iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-
personnel mines in mined areas; 
  c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; 
and
  d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension. 
5.  The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration 
the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of 
States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.
6.  Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance 
with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State 
Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the 
















International cooperation and assistance
1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek 
and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible.
2.  Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the 
fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information 
concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose 
undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological 
information for humanitarian purposes.
3.   Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and 
rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness 
programs. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, 
international, regional or national organizations or institutions, the International Committee 
of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International 
Federation, non-governmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis.
4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for mine clearance 
and related activities. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United 
Nations system, international or regional organizations or institutions, non-governmental 
organizations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis, or by contributing to the United Nations 
Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, or other regional funds that deal with 
demining. 
5.  Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of 
stockpiled anti- personnel mines.
6.  Each State Party undertakes to provide information to the database on mine clearance 
established within the United Nations system, especially information concerning various 
means and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of experts, expert agencies or national 
points of contact on mine clearance. 
7.  States Parties may request the United Nations, regional organizations, other States Parties 
or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental fora to assist its authorities in 
the elaboration of a national demining program to determine, inter alia:
  a) The extent and scope of the anti-personnel mine problem;
  b) The financial, technological and human resources that are required for the implementa-
tion of the program;
  c) The estimated number of years necessary to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined 
areas under the jurisdiction or control of the concerned State Party;
  d) Mine awareness activities to reduce the incidence of mine-related injuries or deaths;
 e) Assistance to mine victims;
  f) The relationship between the Government of the concerned State Party and the relevant 
governmental, inter-governmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the 
implementation of the program. 
8. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall 





1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon 
as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this 
Convention for that State Party on:
  a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9;
  b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it, or under its 
jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot 
numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;
  c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to 
contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail 
as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each 
mined area and when they were emplaced;
  d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines retained 
or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or 
mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the 
institutions authorized by a State Party to retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in ac-
cordance with Article 3; 
  e) The status of programs for the conversion or de-commissioning of anti-personnel mine 
production facilities;
  f) The status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with 
Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which will be used in destruction, the 
location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to 
be observed; 
  g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed after the entry into force 
of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type 
of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along 
with, if possible, the lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine in the case of destruc-
tion in accordance with Article 4;
  h) The technical characteristics of each type of anti-personnel mine produced, to the 
extent known, and those currently owned or possessed by a State Party, giving, where 
reasonably possible, such categories of information as may facilitate identification and 
clearance of anti-personnel mines; at a minimum, this information shall include the 
dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other 
information which may facilitate mine clearance; and
  i) The measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population in 
relation to all areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5.
2. The information provided in accordance with this Article shall be updated by the States 
Parties annually, covering the last calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations not later than 30 April of each year. 
3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports received to 
the States Parties.
ARTICLE 8
Facilitation and clarification of compliance
1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the 
implementation of the provisions of this Convention, and to work together in a spirit of 
















2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to 
compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, 
through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter 
to that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by all appropriate information. 
Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken 
to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all 
information which would assist in clarifying this matter.
3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be 
unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the 
next Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the 
submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, 
to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requested State Party which 
shall have the right to respond. 
4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States Parties, any of the States Parties 
concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her 
good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.
5. The requesting State Party may propose through the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations the convening of a Special Meeting of the States Parties to consider the matter. The 
Secretary-General of the United Nations shall thereupon communicate this proposal and all 
information submitted by the States Parties concerned, to all States Parties with a request that 
they indicate whether they favour a Special Meeting of the States Parties, for the purpose of 
considering the matter. In the event that within 14 days from the date of such communication, 
at least one-third of the States Parties favours such a Special Meeting, the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations shall convene this Special Meeting of the States Parties within a further 
14 days. A quorum for this Meeting shall consist of a majority of States Parties.
6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties, as the case 
may be, shall first determine whether to consider the matter further, taking into account all 
information submitted by the States Parties concerned. The Meeting of the States Parties 
or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach a decision by 
consensus. If despite all efforts to that end no agreement has been reached, it shall take this 
decision by a majority of States Parties present and voting.
7. All States Parties shall cooperate fully with the Meeting of the States Parties or the 
Special Meeting of the States Parties in the fulfilment of its review of the matter, including 
any fact-finding missions that are authorized in accordance with paragraph 8.
8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting 
of the States Parties shall authorize a fact-finding mission and decide on its mandate by a 
majority of States Parties present and voting. At any time the requested State Party may invite 
a fact-finding mission to its territory. Such a mission shall take place without a decision by a 
Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties to authorize such a 
mission. The mission, consisting of up to 9 experts, designated and approved in accordance 
with paragraphs 9 and 10, may collect additional information on the spot or in other places 
directly related to the alleged compliance issue under the jurisdiction or control of the 
requested State Party.
9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare and update a list of the 
names, nationalities and other relevant data of qualified experts provided by States Parties 
and communicate it to all States Parties. Any expert included on this list shall be regarded 
as designated for all fact-finding missions unless a State Party declares its non-acceptance 
in writing. In the event of non-acceptance, the expert shall not participate in fact- finding 
missions on the territory or any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the objecting 
State Party, if the non-acceptance was declared prior to the appointment of the expert to 
such missions.
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10. Upon receiving a request from the Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of 
the States Parties, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, after consultations with 
the requested State Party, appoint the members of the mission, including its leader. Nationals 
of States Parties requesting the fact-finding mission or directly affected by it shall not be 
appointed to the mission. The members of the fact-finding mission shall enjoy privileges 
and immunities under Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
United Nations, adopted on 13 February 1946.
11. Upon at least 72 hours notice, the members of the fact-finding mission shall arrive in the 
territory of the requested State Party at the earliest opportunity. The requested State Party 
shall take the necessary administrative measures to receive, transport and accommodate the 
mission, and shall be responsible for ensuring the security of the mission to the maximum 
extent possible while they are on territory under its control.
12. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of the requested State Party, the fact-finding 
mission may bring into the territory of the requested State Party the necessary equipment 
which shall be used exclusively for gathering information on the alleged compliance issue. 
Prior to its arrival, the mission will advise the requested State Party of the equipment that it 
intends to utilize in the course of its fact-finding mission.
13. The requested State Party shall make all efforts to ensure that the fact-finding mission 
is given the opportunity to speak with all relevant persons who may be able to provide 
information related to the alleged compliance issue.
14. The requested State Party shall grant access for the fact-finding mission to all areas 
and installations under its control where facts relevant to the compliance issue could be 
expected to be collected. This shall be subject to any arrangements that the requested State 
Party considers necessary for:
  a) The protection of sensitive equipment, information and areas;
  b) The protection of any constitutional obligations the requested State Party may have 
with regard to proprietary rights, searches and seizures, or other constitutional rights; or
  c) The physical protection and safety of the members of the fact-finding mission.
In the event that the requested State Party makes such arrangements, it shall make every 
reasonable effort to demonstrate through alternative means its compliance with this Convention. 
15. The fact-finding mission may remain in the territory of the State Party concerned for no 
more than 14 days, and at any particular site no more than 7 days, unless otherwise agreed.
16. All information provided in confidence and not related to the subject matter of the fact-
finding mission shall be treated on a confidential basis.
17. The fact-finding mission shall report, through the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, to the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties the 
results of its findings. 
18. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall consider 
all relevant information, including the report submitted by the fact-finding mission, and may 
request the requested State Party to take measures to address the compliance issue within a 
specified period of time. The requested State Party shall report on all measures taken in response 
to this request.
19. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may 
suggest to the States Parties concerned ways and means to further clarify or resolve the 
matter under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity 
with international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is determined to be due 
to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of the States 
Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, 
including the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 6.
20. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall 
make every effort to reach its decisions referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 by consensus, 

















Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including 
the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State 




1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperate with each other to settle any dispute that 
may arise with regard to the application or the interpretation of this Convention. Each State 
Party may bring any such dispute before the Meeting of the States Parties.
2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by 
whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the 
States parties to a dispute to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending 
a time-limit for any agreed procedure.
3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of this Convention on facilitation and 
clarification of compliance.
ARTICLE 11
Meetings of the States Parties
1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with regard to the 
application or implementation of this Convention, including:
 a) The operation and status of this Convention;
  b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention; 
  c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6;
  d) The development of technologies to clear anti- 
personnel mines;
  e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; and
  f) Decisions relating to submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5.
2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations within one year after the entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent 
meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until 
the first Review Conference. 
3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
shall convene a Special Meeting of the States Parties.
4. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant 
international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to 
attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure. 
ARTICLE 12
Review Conferences
1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be 
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convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States 
Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five 
years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.
2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:
  a) To review the operation and status of this Convention;
  b) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of the States Par-
ties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11; 
  c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5; and
  d) To adopt, if necessary, in its final report conclusions related to the implementation of 
this Convention.
3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant 
international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited 




1. At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any State Party may propose 
amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated 
to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views 
on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a 
majority of the States Parties notify the Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation 
that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Depositary shall convene an 
Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.
2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant 
international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited 
to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of 
Procedure.
3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the States 
Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held 
earlier.
4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of 
the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall 
communicate any amendment so adopted to the States Parties.
5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for all States Parties to this 
Convention which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments 
of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any 
remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.
ARTICLE 14 
Costs
1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Special Meetings of the States 
Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the 
States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance 















2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 
and the costs of any fact-finding mission shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance 
with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
ARTICLE 15
Signature
This Convention, done at Oslo, Norway, on 18 September 1997, shall be open for signature 
at Ottawa, Canada, by all States from 3 December 1997 until 4 December 1997, and at the 
United Nations Headquarters in New York from 5 December 1997 until its entry into force.
ARTICLE 16
Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the Signatories.
2. It shall be open for accession by any State which has not signed the Convention.
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with 
the Depositary. 
ARTICLE 17
Entry into force 
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month 
in which the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been 
deposited.
2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth 
month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession.
ARTICLE 18
Provisional application
Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that 




The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.
ARTICLE 20
Duration and withdrawal
1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw 
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from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the 
Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall 
include a full explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal.
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument 
of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six- month period, the 
withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect 
before the end of the armed conflict.
4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the 








The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and 
Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations.

